A timely and accurate analysis of what went wrong and how.
Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War - By Stephen M. Walt | Foreign Policy
In addition to Stephen Walt's list, I also think there were two big problems revealed by the Iraq war from the occupation in 2003 onwards:
(1) Resourcing - there were simply never enough ground forces in-country to truly enforce order, both in the Sunni West and in the Shia South. One significant difference between the supposed neocon model of Europe in 1945 and the reality of Iraq in 2003 was (A) most (sadly not all) Europeans wanted the Allies to come in and remove the Nazis in 1945 and (B) the Allies had destroyed the Wehrmacht, and then occupied Germany and Austria with overwhelming numbers of troops. The German werewolf threat never materialised. Whereas in Iraq, few Iraqis wanted the Coalition there and then, undefeated, disgruntled Iraqi Army personnel and foreign fighters helped to form the Sunni insurgency, which quickly started attacking Coalition Forces and Shia sites and then the Shia militias arose as well to defend their own and to effectively seize power. Chaos throughout 2003 and 2004 allowed the sectarian fissure to become a full-on civil war. By 2006, Baghdad and western Iraq were sectarian battlegrounds.
(2) Leaders -- sadly, the pro-consuls sent to Iraq in 2003-2004 were not brilliant. Paul Bremer was not Douglas MacArthur. The Bremer decision to disband the Iraqi Army and dismiss from Government service all of the Iraqis who had kept it running, was an act of insanity. Most of the Coalition's senior commanders and officials had no deep knowledge of Iraqi or even Arab culture. I suspect this is because the most knowledgeable diplomats were against the war and because the most experienced strategist-soldiers (eg GEN Anthony Zinni) had retired. It is difficult to believe that the Allied occupation forces in 1944-1945 were as poorly prepared as the Coalition commanders were to take charge of an Arab and Islamic country.
There was also a moral problem that should be discussed as well alongside any lessons. In 2003-2004, there was conduct at Abu Ghraib prison that disgraced the US military and from which the Coalition Forces never subsequently recovered. Even now it is shocking. From then on, whatever residual goodwill may have existed among locals for the Coalition was gone. That conduct arose, in part, from a determination on the part of some, after 9/11, to dehumanise any enemies and treat suspected members of the Iraqi insurgency as ripe for acts of bestial cruelty and perversion. That conduct was possible in part because the military is a reflection of society and, since the 1960s, traditional moral values in western societies have on any viewed eroded. It is impossible to believe that in WWI or WWII there was any requirement to train young troops in how to treat captured prisoners, at least in terms of not committing acts of perversion on them. In 2003, it was, it seems, sadly necessary. If ever there was a lesson in what happens when a military does not teach and enforce basic Judeo-Christian morality among its own ranks, then this was it. Sadly, one unit's feral behaviour cast a pall over the honourable and decent conduct of others who served in Iraq. All of the officers in that unit's chain of command should have been held accountable, not just the junior enlisted personnel.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Monday, March 19, 2012
1848: History
Robert D. Kaplan is one of my favourite writers and kudos to Stratfor for hiring him. He writes below of the challenge posed to the Middle East's fragile order by the West's renewed push for democracy.
One of the ongoing problems of the post-11 September 2001 world is that, in order to fight Sunni jihadists, it somehow became necessary that everywhere in the Middle East be made into a secular democracy. The rationale for this was never explained by the Bush Administration and the proposition was, sadly, never challenged by sufficient numbers of conservative Americans, custodians of the realpolitik tradition. As a result, the years since 2001 have been seen, inter alia, the US and its allies attempt to remediate Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and now Syria. At the same time, even allies hosting US facilities like Bahrain have been pressured to give more ground to dissentients even ones allied to Iran. However this toppling of previously friendly or at least benign Arab regimes has come at a cost - to locals, to Arab women and to Arab Christians. No one seems to have thought ahead and asked "what comes next"? It is almost as if no lesson was learned from the Iraq debacle. At no stage has the national interest test been passed whereby any Western country can say its security has been improved because, say, Mubarak has been toppled and now a military council (requiring Islamist backing) is in charge.
"While there is no equivalent in the Middle East of the Habsburg system, not every dictatorial regime in the Arab world is expendable for some of the same reasons that Habsburg Austria's was not. That is the burdensome reality of the Middle East today: If conservative -- even reactionary -- orders are necessary for inter-communal peace, then they may survive in one form or another, or at least resurface in places such as Egypt and Iraq."
Read more: 1848: History's Shadow Over the Middle East, by Robert D. Kaplan | Stratfor
1848: History
I should add, meanwhile, that while the US is expending billions to somehow perfect the Middle East, the US is borrowing the money from China ... what sense is there in such a policy?
One of the ongoing problems of the post-11 September 2001 world is that, in order to fight Sunni jihadists, it somehow became necessary that everywhere in the Middle East be made into a secular democracy. The rationale for this was never explained by the Bush Administration and the proposition was, sadly, never challenged by sufficient numbers of conservative Americans, custodians of the realpolitik tradition. As a result, the years since 2001 have been seen, inter alia, the US and its allies attempt to remediate Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and now Syria. At the same time, even allies hosting US facilities like Bahrain have been pressured to give more ground to dissentients even ones allied to Iran. However this toppling of previously friendly or at least benign Arab regimes has come at a cost - to locals, to Arab women and to Arab Christians. No one seems to have thought ahead and asked "what comes next"? It is almost as if no lesson was learned from the Iraq debacle. At no stage has the national interest test been passed whereby any Western country can say its security has been improved because, say, Mubarak has been toppled and now a military council (requiring Islamist backing) is in charge.
"While there is no equivalent in the Middle East of the Habsburg system, not every dictatorial regime in the Arab world is expendable for some of the same reasons that Habsburg Austria's was not. That is the burdensome reality of the Middle East today: If conservative -- even reactionary -- orders are necessary for inter-communal peace, then they may survive in one form or another, or at least resurface in places such as Egypt and Iraq."
Read more: 1848: History's Shadow Over the Middle East, by Robert D. Kaplan | Stratfor
1848: History
I should add, meanwhile, that while the US is expending billions to somehow perfect the Middle East, the US is borrowing the money from China ... what sense is there in such a policy?
Obama's war
This happened in Australia as well, where the ALP championed Afghanistan as the "good war" and Iraq as the "bad war", ignoring the strategic reality that Iraq is an important country for a host of strategic and demographic reasons and Afghanistan is ... not. This is quite apart from Afghanistan's status as the graveyard of empires. But the Left needed its war, too, and this one came with a nation-building, missionary aspect that would warm the hearts of liberals who wanted to let the oppressed go free and all that. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, there is a clash of medieval cultures (Pashtu, Tajik, Hazara) and the resolution of these, unless it leads to terrorist sanctuaries, is any problem of Australia (or the United States') to solve.
The saddest aspect is that President Obama could, in 2009, have ordered a thorough reassessment of Afghanistan, not just how the war was being fought but what the point of the war was, but he chose not to. History will probably record VP Biden's internal criticism of the Afghan war as prescient but sadly the criticism should have been being made in 2006-2007 when it was clear that the TB was resurgent in southern Afghanistan.
The key passage here:
"Furthermore, Iraq was always a more solvable problem than Afghanistan for demographic and historical reasons. Compared to Afghanistan's multifarious ethnic and religious groups, Iraq is quite cohesive, with only three major ethnic groups and two languages. While Iraq experienced four years of war from 2003 to 2007, and although Saddam Hussein's regime was vicious, war-torn and bloody, Iraq was a stable paradise compared to the thirty years of near anarchy and constant warfare Afghanistan has seen since the Soviet invasion."
RealClearWorld - Come What May, Obama Owns Afghanistan
The saddest aspect is that President Obama could, in 2009, have ordered a thorough reassessment of Afghanistan, not just how the war was being fought but what the point of the war was, but he chose not to. History will probably record VP Biden's internal criticism of the Afghan war as prescient but sadly the criticism should have been being made in 2006-2007 when it was clear that the TB was resurgent in southern Afghanistan.
The key passage here:
"Furthermore, Iraq was always a more solvable problem than Afghanistan for demographic and historical reasons. Compared to Afghanistan's multifarious ethnic and religious groups, Iraq is quite cohesive, with only three major ethnic groups and two languages. While Iraq experienced four years of war from 2003 to 2007, and although Saddam Hussein's regime was vicious, war-torn and bloody, Iraq was a stable paradise compared to the thirty years of near anarchy and constant warfare Afghanistan has seen since the Soviet invasion."
RealClearWorld - Come What May, Obama Owns Afghanistan
Monday, March 12, 2012
Syria - will we be smart or dumb?
Great summary of the problem and the options in Syria. Miller ends with this:
"We should stop beating ourselves up for once. Given the complexity of the problem, other pressing priorities, our interests, and the potential costs of an intervention, the administration is doing what it can. Chances are the longer the killing goes on, the more likely we be will dragged into doing more. But the notion that we should intercede quickly with some dramatic, ill-advised, poorly thought through idea of kill zones or safe havens without thinking through the consequences of what protecting those areas would entail is a prescription for disaster.
Intervening militarily now isn't about left or right, liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat, or even about right or wrong -- it's really about choosing between being dumb or smart. I know where I come down."
How Not to Intervene in Syria - By Aaron David Miller | Foreign Policy
"We should stop beating ourselves up for once. Given the complexity of the problem, other pressing priorities, our interests, and the potential costs of an intervention, the administration is doing what it can. Chances are the longer the killing goes on, the more likely we be will dragged into doing more. But the notion that we should intercede quickly with some dramatic, ill-advised, poorly thought through idea of kill zones or safe havens without thinking through the consequences of what protecting those areas would entail is a prescription for disaster.
Intervening militarily now isn't about left or right, liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat, or even about right or wrong -- it's really about choosing between being dumb or smart. I know where I come down."
How Not to Intervene in Syria - By Aaron David Miller | Foreign Policy
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Why 2012 reminds us of 1871
Harold James is a Princeton professor and historian of globalisation - his piece for Bloomberg bears close reading.
History Blinds Europe to a Germany Worth Emulating: Harold James - Bloomberg
Probably the most interesting aspect is that none of the European nation-states' problems can be divorced from their prevailing cultures, be it the Teutonic work ethic or the Latin penchant for denying problems and thereby delaying doing anything about them. This all said, given Europe's terrible demographic problems, perhaps currency woes are the least of the old world's problems:
http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-the-15-demographic-dogs-that-are-going-the-way-of-greece-2010-3
History Blinds Europe to a Germany Worth Emulating: Harold James - Bloomberg
Probably the most interesting aspect is that none of the European nation-states' problems can be divorced from their prevailing cultures, be it the Teutonic work ethic or the Latin penchant for denying problems and thereby delaying doing anything about them. This all said, given Europe's terrible demographic problems, perhaps currency woes are the least of the old world's problems:
http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-the-15-demographic-dogs-that-are-going-the-way-of-greece-2010-3
Tory against war with Iran
This is a provocative piece by a British Conservative opposing military action against Iran.
New Statesman - Why the west should rule out military action against Iran
This issue has a way to play out yet.
Among the questions still unanswered is, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, if there is a decision to launch attacks on Iran, then what comes next? Is the military operation a series of coordinated strikes against Iran's military/scientific infrastructure or is it a wider regime change campaign against the Islamic Republic's power structure? All of these questions are unanswered as yet by proponents of military action. After Afghanistan and especially Iraq, perhaps some serious thinking and planning is required.
Right now, the prudent realist on this issue is ... President Obama.
New Statesman - Why the west should rule out military action against Iran
This issue has a way to play out yet.
Among the questions still unanswered is, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, if there is a decision to launch attacks on Iran, then what comes next? Is the military operation a series of coordinated strikes against Iran's military/scientific infrastructure or is it a wider regime change campaign against the Islamic Republic's power structure? All of these questions are unanswered as yet by proponents of military action. After Afghanistan and especially Iraq, perhaps some serious thinking and planning is required.
Right now, the prudent realist on this issue is ... President Obama.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)