GEOPOLITICS-FAITHS-HISTORY-WAR
Proverbs 24:5-6
A wise man is mightier than a strong man,
and a man of knowledge than he who has strength;
for by wise guidance you can wage your war,
and in abundance of counselors there is victory.
Sunday, April 29, 2018
The Crown and the Republic
Reasonable people may differ on the issue of whether Australia should remain as a constitutional monarchy or whether Australia should become a republic.
However, Australia is a constitutional monarchy at present and any move by the Australian people to change to a republic would require the drafting of significant constitutional amendments and the approval by the Australian people, in accordance with s.128 of the Constitution, of these republican amendments.
The text of the Australian Constitution can be found here and I would urge all Australians to read it and understand their fundamental law.
My view is that if one wants to break with the Crown and institute a republic - with all that will entail - then one has to accept that significant amendments will have to be made to our Constitution. Moreover, these significant amendments will have, also, to deal with the separate relations of the Crown to the several States, as set out below. As WA Wynes noted, "The central characteristic of the Australian Constitution is the predominance of the Crown in every aspect of governmental powers." There is no 'minimalist republic'. In fact, it would be much safer for republicans to propose a wholly new constitution than seek to amend our monarchical and federal Constitution.
Amending the Constitution to create a Republic
To amend the Australian Constitution to create a republic would, at the very least, require the altering of these key provisions:
(A) the Preamble to the Constitution: the Commonwealth of Australia is, literally, constituted via these words and the Constitution that follows:
“Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established”
On any view, this preamble would have to change and a new sovereign authority found to replace the Crown. Note that the Australians are federating pursuant to the "Two Unders": under the British Crown and under the Constitution. The Crown's position in our Constitution is a matter, simply, of enormity. Also, I am unaware of whether Australia’s republicans wish to remove the references to God in the preamble. The other covering clauses would have to be changed as well;
(B) Chapter II of the Constitution concerning the Executive Power of the Commonwealth, will have to be significantly amended, or, more likely, replaced in its entirety. Section 61 vests, specifically, the Executive Power of the Commonwealth in the Monarch, to be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative. The constitutional vesting of the Commonwealth’s executive power in the Crown means that, along with that power, we derive from the Crown’s existence, also, our day-to-day Westminster governing norms of responsible government and, in a crisis, the reserve powers of the Crown. In any parliamentary crisis, such as in 1932 or 1975, it is the Governor-General’s duty to ensure that the Constitution is maintained and the laws enforced, and, especially, to ensure that the Australian people decide through elections how a situation of government illegality or deadlock is to be resolved (hence the Governor-General’s power per s.5 to dissolve the House for fresh elections-see discussion below). If the Crown is abolished, so, too, are all these understandings of the executive power that are answered, currently, by the Crown’s position in our Constitution. Inevitably any republic will create a vacuum in the exercise of the executive power–and it cannot be filled by a jurisprudence of ‘cut and paste/replace’ republicanism. A Governor-General acting under royal convention cannot become a President who will be restrained by none of those conventions.
Any president - regardless of whether she or he is elected by two-thirds of the Parliament or directly by the people - will have an electoral mandate that no Governor-General, as the representative of the Monarch, can ever have, or seek to assert now. It will be only human for an elected president of the republic with this sort of national mandate to, sooner or later, seek to exercise the powers that will be reposed in that office, unhindered by royal conventions. There is no minimalist replacement of the Governor-General with any sort of elected President that is, at all, constitutionally safe. There is no safe replacememnt, either, of the Governor-General, by a president appointed by the Prime Minister of the day, who has no security of tenure. Chapter II was drafted on the basis that the Governor-General was the Monarch’s representative and, on those royal and constitutional terms, would exercise the executive power. Chapter II cannot, now, be warped into a republican provision. Instead, any republic would require wholly new provisions setting out what the republican president may or may not do in explicit terms, especially if that president is to ‘cohabit’ with an elected Prime Minister who is already enjoying the confidence of the House of Representatives, where governments are made and broken. The potential for frequent conflict between these two executive office holders - who both have their own national mandates - is obvious, as is the scale of the chaos that could well ensue if they are deadlocked. Again, there is no minimalist solution to the problem of the executive power;
(C) Section 5 will need to be amended, as it allows the Governor-General to prorogue the Parliament and, where necessary, to dissolve the House of Representatives. The exercise of this power now is, almost always, only done on the advice of the Prime Minister of the day, to cause a federal election. However, in times of crisis or deadlock, s.5’s power may be exercised by the Governor-General to force new elections and ensure the Australian people are the ones to resolve a parliamentary crisis at the ballot box. It is hard to see how any future republican president, possessed of a national mandate, where faced with an opposing Prime Minister, especially if that Prime Minister was unpopular, could avoid the temptation to dissolve the House and seek new elections that could remove the difficult Prime Minister. Absent the Crown and precedent regulating this power’s exercise, one can foresee s.5 enabling the slow accretion of power to the presidential office by the frequent calling of elections for the House to remove opposing and difficult prime ministers;
(D) Section 68, as the issue of who is to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces and on what terms, will also be a critical matter. Again, the centuries-old British understandings of a Monarch in command of the armed forces, exercised by the Crown only on advice of the elected government of the day, will be replaced by a President who, one presumes, will have powers of military command, while having, also, this national mandate of either parliamentary or popular vote. What are the armed forces to do when a President and the Prime Minister both have an electoral mandate and yet disagree on matters of war, peace or, in times of domestic crisis, disagree on what is to be done to suppress terrorism, riot, disorder, or an insurgency? One should note here that s.119 obliges the Commonwealth to “...protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence” and the obvious problems of who decides what that protection may involve. The armed forces cannot be left to guess and, in the long history of republican collapses, they have not infrequently been brought to an end by a coup as by civil war or economic slump. While such military stirrings against the civil power are anathema to our history and traditions, so, too, is the idea of a republic itself. If you will the republic, you will the risks of disorder that any republic entails;
(E) Section 126, which permits the Monarch to authorise the Governor-General to appoint any person, or any persons jointly or severally, to be deputy or deputies exercising powers, will have to be amended, as presumably any republican president will have a vice-president? If not, what is to happen when the republican president is disabled or impeached? Who is to succeed to the office?
Additionally – and this is a matter worthy of a long treatise in itself – each of the Australian States has their own royal Governor, each with their own state constitutional foundation and relationship to the Monarch. Any federal move to a republic is not necessarily binding on the individual States and their peoples who, also, with a Governor and parliament, have their own polities under the Crown. I recommend, strongly, the magisterial “The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors” by Anne Twomey on this matter. The potential position of royal States attempting to exist within a national republic is the stuff of constitutional minefields. (One should note that Western Australia has, already, a history of secessionism under the Crown….)
These are just some of the major provisions that will require amendments. Others, such as sections 16, 34. and 44, dealing with the constitutional qualifications of Senators and House members will have to be amended, entirely, as the concept of a “subject of the Queen” will be rendered nugatory by the republic. Moreover, there can be little doubt, following on from the recent parliamentary citizenship debacles, that proposals will be made that persons with dual citizenship should be eligible for election to the House and Senate and, presumably, to then hold ministerial office. One awaits the referendum that asks Australians to agree to risk having dual citizens hold the offices of Prime Minister, Treasurer, Attorney-General, Home Affairs, Defence, National Security, and Foreign Affairs.
In short, creating an Australian republic is an enormous constitutional undertaking. Do not let anyone tell you otherwise. Please read and know your Constitution.
The Referendum
Assuming, though, that all of these (and, no doubt, other) necessary republican alterations can, somehow, be agreed upon by constitutional conventions and by the parliament, then the republic would still need to be approved by the Australian people in a way that satisfies s128’s “double majority” requirement: the republic would need to be supported both by (A) a national majority of all electors and (B) a majority of the electors in a majority of the States. Over the past 117 years of the Australian Commonwealth, the Australian people have passed only 8 of the 44 referenda proposed, with the most recent 1999 referendum on an Australian republic being defeated in all States and succeeding only in the Australian Capital Territory. This history is not encouraging for major changes of the kind that will have to be proposed by the domestic republican movement.
My Own Thoughts
Good people may differ on the merits of republics and whether one is appropriate for Australia. The American republic offers a model of a classical republic, with separations of all powers and of all bodies, with the executive and the legislature as strangers, often hostile ones. The American model has its strengths and weaknesses, even after a bloody civil war, and so do, also, the various French, Irish, German, and Swiss models. At time of writing, I have no idea what is proposed for Australia’s republic other than assurances that it is not a major change. I trust the above has dissuaded any honest Australian from holding such an ignorant view.
If one has been convinced by the cosmetic and symbolic appeal of a republic and the need to break with the Crown, then one has a duty to one’s fellow Australians to not allow the current constitutional monarchy to be replaced by some antipodean republican chaos that is devised by the fashionable dregs of celebrity, media, and academe.
(I note here for completeness that while the throne is occupied, at present, by the descendants of the usurping German Protestant Hanoverians, not the legitimate British Catholic Stuarts, that is not the issue here).
So, please look at our Constitution with sobriety and with a justifiable scepticism as to whether any proposed republic will function under the stresses of war, peace, depression, etc, and whether the inevitably competing centres of power created by a republic can be restrained by law.
The rule of law, once lost, is extraordinarily hard to re-establish. The grisly fate of the Weimar republic should always be upper most in anyone’s mind, and, also, so should the British constitutional monarchies infinitely better weathering of the stresses of two world wars and depressions, and without any shift away from parliamentary democracy to authoritarianism. For over a century, tens of millions of people have left their homelands to immigrate to Australia, with the security and stability of our Constitution and commitment to the rule of law an unspoken but foundational attraction. And, need I point out, our Constitution cannot enforce itself. In our system, it is the Crown that is the ultimate guarantor of our constitutional order, and the enforcement of both the Constitution and the laws made under it. Most importantly, the Crown also supplies the royal umpire to resolve periodic parliamentary crises or constitutional deadlocks – if necessary by dissolving the House to ensure fresh elections.
It is said of the Australian Constitution that it was drafted by geniuses so that Australia could be governed by fools, such that it also made it very hard for our Constitution to be amended. For my part, I am thankful for the Australian founding fathers’ efforts to make our Constitution as difficult to change as it is made by s.128’s deliberately onerous processes, which showed an early but correct distrust of the schemes and machinations of the political classes who they clearly suspected would come to inhabit a remote capital. The saying, “If there is no need for change, there is a need not to change”, is a sound one for constitutional questions. So is, “if you do not know, vote NO.”
For over 117 years, the Australian Constitution has survived wars, depressions, cold wars, hung parliaments, numerous innumerate and ethically dubious governments, a coterie of crooked MPs and Senators, and a host of other afflictions imposed by the political class on the rest of us. It is said against the Crown that it is undemocratic, remote, and anachronistic. However, in my view, these qualities are but only a few of the Australian Crown's key strengths. The monarch cannot be ejected by the ambitious politicians of the day, most of whom resent that they may aspire only to be ministers of the Crown and not holders of supreme power. The monarchy is a guardian of the Constitution and not some proto-Caesar eager to dictate to the polity. And, yes, the monarchy is as irrelevant to our age as the monarchy is to every age, but its irrelevancy is what makes it also timeless, as is its usefulness, practicality, and value as an enduring institution that is beyond the petty politics of the day. The reposing by our Constitution of the Executive Power in the Crown provides Australia with stability and order in the day-to-day operation of government, as well as a source of military traditions and non-partisan allegiance. The armed forces, police, prosecutors, and other coercive and powerful arms of the state serve the Crown, not the politicians of the day. There is much to be said for such a distinction between the Crown that is served and to which allegiance is owed, and the day-to-day responsiveness of such public servants to the elected government, which changes with elections. One junks such traditions and practices of legality, stability, and good order, only at one’s national peril. Any proposed republic must not compromise the legitimacy and security provided by the Crown to our Constitution. It would be nothing short of insane for Australians to trust in and accept the assurances of our political class (and their acolytes in the media and elsewhere) that they will, by some hypothetical and unexplained republic, improve on an old and enduring constitutional monarchy that has already worked so well, so consistently, under so much historic stress.
So, it is over to the republicans to make their case and to propose their large and necessary constitutional amendments. In explicit detail. And well in advance of any referendum. With time for the needed debates and back and forth that any sensible polity must engage in before changing their organic law.
As for the rest of my fellow Australians, please remember that these debates will occur in respect of our Constitution and, as the ancient maxim found on war memorials across Australia and across the world goes, “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.” Please do not just be vigilant: be demanding, be questioning, be sceptical, be exacting, and demand answers, of those promoting constitutional change. We Australians and our Constitution are too important and too special to be corrupted, meddled with, or compromised, and in a manner that may have permanently dire consequences for all that we have achieved, thus far, as a nation. The Constitution is our fundamental law and, if it unravels, so, too, will the Australian nation that it, literally, constitutes. CAVEAT
POSTSCRIPT (Thursday 10 May 2018)
Noting that I had, briefly, covered, the s44 issue, above, I make this postscript as the High Court of Australia, yesterday, made its orders and published its reasons for judgment in the Gallagher case. The High Court had previously published reasons in the prior Canavan and Nash cases, which also concerned s44 of the Constitution. I would make these observations relevant to the Crown and Republic issues:
1/ There have been predictable calls for s44 to be amended to allow for dual citizens to be qualified to stand for the Parliament. Any constitutional alteration to amend s44 would have to pass the double majority required by s128. This attempt would most certainly fail nationally and, one suspects, in every State, as well.
2/ The High Court, helpfully, set out in its various reasons that the Constitution prescribes a system of "representative and responsible government", in which citizens elect representatives in the House and Senate, to which the Executive is responsible. In Australia's "Washminster" system, an MP or Senator, once elected, participates not just as a parliamentarian but, also, may participate in the executive government as a minister or parliamentary secretary. To the degree that Australians elect their local MP and their State's Senators, they are, also, electing the current or future members of the executive branch. Insofar as MPs and Senators could, ever, hold dual citizenship, then, inevitably, Australia would risk having a Prime Minister, Treasurer, Attorney-General, Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Ministers who also hold Russian, Chinese or Iranian citizenships.
3/ When the Australian Constitution was being debated and drafted in the 1890s, there had been, for decades, significant immigration from around the world to the various Australian colonies that would unite from New Year's Day 1901 as the Commmonwealth of Australia. Pretty much every one of the founding fathers of the Australian federation and the Constitution's framers was familiar with mass immigration, either as an immigrant or as a child of an immigrant(s). At the same time, one of the key drivers of the Australian federation movement was national security. As the High Court held in Joseph v Colonial Treasurer (1918) 25 CLR 32 at 46, "It is a matter of common knowledge that the necessity of a single authority for the defence of Australia was one of the urgent, perhaps the most urgent, of all the needs for the establishment of the Commonwealth." It is difficult to see how any case can be made, in 2018, that considerations of the effects of immigration and competing loyalties of newcomers would have been absent from considerations in the 1890s as to what qualifications may be required of a member of the House and Senate. At the same time, as one can note from (2) above, in our Washminster system, any MP or Senator may become a member of the executive. In certain portfolios, there will be reposed a very high degree of trust in, and loyalty demanded from, the executive office holder. It is very hard to see how it serves Australia's welfare to have a Prime Minister, Treasurer, Attorney-General, or Defence, Home Affairs, or Foreign Minister, with a foreign citizenship, allegiance or other obligation of loyalty.
4/ The most practicable solution to the current crisis is for all aspiring members of the House and Senate to ensure, before they nominate for the Parliament, that their citizenship affairs are in good order and that they comply with s44's requirements. It is the height of absurdity for any aspiring politician to think they should enter Parliament and make laws for the Australian people to live under, when that aspiring politician has, clearly, never read Australia's fundamental law, the Constitution. Australia has an insular political class that believes that when their members are in conflict with the Constitution's clear requirements, that it is the Constitution that should change, not our political class that should ensure their own compliance.
Finally, as a true postscript, I would add that Australia's Constitution provides in Chapter I for a House composed of members representing the interests of their local electoral divisions and a Senate composed of senators representing the interests of their States. The Constitution does not and was never intended to provide for a permanent political class, to provide career tracks (or endless loops) for politicians, staffers, advisors, lobbyists, and a host of other dubious inhabitants of the 2600 postcode. Australian politics - and the quality of our law making and governance - is afflicted, as never before, by party machines, hacks, 'introducers', and a raft of political vagabonds, for whom Parliament is merely a means to further sinecures, not an opportunity to serve Australia and her interests.
It was said of the Roman consul Cincinnatus (519BC–430 BC) that, when Rome was threatened, he left his small farm, laying down his plough so as to wield his sword in Rome's cause, and that, once Rome had been saved and the danger passed, Cincinnatus gave up power, willingly, to return his sword to its scabbard and plow, once again, his fields. The story of Cincinnatus was well known to the early American republic. The example of General George Washington surrendering the American presidency after two terms to return to Mount Vernon is, perhaps, the best example of Cincinnatus since the ancients. Nonetheless, this ancient model of political life and public service - as a vocation for serious people not a career for swamp dwellers - must return in our own times if we are to have any hope of improving the standards of our Parliament and our governance. As Montesquieu wrote in his Spirit of the Laws (1748), "The deterioration of a government begins almost always by the decay of its principles."
Australians need to rediscover not just our Constitution, and the principles on which it is founded, but, also, defend them against those whose negligence and stupidity threaten them and risk their ruin.
Tuesday, April 10, 2018
The Syrian War
With US/Western military action against Syria now seemingly a matter of when not if, it is good to take stock as to where we are on this matter. And by “we”, I mean the Western military alliance led by the US, which stretches from the Americas to NATO, through Israel and the Gulf allies, then through increasingly India, to the US’ Asian allies such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and New Zealand.
There are very good international order and public international law reasons for the US to strike the Assad regime insofar as such a strike is punishment for the regime’s use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against their own people or, indeed, against any regime that would use WMDs, at all. There is a general agreement that as weapons of war go, and as bad as war is, the use of WMDs is a threshold that is best not crossed and, if so, no use of WMDs should go unpunished. The use of nuclear, chemical, or biological, weapons, must not be excused, and none of us should want to live in a world where this sort of warfare is routine.
At the same time, there are very good reasons for avoiding any further involvement in the Syrian war and, especially, pushing for any sort of regime change in Syria. This has been my view since at least 2013.
Firstly, Syria is c18-20m people, a majority of whom are Sunni Muslim (most of a not particularly zealous kind), but who are also composed of sizeable Alawite, Druze, Christian and other minorities. The non-salafist Sunnis, as well as the minorities, still cling to the Assad regime out of both fear, and the ultimate prudential choice of Assad’s brutishness being infinitely preferable to being subjects of an Islamist regime or the next star of a jihadi beheading video. Welcome to the world of “the enemy of my enemy may be a brute but he will hopefully kill me last”. If you struggle in comprehending this sort of complexity, please do not dabble in the Middle East. Syria is the last bastion of Baathism and the sort of pan-Arab, formally secular, ideology that had once been a conventional wisdom across the Middle East, which manifested itself in similarly brutal if secular regimes in Egypt and Iraq.
Secondly, as a matter of realpolitik, the Syrian regimes of Assad senior and junior have been reliable Soviet/Russian and Iranian clients for well over 40 years.
The Russians have growing bases in Syria at Tartus and Latakia, and supply arms, personnel, and even mercenaries to the Assad regime. Putin has made very clear that he supports the Syrian regime, even if he may be open to discussing the terms of an Assad family exit. It is hard to see how or why the Russians would ever surrender bases and influence in a prime Mediterranean location, as well as the venues these offer Russia to expand its intelligence collection and operational capabilities.
The Iranians, also, since at least the Iran-Iraq war, have been reliable allies of Assad and the Syrians have been loyal facilitators of Iran's ambitions, including its arming and training of Hezbollah in adjoining Lebanon, as well as helping run a Sunni jihadi ratline into western Iraq during the allied occupation of Iraq.
Any move on Syria risks entrapment in all of these inescapable foes’ schemes, especially the poking of a Russian bear. The Russians do have a quite serious domestic jihadi threat and the Putin regime has expressly linked Russia’s war in Syria to its war against other Islamist terrorist groups. It is difficult to explain to Westerners ignorant of Russian religion, history and culture, just how seriously the Russians view the threat of Islamist terrorism, which in the Russian mind, they have been fighting in one form or another for centuries.
As for Iran, if combating its influence is a goal, as it should be, then Lebanon, rather than Syria, is, on any view, a better place to do this, especially in the building up of the Lebanese armed forces and the Lebanese state so that, in due course, Hezbollah can be disarmed or at least marginalised. Those seeking to reduce Iran are looking in the wrong place for the right objective.
It has been difficult to comprehend what, precisely, is the Western interest in seeing the status quo – the Assad regime – replaced by an inevitably Sunni Islamist regime, that would have been brought to power by a jihad that has the cosmetics of a rebellion. There is no third option, no military junta, no wise council of the liberally minded to play founding fathers of a new Syria. This has not been for a lack of looking by Western Governments eager to, again, try and find a new Syrian team to support. No one advocating regime change in Syria can explain to you who or what is to replace Assad.
Indeed, the usual pattern of Western liberal interventionism has been that a brutish regime’s toppling will lead to a democracy of a sort; there will be elections, and popular involvement will confer legitimacy and a new state will emerge over time. This was the plan in Iraq, Libya and Syria. That the various national histories, geography, culture, religion, all pointed to these plans being hopelessly ill-founded was entirely irrelevant.
What is meant to happen is overtaken by what always happens: the strong man’s regime falls, there is an ineffective replacement of nice people who can speak English on CNN for a period, and then, the strongest, most brutish horse wins. To use the Iranian example, the brutish but modernising Shah is replaced by ineffectual but well meaning liberals educated in the West....and these are then toppled by murderous Mullahs (who, like the Shah, deliver bread and electricity, but also, now, turn the nation into a prison). There is no reason to believe that toppling Assad’s regime in Syria will not, similarly, see a brutish secular regime replaced by a worse regime supportive of Sunni jihadis.
Much Western commentary advocating Syrian regime change has been authored by politicians and pundits who, from Afghanistan to Iraq to Egypt to Libya, have been completely and utterly discredited by events over more than three decades and by a repeated unwillingness to recognise the unique governance problems that persist in this tribalised and sectarian region. From John McCain to Bernard-Henri Lévy to Michael Ignatieff, the coalitions of laptop bombardiers and the foreign policy “Blob” have got everything wrong about their successive targets. These errors are still debated in the West but nothing can alter the tens of thousands of lives lost and irretrievably destroyed, as well as the billions wasted, by catastrophically stupid Western interventions in the lands of the Ottomans and the Shahs.
Since well before the fall of Constantinople, what is now the greater Middle East was traumatised over centuries by conquerors and invaders, by the clash of Christian and Islamic worlds, and by the desire to control silk roads and seaways. In particular, the brutalisation of the region by the Ottomans and, also, by great power conflicts among the Ottomans, the Iranians, various Western powers and by Russian intrigue and "The Great Game", cannot be overstated. Only in the post-everything West is history considered optional. Yet, breathtakingly stupid Westerners have blundered away for the past almost 20 years and wreaked havoc in an already Hobbesian region that almost none of them can find on a map and/or have read anything about. It is, frankly, maddening.
Moreover, in a strategic situation in which Russia, China, and Iran, pose an increasingly coordinated threat in Eurasia against the West's security interests, then Syria is the worst possible place to divert scarce military and intelligence resources to mount a hopeless and, inevitably, counter-productive campaign. The Western security position is opposed if not yet threatened by a China seeking its own commercial, energy, and security domain.
Indeed, the object of a sensible and realistic Western policy would be to note China's OBOR push and to seek to detach Russia, given China's drive to regain its natural, historic hegemony and Iran's imperial ambitions. Russia is the odd member of this anti-Western coalition. This said, before any rapprochement with Russia is possible, the Russians would have, first, to show signs of being willing to act in good faith, in substance not in form. It is hard, regardless, to see how now escalating a Western war against a Russian ally would make that rapprochement any more likely, as opposed to it likely solidifying further the current if historically unnatural rapport among Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.
As for what comes next, one can only hope that the realistic instincts of President Donald Trump overcomes the advice he will be given by institutions and advisors who have learned nothing.
Enforcing public international law norms against the use of WMDs cannot be confused with the international social work of remaking Syria.
A strong and measured strike against Assad and his military is deserved and should be supported. But a wider campaign of regime change would be pure idiocy and should be opposed.
One can only hope that Trump has asked his more hawkish advisors what comes next after any strike? What does happen next? What, especially, is to happen, if Western military/intelligence operators or civilians are captured by Assad's forces? Has anyone sat down, calmly, and thought of the second and third order effects of escalating any war with Assad's regime, which will inevitably involve Russia and Iran?
I wrote this last April 2017 when Trump found himself at a similar crossroads with Syria and nothing has altered my view since:
However, the scope of the West's military effort in Syria should not be broadened to include that of seeking regime change or, indeed, some wider war in the Iraq and Syria areas of operations with Iran, Russia or their proxies. The West already has sufficient unfinished wars as it is without adding new fronts fighting protracted wars with the well-armed and combat-experienced forces of major military powers.
President Trump is known to be a disciple of two of America's greatest soldiers, General Douglas MacArthur and General George Patton. Both men were commanders known for achieving victories based on inspired leadership, meticulous planning, a keen appraisal of opposing forces, the relentless use of mass firepower, speed, and the remorseless concentration of forces on the weakest points of the enemy's positions. MacArthur himself has gone into history for the phrase, "In war there is no substitute for victory", uttered after MacArthur's relief as the allied commander during Truman's poorly prosecuted war in Korea.
However, less well known is that General MacArthur, in retirement, counselled presidents, prime ministers and various 'wise men' that wars that cannot be won must never be fought. MacArthur, in particular, advised his former Pacific war subordinate, President John F. Kennedy, to avoid land wars in Asia and, in particular, escalating the Vietnam war, which MacArthur judged as likely only to result in the US and its allies being bogged down in a costly quagmire that placed them at the mercy of their foes.
In the loneliness of the presidency, with all its burdens and responsibilities, and surveying the world on fire that has been bequeathed to him, President Trump could surely do worse than ask what his heroes MacArthur and Patton would make of the prospect of yet another long and unwinnable war in the Middle East? One suspects their advice would be, in every sense, laconic.
The Syrian war is a hole that we should not go down, let alone dig any deeper.
Tuesday, August 29, 2017
Imperium's Graveyard: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Strange Death of the Western Way of War
At time of writing, US President Donald Trump has delivered his Afghan war strategy speech, having huddled and conferred with his senior military and foreign policy advisors to discuss what to do next in the Afghan War. The decision of the Trump WH is to increase the US presence in Afghanistan by 4,000 troops. There is as yet no allied commitment but, certainly, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and other NATO allies can expect American requests for assistance in Afghanistan.
Weirdly, for a war that involved an array of US, allied and NATO HQ elements until the end of 2014, there seems to be no allied input into the Trump administration's discussions and, judging from press reporting, very little media interest, at all, whether in the US or overseas.
I have no special insight as to what the extra 4,000 troops is meant to achieve in Afghanistan (population c30m). First Bush, then Obama, now Trump, seem to want to stave off the inevitable collapse of Afghanistan into its natural state of civil war amid competing Pashtu and non-Pashtu elements, who are themselves proxies for Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and, going forward, China.
The Afghan war, so far as the West is concerned, now enters its 16th year, and the view from national capitals is that it is best not seen, and even better unheard. But the war continues, "over there", with young troops, even those now in training and support roles, still exposed to death and wounding in what seems an interminable campaign. Moreover, Western nations have suffered enormous casualties, included many who were traumatically wounded and will need constant medical and specialist support for the rest of their lives.
Even Trump's worst and most "broken" critic would acknowledge that the Afghan War is, at best, a stalemate, a slog, a meandering if deadly struggle, with no clear end in sight. Others might say, "quagmire". And some others might say, more accurately, a searing indictment of Western military command and its inability to apply the Western way of war.
Indeed, it is hard to look back at the last 16 years of the Afghan War and not see every, or almost every, principle of war and Western military theory, violated. This infamous image of the ISAF/NATO operational concept is a symptom of a much bigger problem:
Somehow, the Western military effort would, apparently, succeed in Afghanistan when the Soviets, who at their peak strength had deployed 120,000 combat troops, with no restrictions on rules of engagement, and who also employed a massive civic aid program, failed to prevail there.
The Afghan War's conduct would have ashamed any great captain of the past or even the recent present. One did not have to be Sun Tzu to look at Afghanistan and conclude, also, that "there is no good protracted war for a conventional army". The cancer spread among the military caste by politicians that reward and promote the, frankly, pliant Generals, who were happy to uncomplainingly manage failure at a horrendous cost in allied lives and treasure, will threaten the security of the Western body politic for decades.
Yet the NATO forces in Afghanistan were not just at war. They have also spent well over a decade and enormous resources trying to train local Afghanis in democratic state building, which included training their military and security forces. The effort by the West to effect a wholesale reform of Afghan ways and religious sympathies - not just deter them from hosting Sunni jihadis such as Al Qaeda - has been Herculean in its ambitions and unrealistic in the extreme. While there may be a very politically incorrect if economically rewarding case for military colonialism, there is no logic or economic reward in an endless occupation of foreign lands, especially at the enormous cost of precious lives, lost or forever damaged by war.
The great British military historian Corelli Barnett wrote that War is the auditor of a nation’s resources, talents and failings. In the case of Afghanistan, war as auditor has exposed the West's military liabilities as well as the political insolvency of many nations' capacity to wage and sustain war to a successful conclusion. World War One was a global war that lasted barely four years. World War Two lasted just under six years. Korea went for three years and Vietnam’s major commitments went for seven years. The NATO forces have been deployed in Afghanistan for almost 16 years, with no end in sight.
It is time to learn some lessons from the endless Afghan War even if will not end for many years yet.
Lesson 1: Strategic clarity matters
Western governments should avoid strategic mushiness as to the purpose of military force, and when and why it is deployed in harm's way.
Armed forces should only be deployed if necessitated by a threat to the nation's or an allies' territorial security and/or a threat to well-defined and well-enunciated national security interests.
That is, only deploy military force to serve actual security interests, not vague ambitions to prevent societal unpleasantness, promote democracy or export the 'rule of law', the last of which means something entirely different in an Islamic culture.
The Afghan War suffered from objective confusion, whereby no one in 2017 can explain what real interests drove the NATO military commitment from 2002 on, after Operation Anaconda's conclusion. As former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates recently said, the proponent of any future large-scale deployment of land forces to Asia or the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined” .
Lesson 2: the Mission matters
Second, the mission matters, or as the maxim goes, “in war, the main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing”. And when the mission as stated is over, then that should be "it". Unfortunately, the experience of both Iraq and Afghanistan is that missions do not end, anymore.
The war phase gives way, inevitably, to an occupation phase that post-cold war Western militaries find very difficult to sustain and their societies find even more difficult to stomach. In words attributed to Genghiz Khan, "occupations turn soldiers into jailers".
While it is true, that the “main thing” of the Iraq war did shift from destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to defending the new Iraqi state, Iraq was and remains a country that actually matters, given its position, its massive oil reserves, its and its susceptibility to domination by neighbouring Iran, the natural hegemon of a region that spans from Kabul to Kobane. Iran's posture and its willingness to both support Sunni jihadis as well as use Greater Khorasan to provide strategic depth, is probably one of the most important and yet underreported stories of our time.
Nonetheless, nothing similar can be said about Afghanistan itself, or about much of the war that has raged there since late 2001. The reality is that Afghanistan was only ever important because it hosted bases for Al Qaeda that had to be destroyed, not because the Taliban ran a brutal regime. The original 2001-2002 “main thing” was the destruction of Al Qaeda and all of its support networks, not the civilising of Pashtu culture. The original mission involved Special Forces, backed by airpower and, significantly, was supported by those non-Pashtu Afghans who were most interested in removing the Taliban and their foreign Al Qaeda allies. By the end of 2002, with Al Qaeda’s personnel and camps in Afghanistan bombed, raided, killed and destroyed to the maximum extent possible by military means, and Al Qaeda spreading to the four corners, the US-led coalition should have declared victory and gone home, having negotiated a realistic future that accommodated competing Russian, Iranian, Indian and, yes, Pakistani, interests. Afghanistan, in the absence of the decade-plus NATO mission, would then have reverted to its traditional role as a problem and battleground for these competing Russian, Iranian, Indian and Pakistani interests, all of which can occur without any need for Western troops to be exposed to the deadly consequences of these rivalries.
For reasons that defy any strategic logic, the Western coalition - first under Bush, then Obama - determined that Afghanistan should become some sort of civilised place, as if somehow a validation of the West's mission there, rather than leaving an historically brutal Afghan society to its warring tribes and factions. Quite inexplicably, conservatives, as well as liberals, in the last decade-plus have supported nation-building missions in the Islamic world, and mistakenly embraced foreign movements professing ‘freedom’ and which are led by, “those who wax eloquent about democracy and moderation, hold advanced degrees and speak English” , and are entirely unrepresentative of the people they purport to speak for. Trump, for what it is worth, has specifically disavowed nation-building in favour of "killing terrorists" but it is hard to make this distinction in form if, in substance, there is still a substantial Western presence, whose objective is to make Afghanistan something different from it has been, historically.
The confusion over the Afghan War's real mission meant, over time, that the mission became one directed against its most distasteful but dominant Sunni fundamentalism, which manifests itself in various forms of Taliban and other militias and movements. To the degree that Afghani Islam and the Taliban’s return to power is an internal matter, then Afghanistan’s future, however lamentable it may be to us in the West, is a matter for the Afghans to fight for and cannot alone justify a Western presence. (Albeit the strategic value of holding onto the Bagram airfield complex, north of Kabul, and perhaps the Kandahar airbase, would serve a s a significant justification for a residual NATO military presence in the vicinity of the Iranian and Chinese frontiers, not to mention the Pakistan that supports the Taliban and gave sanctuary to Usama bin Laden for years. The realpolitik case for Bagram as NATO's ongoing imperial stronghold to help guard a pacified Afghanistan, with obvious capabilities for future missions related to China, Russia, and Iran, etal, strangely, has never been made by any senior US or NATO military or civil leader.).
In future, Western forces should not seek to protect or secure a country that its own people have shown little or no interest in protecting or securing. Much worse, these needless, quasi-colonial occupations (without securing the extractive benefits of empire) have cost us dearly in blood and treasure. Never again!
Lesson 3: Public support matters
Third, public support matters. Strategic confusion and mission creep corrode Western population's trust in their Governments and the public support on which the armed forces rely, not just in current conflicts but for longer term recruitment and rearmament programs.
The peoples of Western nations should understand, in clear and unmistakable language, what the military mission is and how it relates, in clear terms, to the national interest.
They should also know what the end-state will be and how, roughly, it will be achieved.
Additionally, public support requires a level of transparency and regular dissemination of information, in which the Government treats democratic polities seriously and takes the people, whose sons and daughters are in harm's way, into their confidence. Citizens are not stupid and understand, indeed they expect, that their armed forces will target and destroy the enemies of the nation. For conservatives, the reality is that while security interests in 2017 mean that one cannot indulge in isolationism, the nature of the West's strategic position means we can also never indulge in do-gooderism.
Western governments should expect that their people will earnestly support armed forces and just military actions that require the targeting, destruction, killing and capturing of those who may threaten. However, no one has yet explained why the West's young troops and scarce national wealth should be expended for objectives far remote from national security, such as ensuring the success of infant and fragile democracies or propping up corrupt foreign regimes.
Lesson 4: Making war matters
Fourth and lastly, and most importantly, even despite the last 16 years’ experience, Western governments suffer from a regrettable and widespread naivete about war, which needs to be expressly anathematised. If nothing else, the making of modern war is a subject on which reality must be allowed to intrude and, in a sense, imposed.
Western political leaders and media can be relied on to decry the use of excessive force, ensure restrictive rules of engagement, and urge the winning of hearts and minds, not create a massive “body count”. They cannot be relied on to discuss war in any way that is honest, or which grapples with the true nature of conflict. This elite naivety refuses to face the central reality of war in the Western tradition: that successful war requires the swift application of massive resources in the guise of overwhelming force. If the war cannot be won by these means, it is pointless trying to fight it. The pliant Western Generals, who seemed to have told governments what they want to hear, are not innocents here, either.
It is no accident that the last wars unmistakably won by Western democracies were the Second World War and the Gulf War of 1991, where national leaders accepted that victory required defined objectives and the use of overwhelming force and speed to achieve them. These were also both inter-state wars, where nation-states battled nation-states, rather than some muddled through conflict occurring in broken and hopelessly tribalised states, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The Second World War also featured a senior Allied military caste that was unafraid of speaking truth to power and demanding political support for decisive military victories. The Second World War also featured a political leadership that would listen to and work with its Admirals and Generals, even at times if fraught, and would listen to and rely on their professional military advice.
In Afghanistan, no General or NATO official could ever explain how a protracted intervention by an international Coalition can succeed in Afghanistan when local fighters and their Pashtu fathers, brothers and uncles have been fighting a jihad of one form or another since (at least) Russia’s invasion in 1979. No General or NATO official could, either, explain how 21st century Westerners, lacking any sort of relevant language and cultural knowledge, are temperamentally suited to occupying other countries and attempting to force our way of life on the locals. The fate of the US General Eric Shinseki, whose career ended under the Bush Administration, for saying, "beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division Army". Shinseki's fate serves as a warning to those in senior command whose advice was all too real.
Future military deployments should only be made in a way that accords with our own strengths and own distinctive way of war, which applies overwhelming force, speed, firepower and decisive manoeuvre to achieve an identifiable result, as opposed to the continual drain of counter-insurgency warfare, seeking hopelessly to win the hearts-and-minds of people whose attitudes to Westerners vary from merely hating us to fighting a jihad against us.
The Strategic Costs of Dumb Wars
As a wise man once said, predictions are hard, especially about the future. No sensible person would predict whether there will still be an Afghan War raging on 11 September 2021, but, on the evidence of the drift and intellectual stagnation of the past 16 years, it is more than likely the war will still continue. The Roman imperial and British Raj aesthetic of sons relieving fathers on the front lines of empire looms large in any discussion of where this endless mission goes on – without end. In an era of volunteer militaries, it is unlikely that anyone will care beyond those immediately tasked with fighting wars and their anxious families.
One critical aspect of these wars adverse effects on Western security, missed by most analysts, and which has been raised by recent naval disasters and air safety issues, is that the enormous diversion of scarce defence monies into protracted land wars.
Across the Western world, fleets have contracted and squadron numbers have declined, as the urgent need to fund the Iraq, Afghanistan and other campaigns took priority, a priority that has persisted for almost 20 years.
Given the enormous contribution of Allied seapower to ensuring the security and safety of the sea as a global commons, which delivers commodities and prosperity to the world, it cannot be healthy for Allied fleets to have shrunk, especially as Chinese and Russian navies grow and start to operate in what were formerly 'allied lakes', particularly the greater South China Sea and the Persian Gulf, as access to regional ports grows. The West has not, since the 1970s, had a period when Allied naval supremacy was ever challenged and, even then, severe doubts plagued the Soviet ability to project and sustain sea power. However, the advent of Chinese seapower, and the leverage this will provide Beijing, should concern all observers.
Similarly, the NATO appetite to maintain forces to maintain a viable deterrence of Russian ambitions has waned to a dangerous degree. While European pusillanimity was a problem before Sept 11, the degradation of European defences has only grown more concerning in the last few years. Even in the US, the enormous cost and priority imposed by Iraq and Afghanistan has seen the US Army focused more on low intensity warfare, at the cost of the heavy army that would be needed to meet any challenge by the Russians to central Europe.
Truly, it seems that the only strategic effects of these dumb wars has been not to cause any decline in jihadist attacks, but to waste precious lives and increase Western indebtedness, and to provide the Chinese and Russians with opportunities to fortify their positions and expand their influence. It is difficult to understand how it was that Admirals and Air Marshals looked on as precious defence funds were absorbed by fruitless wars, as their own sea and airpower contracted and atrophied, dangerously. The diminished navies and air forces of the post-Vietnam era stand as a warning of what happens when land wars roll on, and on, with no sense of urgency and no identifiable objectives.
It is likely that Western strategic drift will get worse, before it gets better. In another age, composed of more serious people, the Western policymaker would be presumed familiar with history, maps, geopolitics and the iron demands of reality. She or he may not be Churchill, de Gaulle, Adenauer or FDR, but those that came after at least knew they should aspire to be like them, they should read and educate themselves, and they should be cautious of seeing politics as an end in itself, and not merely a means to conducting statecraft.
Unfortunately, in 2017, we have the political classes that we do and, in every Western jurisdiction from the Baltic States to the Atlantic, from Ottawa to Canberra, there is no relief in sight from the tyranny of the combined machinations of the political hack, the former lobbyist, the PR whiz, the "human rights lawyer", and those, frankly, who would be unemployable in government in any other age.
The Proconsuls, Legates, Tribunes & Centurions Must Speak
This is where the West's professional military cohorts need to, urgently, assert themselves more and pre-emptively capitulate less.
It is absurd that so few military officers speak loudly and clearly, even when in comfortable retirement, about proposed and continuing wars which serve no or at best dubious strategic interests. The bonds of camaraderie and duty of loyalty between leadership and led have evaporated in a political climate dominated by spin, lies, sound bites and the need to be seen to be 'doing something', however vain and ineffectual.
Perhaps this is the long hangover in Western Generalship since the notorious relief of General Douglas MacArthur by President Truman in April 1951? MacArthur had presented Truman with an honest military appreciation of the Korean War – and, after some impolitic remarks, MacArthur was fired. MacArthur did, nonetheless, continue to counsel and advise, including warning President Kennedy to not escalate the Vietnam War but, regardless, the cost to be paid for being the stentorian patrician in the MacArthur mold was more than clear to all who came after him. One suspects that, given the rise of China and the threat from North Korea, that a harsher and more critical view of Truman's relief of MacArthur will be taken in future, than has been taken in the past. MacArthur's military and historical grasp was vast, and he could see, as the provincial Truman could not, how precarious both Asian and Western security would be should the communist Chinese state be allowed to aggress and establish proxy regimes on their periphery. Moreover, good leaders know how to handle their difficult geniuses. President Roosevelt managed, in addition to the Second World War, not just MacArthur, but Admiral Ernest King, General George Patton, General Curtis LeMay, and a host of other war-winning military leaders who would be the nightmare of contemporary human resources' departments. Winston Churchill had not just Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery but the brilliant if tempestuous General Charles de Gaulle as well. Churchill famously said of de Gaulle, "He thinks he's Joan of Arc, but I can't get my bloody bishops to burn him". Good leaders keep their wild horses in harness.
Nonetheless, Generals since MacArthur, throughout the Western world, learned their lesson, that command honesty to the political authority would be rewarded with dismissal, not any sort of strategic dialogue of the kind that Churchill and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, or FDR and General George Marshall, had enjoyed. The successful post-war commanders that survived political meddling, such as Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer and General Alexander Haig, were by the ends of their career seen by political insiders as oddities, notwithstanding their long-demonstrated military competence.
Sadly, the model for the modern General is David Petraeus. Despite Petraeus having championed Counter Insurgency (aka COIN) - the most insanely costly and self-defeating form of warfare for wealthy first world nations to pursue - as well as incurred a criminal conviction for sharing classified material with his mistress, and advocated the US arm Al Qaeda to fight Iran, Petraeus' record of catastrophically bad judgements has not impacted his reputation among the American elite. In any other age, Petraeus' record would have seen him retire to the back shed with his service revolver. In 2017, with a strategic culture mired in permanent idiocy, Petraeus is sought out, including by US Presidents.
While Prime Minister Churchill may have described a Field Marshal Montgomery as, "in defeat, unbeatable; in victory, unbearable", Monty, and his like, were very familiar with history, with what was possible and what was not, and with the tragic results for the nation and its people of commanders engaging in wishful thinking in matters of war and peace. Like MacArthur, Monty had seen considerable action in the Great War, he had been badly wounded, and he had seen the carnage caused by unreliable allies on other fronts and bad planning and inadequate intelligence preparation on one's own front. It may be worth all of our whiles to have more Generals who are unbeatable and victorious and, to borrow from Lincoln, we should risk the "unbearable". If not MacArthurs or Montgomerys, at least we can aspire to have more General Shinsekis? It is too much to hope for fewer of the Petraeus ilk as the lesson of MacArthur's firing and after has been that truthtellers are relieved and pliant politicos are rewarded and, even if they fail, only fail upward.
In any event, either the military classes recover their belief in their own vocations, relearn and reapply the principles of war, and assert the profession of arms' role in the conduct of war, or they will see themselves and, more importantly, their troops, devolve more into the role of the doomed legionaries of the insane ambitions of the West's 'forever bubbled' political classes.
For the West to survive as a political and military entity, it has never been more crucial than now for its military leaders to provide to the West's peoples the honest and frank discussion of war and its ends that its political classes will not. As General George Patton wrote, not long before his most untimely death:
There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent. One of the most frequently noted characteristics of great men who have remained great is loyalty to their subordinates.
The only greater loyalty is to the Truth.
Weirdly, for a war that involved an array of US, allied and NATO HQ elements until the end of 2014, there seems to be no allied input into the Trump administration's discussions and, judging from press reporting, very little media interest, at all, whether in the US or overseas.
I have no special insight as to what the extra 4,000 troops is meant to achieve in Afghanistan (population c30m). First Bush, then Obama, now Trump, seem to want to stave off the inevitable collapse of Afghanistan into its natural state of civil war amid competing Pashtu and non-Pashtu elements, who are themselves proxies for Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and, going forward, China.
The Afghan war, so far as the West is concerned, now enters its 16th year, and the view from national capitals is that it is best not seen, and even better unheard. But the war continues, "over there", with young troops, even those now in training and support roles, still exposed to death and wounding in what seems an interminable campaign. Moreover, Western nations have suffered enormous casualties, included many who were traumatically wounded and will need constant medical and specialist support for the rest of their lives.
Even Trump's worst and most "broken" critic would acknowledge that the Afghan War is, at best, a stalemate, a slog, a meandering if deadly struggle, with no clear end in sight. Others might say, "quagmire". And some others might say, more accurately, a searing indictment of Western military command and its inability to apply the Western way of war.
Indeed, it is hard to look back at the last 16 years of the Afghan War and not see every, or almost every, principle of war and Western military theory, violated. This infamous image of the ISAF/NATO operational concept is a symptom of a much bigger problem:
Somehow, the Western military effort would, apparently, succeed in Afghanistan when the Soviets, who at their peak strength had deployed 120,000 combat troops, with no restrictions on rules of engagement, and who also employed a massive civic aid program, failed to prevail there.
The Afghan War's conduct would have ashamed any great captain of the past or even the recent present. One did not have to be Sun Tzu to look at Afghanistan and conclude, also, that "there is no good protracted war for a conventional army". The cancer spread among the military caste by politicians that reward and promote the, frankly, pliant Generals, who were happy to uncomplainingly manage failure at a horrendous cost in allied lives and treasure, will threaten the security of the Western body politic for decades.
Yet the NATO forces in Afghanistan were not just at war. They have also spent well over a decade and enormous resources trying to train local Afghanis in democratic state building, which included training their military and security forces. The effort by the West to effect a wholesale reform of Afghan ways and religious sympathies - not just deter them from hosting Sunni jihadis such as Al Qaeda - has been Herculean in its ambitions and unrealistic in the extreme. While there may be a very politically incorrect if economically rewarding case for military colonialism, there is no logic or economic reward in an endless occupation of foreign lands, especially at the enormous cost of precious lives, lost or forever damaged by war.
The great British military historian Corelli Barnett wrote that War is the auditor of a nation’s resources, talents and failings. In the case of Afghanistan, war as auditor has exposed the West's military liabilities as well as the political insolvency of many nations' capacity to wage and sustain war to a successful conclusion. World War One was a global war that lasted barely four years. World War Two lasted just under six years. Korea went for three years and Vietnam’s major commitments went for seven years. The NATO forces have been deployed in Afghanistan for almost 16 years, with no end in sight.
It is time to learn some lessons from the endless Afghan War even if will not end for many years yet.
Lesson 1: Strategic clarity matters
Western governments should avoid strategic mushiness as to the purpose of military force, and when and why it is deployed in harm's way.
Armed forces should only be deployed if necessitated by a threat to the nation's or an allies' territorial security and/or a threat to well-defined and well-enunciated national security interests.
That is, only deploy military force to serve actual security interests, not vague ambitions to prevent societal unpleasantness, promote democracy or export the 'rule of law', the last of which means something entirely different in an Islamic culture.
The Afghan War suffered from objective confusion, whereby no one in 2017 can explain what real interests drove the NATO military commitment from 2002 on, after Operation Anaconda's conclusion. As former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates recently said, the proponent of any future large-scale deployment of land forces to Asia or the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined” .
Lesson 2: the Mission matters
Second, the mission matters, or as the maxim goes, “in war, the main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing”. And when the mission as stated is over, then that should be "it". Unfortunately, the experience of both Iraq and Afghanistan is that missions do not end, anymore.
The war phase gives way, inevitably, to an occupation phase that post-cold war Western militaries find very difficult to sustain and their societies find even more difficult to stomach. In words attributed to Genghiz Khan, "occupations turn soldiers into jailers".
While it is true, that the “main thing” of the Iraq war did shift from destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to defending the new Iraqi state, Iraq was and remains a country that actually matters, given its position, its massive oil reserves, its and its susceptibility to domination by neighbouring Iran, the natural hegemon of a region that spans from Kabul to Kobane. Iran's posture and its willingness to both support Sunni jihadis as well as use Greater Khorasan to provide strategic depth, is probably one of the most important and yet underreported stories of our time.
Nonetheless, nothing similar can be said about Afghanistan itself, or about much of the war that has raged there since late 2001. The reality is that Afghanistan was only ever important because it hosted bases for Al Qaeda that had to be destroyed, not because the Taliban ran a brutal regime. The original 2001-2002 “main thing” was the destruction of Al Qaeda and all of its support networks, not the civilising of Pashtu culture. The original mission involved Special Forces, backed by airpower and, significantly, was supported by those non-Pashtu Afghans who were most interested in removing the Taliban and their foreign Al Qaeda allies. By the end of 2002, with Al Qaeda’s personnel and camps in Afghanistan bombed, raided, killed and destroyed to the maximum extent possible by military means, and Al Qaeda spreading to the four corners, the US-led coalition should have declared victory and gone home, having negotiated a realistic future that accommodated competing Russian, Iranian, Indian and, yes, Pakistani, interests. Afghanistan, in the absence of the decade-plus NATO mission, would then have reverted to its traditional role as a problem and battleground for these competing Russian, Iranian, Indian and Pakistani interests, all of which can occur without any need for Western troops to be exposed to the deadly consequences of these rivalries.
For reasons that defy any strategic logic, the Western coalition - first under Bush, then Obama - determined that Afghanistan should become some sort of civilised place, as if somehow a validation of the West's mission there, rather than leaving an historically brutal Afghan society to its warring tribes and factions. Quite inexplicably, conservatives, as well as liberals, in the last decade-plus have supported nation-building missions in the Islamic world, and mistakenly embraced foreign movements professing ‘freedom’ and which are led by, “those who wax eloquent about democracy and moderation, hold advanced degrees and speak English” , and are entirely unrepresentative of the people they purport to speak for. Trump, for what it is worth, has specifically disavowed nation-building in favour of "killing terrorists" but it is hard to make this distinction in form if, in substance, there is still a substantial Western presence, whose objective is to make Afghanistan something different from it has been, historically.
The confusion over the Afghan War's real mission meant, over time, that the mission became one directed against its most distasteful but dominant Sunni fundamentalism, which manifests itself in various forms of Taliban and other militias and movements. To the degree that Afghani Islam and the Taliban’s return to power is an internal matter, then Afghanistan’s future, however lamentable it may be to us in the West, is a matter for the Afghans to fight for and cannot alone justify a Western presence. (Albeit the strategic value of holding onto the Bagram airfield complex, north of Kabul, and perhaps the Kandahar airbase, would serve a s a significant justification for a residual NATO military presence in the vicinity of the Iranian and Chinese frontiers, not to mention the Pakistan that supports the Taliban and gave sanctuary to Usama bin Laden for years. The realpolitik case for Bagram as NATO's ongoing imperial stronghold to help guard a pacified Afghanistan, with obvious capabilities for future missions related to China, Russia, and Iran, etal, strangely, has never been made by any senior US or NATO military or civil leader.).
In future, Western forces should not seek to protect or secure a country that its own people have shown little or no interest in protecting or securing. Much worse, these needless, quasi-colonial occupations (without securing the extractive benefits of empire) have cost us dearly in blood and treasure. Never again!
Lesson 3: Public support matters
Third, public support matters. Strategic confusion and mission creep corrode Western population's trust in their Governments and the public support on which the armed forces rely, not just in current conflicts but for longer term recruitment and rearmament programs.
The peoples of Western nations should understand, in clear and unmistakable language, what the military mission is and how it relates, in clear terms, to the national interest.
They should also know what the end-state will be and how, roughly, it will be achieved.
Additionally, public support requires a level of transparency and regular dissemination of information, in which the Government treats democratic polities seriously and takes the people, whose sons and daughters are in harm's way, into their confidence. Citizens are not stupid and understand, indeed they expect, that their armed forces will target and destroy the enemies of the nation. For conservatives, the reality is that while security interests in 2017 mean that one cannot indulge in isolationism, the nature of the West's strategic position means we can also never indulge in do-gooderism.
Western governments should expect that their people will earnestly support armed forces and just military actions that require the targeting, destruction, killing and capturing of those who may threaten. However, no one has yet explained why the West's young troops and scarce national wealth should be expended for objectives far remote from national security, such as ensuring the success of infant and fragile democracies or propping up corrupt foreign regimes.
Lesson 4: Making war matters
Fourth and lastly, and most importantly, even despite the last 16 years’ experience, Western governments suffer from a regrettable and widespread naivete about war, which needs to be expressly anathematised. If nothing else, the making of modern war is a subject on which reality must be allowed to intrude and, in a sense, imposed.
Western political leaders and media can be relied on to decry the use of excessive force, ensure restrictive rules of engagement, and urge the winning of hearts and minds, not create a massive “body count”. They cannot be relied on to discuss war in any way that is honest, or which grapples with the true nature of conflict. This elite naivety refuses to face the central reality of war in the Western tradition: that successful war requires the swift application of massive resources in the guise of overwhelming force. If the war cannot be won by these means, it is pointless trying to fight it. The pliant Western Generals, who seemed to have told governments what they want to hear, are not innocents here, either.
It is no accident that the last wars unmistakably won by Western democracies were the Second World War and the Gulf War of 1991, where national leaders accepted that victory required defined objectives and the use of overwhelming force and speed to achieve them. These were also both inter-state wars, where nation-states battled nation-states, rather than some muddled through conflict occurring in broken and hopelessly tribalised states, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The Second World War also featured a senior Allied military caste that was unafraid of speaking truth to power and demanding political support for decisive military victories. The Second World War also featured a political leadership that would listen to and work with its Admirals and Generals, even at times if fraught, and would listen to and rely on their professional military advice.
In Afghanistan, no General or NATO official could ever explain how a protracted intervention by an international Coalition can succeed in Afghanistan when local fighters and their Pashtu fathers, brothers and uncles have been fighting a jihad of one form or another since (at least) Russia’s invasion in 1979. No General or NATO official could, either, explain how 21st century Westerners, lacking any sort of relevant language and cultural knowledge, are temperamentally suited to occupying other countries and attempting to force our way of life on the locals. The fate of the US General Eric Shinseki, whose career ended under the Bush Administration, for saying, "beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division Army". Shinseki's fate serves as a warning to those in senior command whose advice was all too real.
Future military deployments should only be made in a way that accords with our own strengths and own distinctive way of war, which applies overwhelming force, speed, firepower and decisive manoeuvre to achieve an identifiable result, as opposed to the continual drain of counter-insurgency warfare, seeking hopelessly to win the hearts-and-minds of people whose attitudes to Westerners vary from merely hating us to fighting a jihad against us.
The Strategic Costs of Dumb Wars
As a wise man once said, predictions are hard, especially about the future. No sensible person would predict whether there will still be an Afghan War raging on 11 September 2021, but, on the evidence of the drift and intellectual stagnation of the past 16 years, it is more than likely the war will still continue. The Roman imperial and British Raj aesthetic of sons relieving fathers on the front lines of empire looms large in any discussion of where this endless mission goes on – without end. In an era of volunteer militaries, it is unlikely that anyone will care beyond those immediately tasked with fighting wars and their anxious families.
One critical aspect of these wars adverse effects on Western security, missed by most analysts, and which has been raised by recent naval disasters and air safety issues, is that the enormous diversion of scarce defence monies into protracted land wars.
Across the Western world, fleets have contracted and squadron numbers have declined, as the urgent need to fund the Iraq, Afghanistan and other campaigns took priority, a priority that has persisted for almost 20 years.
Given the enormous contribution of Allied seapower to ensuring the security and safety of the sea as a global commons, which delivers commodities and prosperity to the world, it cannot be healthy for Allied fleets to have shrunk, especially as Chinese and Russian navies grow and start to operate in what were formerly 'allied lakes', particularly the greater South China Sea and the Persian Gulf, as access to regional ports grows. The West has not, since the 1970s, had a period when Allied naval supremacy was ever challenged and, even then, severe doubts plagued the Soviet ability to project and sustain sea power. However, the advent of Chinese seapower, and the leverage this will provide Beijing, should concern all observers.
Similarly, the NATO appetite to maintain forces to maintain a viable deterrence of Russian ambitions has waned to a dangerous degree. While European pusillanimity was a problem before Sept 11, the degradation of European defences has only grown more concerning in the last few years. Even in the US, the enormous cost and priority imposed by Iraq and Afghanistan has seen the US Army focused more on low intensity warfare, at the cost of the heavy army that would be needed to meet any challenge by the Russians to central Europe.
Truly, it seems that the only strategic effects of these dumb wars has been not to cause any decline in jihadist attacks, but to waste precious lives and increase Western indebtedness, and to provide the Chinese and Russians with opportunities to fortify their positions and expand their influence. It is difficult to understand how it was that Admirals and Air Marshals looked on as precious defence funds were absorbed by fruitless wars, as their own sea and airpower contracted and atrophied, dangerously. The diminished navies and air forces of the post-Vietnam era stand as a warning of what happens when land wars roll on, and on, with no sense of urgency and no identifiable objectives.
It is likely that Western strategic drift will get worse, before it gets better. In another age, composed of more serious people, the Western policymaker would be presumed familiar with history, maps, geopolitics and the iron demands of reality. She or he may not be Churchill, de Gaulle, Adenauer or FDR, but those that came after at least knew they should aspire to be like them, they should read and educate themselves, and they should be cautious of seeing politics as an end in itself, and not merely a means to conducting statecraft.
Unfortunately, in 2017, we have the political classes that we do and, in every Western jurisdiction from the Baltic States to the Atlantic, from Ottawa to Canberra, there is no relief in sight from the tyranny of the combined machinations of the political hack, the former lobbyist, the PR whiz, the "human rights lawyer", and those, frankly, who would be unemployable in government in any other age.
The Proconsuls, Legates, Tribunes & Centurions Must Speak
This is where the West's professional military cohorts need to, urgently, assert themselves more and pre-emptively capitulate less.
It is absurd that so few military officers speak loudly and clearly, even when in comfortable retirement, about proposed and continuing wars which serve no or at best dubious strategic interests. The bonds of camaraderie and duty of loyalty between leadership and led have evaporated in a political climate dominated by spin, lies, sound bites and the need to be seen to be 'doing something', however vain and ineffectual.
Perhaps this is the long hangover in Western Generalship since the notorious relief of General Douglas MacArthur by President Truman in April 1951? MacArthur had presented Truman with an honest military appreciation of the Korean War – and, after some impolitic remarks, MacArthur was fired. MacArthur did, nonetheless, continue to counsel and advise, including warning President Kennedy to not escalate the Vietnam War but, regardless, the cost to be paid for being the stentorian patrician in the MacArthur mold was more than clear to all who came after him. One suspects that, given the rise of China and the threat from North Korea, that a harsher and more critical view of Truman's relief of MacArthur will be taken in future, than has been taken in the past. MacArthur's military and historical grasp was vast, and he could see, as the provincial Truman could not, how precarious both Asian and Western security would be should the communist Chinese state be allowed to aggress and establish proxy regimes on their periphery. Moreover, good leaders know how to handle their difficult geniuses. President Roosevelt managed, in addition to the Second World War, not just MacArthur, but Admiral Ernest King, General George Patton, General Curtis LeMay, and a host of other war-winning military leaders who would be the nightmare of contemporary human resources' departments. Winston Churchill had not just Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery but the brilliant if tempestuous General Charles de Gaulle as well. Churchill famously said of de Gaulle, "He thinks he's Joan of Arc, but I can't get my bloody bishops to burn him". Good leaders keep their wild horses in harness.
Nonetheless, Generals since MacArthur, throughout the Western world, learned their lesson, that command honesty to the political authority would be rewarded with dismissal, not any sort of strategic dialogue of the kind that Churchill and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, or FDR and General George Marshall, had enjoyed. The successful post-war commanders that survived political meddling, such as Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer and General Alexander Haig, were by the ends of their career seen by political insiders as oddities, notwithstanding their long-demonstrated military competence.
Sadly, the model for the modern General is David Petraeus. Despite Petraeus having championed Counter Insurgency (aka COIN) - the most insanely costly and self-defeating form of warfare for wealthy first world nations to pursue - as well as incurred a criminal conviction for sharing classified material with his mistress, and advocated the US arm Al Qaeda to fight Iran, Petraeus' record of catastrophically bad judgements has not impacted his reputation among the American elite. In any other age, Petraeus' record would have seen him retire to the back shed with his service revolver. In 2017, with a strategic culture mired in permanent idiocy, Petraeus is sought out, including by US Presidents.
While Prime Minister Churchill may have described a Field Marshal Montgomery as, "in defeat, unbeatable; in victory, unbearable", Monty, and his like, were very familiar with history, with what was possible and what was not, and with the tragic results for the nation and its people of commanders engaging in wishful thinking in matters of war and peace. Like MacArthur, Monty had seen considerable action in the Great War, he had been badly wounded, and he had seen the carnage caused by unreliable allies on other fronts and bad planning and inadequate intelligence preparation on one's own front. It may be worth all of our whiles to have more Generals who are unbeatable and victorious and, to borrow from Lincoln, we should risk the "unbearable". If not MacArthurs or Montgomerys, at least we can aspire to have more General Shinsekis? It is too much to hope for fewer of the Petraeus ilk as the lesson of MacArthur's firing and after has been that truthtellers are relieved and pliant politicos are rewarded and, even if they fail, only fail upward.
In any event, either the military classes recover their belief in their own vocations, relearn and reapply the principles of war, and assert the profession of arms' role in the conduct of war, or they will see themselves and, more importantly, their troops, devolve more into the role of the doomed legionaries of the insane ambitions of the West's 'forever bubbled' political classes.
For the West to survive as a political and military entity, it has never been more crucial than now for its military leaders to provide to the West's peoples the honest and frank discussion of war and its ends that its political classes will not. As General George Patton wrote, not long before his most untimely death:
There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent. One of the most frequently noted characteristics of great men who have remained great is loyalty to their subordinates.
The only greater loyalty is to the Truth.
Monday, April 24, 2017
"Lest I Forget"
For Australians, the 11th of November is the date to recall our war dead and wounded, especially of the catastrophic Great War (1914-1919). It is difficult to overstate the enormity of Australia's losses in that war. From a young nation of almost 5 million people, approximately 420,000 enlisted, representing just approximately 40% of the male population aged 18 to 44.
Of those who enlisted for the war, over 60,000 were killed in action and 155,133 were wounded (a figure that includes gassing and what was then called “shell shock”). Another 4,000 Australians were taken as prisoners of war, while over 430,000 Australians suffered from sickness or injuries unrelated to combat. It is unknown how many Australia veterans of the Great War would die in the 1920s as a result of their wounds, or, given the horror of that war, at their own hands.
Wherever one goes in Australia, whether in city or country, suburb, town or village, one finds local memorials to those who served in the wars and, at the least, the names listed of those who made the ultimate sacrifice. These memorials, especially those built originally for the Boer and Great Wars, are, more often than not, straightforward, rather than plain, sometimes with a celebration of Edwardian heroism, often with a Biblical verse deposing to no greater loves, perhaps representations, also, of an ancient representation, perhaps a classical torch to symbolise ancient virtues being passed by the generation lost in the war to those coming after and benefiting from the heroic sacrifice. Australians of the war generations were a stoic, laconic people, not given to agonising self-reflection, and the memorials were a practical gesture to assure those who had lost loved ones far from home that, at home, their sacrifice would never be forgotten.
Like most Australians, my family, too, was touched by wars. And, not unlike most Australians, much of my immigrant family is recently arrived here. My late mother's family included many war veterans, Boer War cavalrymen and Kittyhawk pilots from World War II. My paternal grandparents, who emigrated from the United Kingdom to Australia in 1949, were products of the Great War. Sadly, both of them passed away years before I was born.
My grandfather served as a 19 year old reinforcement subaltern in the British Army at the very final stages of the Great War and then Armistice. He was not a career soldier, but was, rather a product of a Catholic public (ie private) school and the officer cadet training units that by 1918 were producing Second Lieutenants in a matter of weeks, whose war service offered a similar life expectancy once in the front lines.
But for the collapse of the German Army in late 1918, I have often wondered whether his life expectancy would have been that of the short duration of others of his generation. While proud to have done his very small part in late 1918, my grandfather was reluctant to ever share very much with my late father of the details of 'his war', with our only knowledge passed on through some photographs and some stories. My late father only ever very reluctantly raised the war with my grandfather, because of the pain it caused him. One of my great regrets is my grandfather's death so many years before my birth.
My grandfather, though a very young survivor, nonetheless lost his world in the Great War, as did so many of that "lost generation". The Great War destroyed the Edwardian age that my grandfather had been raised in, a loss which, if anything, afflicted British Catholics, with their determinedly medieval sense of right and wrong, more than most. Similarly, all of that golden age for the empire "on which the sun never set" was destroyed by the Great War. As a result of the enormous loss of young men, it meant that many of grandfather's school friends had died or were grievously wounded, many of their sisters would be doomed to spinsterhood as their great loves or future beaus perished on the Somme, while for grief-stricken parents, the war would mean the sale of homes and estates that dead sons could never inherit.
The scale of the enormity of the losses throughout the British Empire cannot be overstated. And in our family's part of western London, where a new repatriation hospital was nearby, the sight of the wounded and the maimed was ever present long after 1918 and the guns falling silent. Seeing the 'living dead' of the Great War, recognisable instantly by their government-issue blue suits, was a feature of my own father's childhood in the London of the Second World War. The Armistice may have taken effect at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, 1918, but for that generation, the war had no end. Its effects were felt on every birthday of the fallen, every anniversary of their death, at every family Easter and every Christmas, at every event at which the chairs once occupied by fallen loved ones would be, henceforth, forever empty and their distinct voices unheard.
My grandfather worked in the Connolly family business, well, if not brilliantly. He married well and was a very good father. The war had not shaken his devoutly Catholic faith. By all accounts, he was grateful to have survived albeit he had been exhausted. The war had robbed him of his youth, as it had robbed so many of their lives, their bodies and their sanity. My grandfather was a gentle man, a kind man, and a man of formality, who even in the Australia of the 1960s, would always, I was told growing up, be dressed properly, acquit himself in the day's work, manfully, answer correspondence promptly and would, on any given Sunday morning, be with my grandmother in their pew for what they called "Maaaas". Yet, in the ghastly chaos of the world destroyed by the Great War, those surviving and continuing institutions, such as the Crown and the Papacy, had never been more important to him.
In the years since my parents' passing, amid the grief that envelops one at this time, it has been something for me to go through my mother's and father's belongings and find there some momento of the grandparents that I never knew, like their commemorations of Royal events and old Bibles and Missals, and to see that, where "Johnny Foreigner" had destroyed his country in the wake of the Great War, the innate good sense of provincial Britons like my grandparents saw them instead hold fast to the Crown, to their traditions, and to the faith, whatever it was.
Unfortunately the Luftwaffe’s bombing of London in 1940-1941 meant that the official military history of my grandfather’s Great War service is unavailable and all that is left are his records, some photographs, some stories, and some cryptic notes on the back of photographs. My grandfather did think very highly of “the Australians”, as he apparently called them even when living among them, as well as their imperial cousins, who rallied to the imperial cause. Indeed, the story of how my late father and his parents came to Australia is intimately connected with the War.
My grandfather’s older cousins had all served in the Royal Artillery in the Great War from 1914 onwards and some had served in the Boer War as part of the “Hooray Henry” yeomanry units formed in the City of London.
Finally, my great uncle was a merchant mariner and then a Sub-Lieutenant, RNR, in the Royal Navy in the Great War. Family lore has it that, after the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow in June 1919, he applied for demobilisation and was then back at sea, quickly thereafter. The rest of my father's extended family include numerous soldiers, including two sound uncles who are retired Majors, one of which Major lives in Gloucestershire and has been known to write letters to the editor expressing his dismay at the decline of everything.
The Connollys and others past, such as they are, loom large, always, in my mind, especially at these times of national remembrance.
As for me, I used to spend every Anzac Day and Armistice Day with my parents. My father grew up during the Korean War and national service and, choosing the Royal Australian Navy, was one of the few of his intake selected for officer training. Fortunately for the Navy, if not for my father, the "Midshipman Connolly" life of the regular Navy was not for my father and he completed his national service, as did his friends, with a spirit of "doing their part", as did every Australian of his generation. Despite being too young for Korea and too old for Vietnam, my father and his friends also served their country, for as Milton said, "They also serve who only stand and wait". My late mother, too, was also a stalwart, as well as the most wonderful mother that one could have been blessed with. It is hard for me to do justice to the enormous support given by my late mother when I was deployed overseas. The "care packages from Mrs Connolly" arrived regularly and sustained morale wherever I was, with more than enough tea, chocolates, biscuits, cookies and the like to share among the ship or unit that I served in for the duration. I still, with the distance of almost a decade, feel responsible for putting my late mother through all the worry and turmoil that I learned, after her passing, that she had gone through, and I have often worried, myself, had I had been a source of unnecessary concern for her? But my late mother was of a proud Portuguese and Scottish ancestry, a lifelong doer of her duty and, I was assured by the extended family, she wanted me to fulfil what I felt was my duty "over there".
Sadly, my parents' passing means that my ANZAC Days and Armistice Days are now spent without them and their irreplaceable presence. Nothing can ever prepare you for the loss of your parents. However, as my devoutly Catholic parents passed in the friendship of Christ, I know that they, too, still muster and march with me, hopefully as proudly each year as ever before.
"Lest I Forget"
Saturday, April 15, 2017
Syria: There Is No Substitute For Realism
The Trump administration is not yet 3 months old and it has already engaged in its first overt military actions. On 06 April 2017, on President Trump's orders, the US Navy launched strikes on Syria's Shayrat airbase after a chemical weapons attack by Syria's Assad regime. As yet, President Trump has said that he is not intervening in Syria. There are conflicting reports about the various options being proposed to President Trump. As always, there remains the concern that, from confusion and a sentiment that "something must be done", a new Western war in Syria may yet result.
Accordingly, and given the range of security challenges already facing the US-led Western alliance, this is a good time to examine, coldly and realistically, today's already grave threats and explain why adding a new war in Syria to them would be a most unwise diversion of scarce military and intelligence resources.
The West's Security Challenges
Long before Donald Trump sought the US Presidency, these were among the more prominent problems in Western security and they persist today:
(1) apart from the UK, France, Canada and Poland, there is no NATO ally of the US that can contribute combat forces to any 'out of area' mission, let alone a sustained mission, and, sometimes, even within the European theatre. Notwithstanding every post-cold war President since Bush 41 pleading with Europeans to pull their weight as security partners, the response, even despite a supposedly ominous Russian threat, has been pathetic;
(2) China is building an ever more powerful military and constituting new bases in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, areas of direct military interest to not just the US but to Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. China has busily realised its "string of pearls" as the West's security position declined in the region, a consequence of maddening obsessions in fighting well intended but futile wars in the Islamic world. In fighting protracted war on land - a costly means of ruining oneself as Sun Tzu warned - West and especially the US has allowed the Chinese to focus on geopolitical realities and the opportunity to challenge both American seapower and the global economic order. The Chinese state is now directly challenging the decades-long hegemony of the United States as the world's greatest sea power. Additionally, China's former client state of North Korea, a nuclear-armed communist dictatorship, continued to issue bellicose statements and to test its increasingly capable missile arsenal. The greatest win for China has been the focus of the American political classes on Russian perfidies when China is consolidating its strategic position in Asia and potentially the South China Sea. It is hard to overstate the influence that China will have once its growing navy also has new Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea bases, in seas that were formerly the "American lake". The last three US administrations' focus on the insoluble problems of the Middle East and the post-Ottoman Islamic world have come at a tremendous cost to the security of the Asia-Pacific, based as it is on a US maritime hegemony;
(3) Iran remains a threat on any number of fronts. Most ominously, Iran continued to cooperate, to varying degrees, with North Korea on missile technology. Iran also continues to threaten to close the Persian Gulf and thereby deny the easy movement of oil from Saudi and Gulf suppliers. Iran also remains the principal state sponsor of terrorism, arming and financing Hezbollah in Lebanon, and supplying terrorists of not only Shia origin but, also, when in Iran's quasi-imperial interests, Sunni salafist groups like Al Qaeda. Iran also threatens to encircle (via its Shia crescent allies and proxies) the West's allies on the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, Iran has not renounced its intent to destroy Israel, albeit the military balance weighs still in Israel's favour and the Israeli arsenal should only be strengthened by the Trump administration;
(4) Russia has conquered (or in the Russian mind, "regained") Crimea, without much of a shot, while Russia still wages a hybrid war campaign to destabilise the new government of Ukraine and threatens the Baltic states. Russia's disinformation and electronic warfare campaigns have only intensified, often uncontradicted by any compelling Western narrative and counter-measures. Russia, also, continues to solicit new relationships in the Middle East, for the first time in 50 years, both as markets for its weaponry as well as its channels for Russian influence and destabilisation. To be fair, though, there is no US or Western policy that can stop Russia influencing its periphery or "near abroad". Russia is approximately 150m people, spanning 11 Eurasian timezones from NATO's fringes to Japan's maritime approaches. Russia is a real country, with a profound sense of itself as an Orthodox Christian, great power in perennial danger of encirclement and invasion, as has been its fate throughout its history. Russia, too, has a long term domestic jihadi problem, which it confronts with an admirable degree of kinetic zeal, and Moscow sees Western policy in Syria as both a threat to its long term Syrian ally and bases, as well as delusionary with regard to, if not tacitly supportive of, Sunni salafist extremism. The Russians can be countered in some areas and cooperated with in others of shared interests. Moreover, the West has more to fear from what former US President Nixon called a "Weimar Russia" than a Russia that asserts itself esp on its southern and eastern flanks. (Anyone familiar with basic Russian, especially Tsarist, military and foreign policies would be unsurprised by patterns of Russian assertiveness, but in this age of historical illiteracy, those so familiar are, sadly, small in number); and
(5) after almost 16 years of war, the Sunni salafist jihadi terrorist threat had not receded but, rather, was as dangerous and more widely distributed than before 11 September 2001. The past 18 months has seen deadly terrorist attacks in Europe and the US, as well as foiled plots in many major cities. As ISIL has become the more prominent jihadist group, now in Afghanistan as well as inspiring "lone wolf" attacks, Al Qaeda has been, for some time, expanding its operations and fundraising, into Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
West's all too protracted wars
Given these five key challenges, it is important to note that Iraq and Afghanistan remain theatres of war for Western military forces, now in their 16th year of the post-9/11 wars. Iraq's west and north remain in a state of war, as the Iraqis (with substantial Western and Iranian help) seek to retake their country from ISIL. These Sunni-majority areas of Iraq were, not coincidentally, identical theatres of war, a decade earlier, as the US-led coalition in Iraq sought to eject Al-Qaeda from western Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the Western-backed government in Kabul controls less of the country than it did one year ago. Various efforts by Western forces to help raise, train and sustain the Afghan military and security forces have been failures. Afghan territory won at considerable cost by Western troops have been surrendered by the Kabul regime to the Taliban with nary a shot fired. The Russians, meanwhile, are reported to be increasingly engaged with the Taliban, less likely as a means of hurting the West than of Moscow now seeking influence with the party that looks, inevitably, to again the Afghan government. Whether Iran, which was a reliable supporter of the Northern Alliance's insurgency against the Taliban before 11 September 2001, would accept the Taliban's resumption of power is an open question. Whether Russia and Iran both see a Taliban-run Afghanistan as preferable to a potentially ISIL-aligned one is another matter.
Meanwhile, the various Western allies that participated and still continue in the Iraq, Afghan and now Syrian wars have incurred thousands of war dead, tens of thousands wounded and maimed (who suffer today from neglect and bureaucratic obfuscation), and war costs in the trillions, from these wars in the Islamic world. It is hard to find any parallel in post-Westphalian military history for wars of such long duration, horrific cost in blood and treasure, and so pronounced a lack of any kind of success, as the West's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If, as the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, "There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited", one wonders what possible rationale there is for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to have been so fitfully and poorly prosecuted.
Notwithstanding these realities, in the West generally and in the United States in particular, there are new calls for a new Western war to be commenced in Syria, to combat, inter alia, Iran, Hezbollah, ISIL, Al Qaeda and...Russia. Thus it is time to calmly examine the Syria question and to, especially, repel the blitzkrieg of strategic stupidity presented by proponents of Western military intervention in Syria, especially that aimed at "regime change".
The case for masterly Western inactivity in Syria
For reasons that are difficult for any prudent observer to comprehend, Syria has now become the latest focus of apparent Western concern and renewed calls for intervention. To be sure, Syria has had a brutal civil war, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the outflow of refugees. Syria, also, has been a warzone between various odious armed groups, each of which pose security challenges to individual Western powers.
Given the Western security challenges identified above, however, and especially the two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the gathering storms in North Asia and the South China Sea, Syria is not the place for increasingly scarce military and intelligence resources to be spent, at least not to any significant degree.
First, the West has, as James Baker said in 1992 of the factions fighting in the former Yugoslavia, "no dog in this fight" and, if anything, Western security, the reduction of refugee flows, and Syria's religious and ethnic minorities, need Assad to survive (to be followed by some form of reconciliation process). While anguished liberal media commentary - and what is left of the neoconservative rump that boarded the Hillary Titanic in 2016 - urges "something must be done", there is very little that can be practically done by the Western powers beyond continuing to augment the war already waged by Assad, Russian and Iranian forces against the salafist jihadist threat. While there is touting by the media of the "moderate Syrian rebels", these groups are allied with Islamists or have aims indistinguishable from jihadis. Meanwhile, Western kvetching over Russian bombing of various Syrian targets, especially Aleppo and Idlib, avoids the obvious reality that the Russians take a much broader – and, frankly, more realistic – view of what is a legitimate jihadi target. The refreshingly kinetic Russian way of war, as well as its decades of dealing with its own deadly internal jihadi threat, has inured Moscow to Western criticism. Russia remains the only (quasi) Western-ish country that has successfully defeated an insurgency, jihadist or otherwise – and the Russians do so using a ferocious mixture of firepower, speed and overwhelming force that every serious Western military leader of yesteryear would have understood, even if anathema to current (and hopeless) Western approaches based on "cultural awareness" and "counterinsurgency". It is no accident that the last wars that Western forces unmistakably won were the Second World War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, where allied political and military leaders accepted that victory required clearly defined objectives, deliberate planning, proper resourcing, coalition building, and the speedy use of overwhelming force-and where Allied forces could avail themselves of seapower and had access to resupply by seaports. Instead, the West's various militaries have had 16 years of protracted wars of 'lions led by donkeys', planned and executed poorly, and of unmeritorious political and media concerns corrupting military operations. At a certain level, the West should be grateful that it is the Russian Bear and his brutal if effective mission focus that is driving the Syrian war's strategy - and not some sensitive, new age, David Petraeus-figure, eager for a 'pat on the head' from the media and whose command is doomed to almost certain defeat.
Secondly, there is no Western solution, of any kind, to Syria's problems. Syria is c.23m people, majority Sunni Muslim (most of the 'gin and tonic' kind) but also with powerful Alawite and Christian minorities. Syria is the reverse of Saddam's Iraq, which was majority Shia but run by a mostly Sunni regime. Syria is the last bastion of Baathism and its sort of pan-Arab, secularist, ideology that had once been a conventional wisdom across the Middle East, which manifested itself in secular and rather brutal regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Such religiously diverse polities and their mismatch between demography and regime cannot ever be truly stable and yet also cannot ever be neatly reformed...certainly not during year 6 of a brutal civil and now sectarian civil war. Therefore, what precisely is the political outcome that any Western intervention would seek? Because once the West were to intervene in Syria to change the regime, it would 'own' whatever polity resulted from it, noting, also, that the anti-Assad forces are patronised by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, hardly known for their adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of non-Sharia law.
Thirdly, as a matter of simple realpolitik, the Russians and the Iranians have large stakes in the survival of Assad's Syria, for which Moscow and Tehran will fight against any Western intervention that seeks to topple or destabilise the regime. The Syrian regimes of Assad (senior and junior) have been reliable Russian and Iranian clients for over 40 years: Russia has substantial bases in Syria at Tartus and Latakia, and from the Iran-Iraq war onwards, Syria has been a loyal facilitator of Iran's regional ambitions, including its arming and training of Hezbollah in adjoining Lebanon. Neither Russia or Iran will want to be seen as fair-weather allies – quite the reverse. Russia and Iran are sending a message to current allies and potential allies that they are true friends and will defend with enormous violence a truly terrible regime like Assad, cf the West's abandonments during the Arab Spring.
Fourthly, any Western military intervention in Syria that is opposed by Russia and Iran (and thus Hezbollah) is guaranteed to incur substantial Western dead and wounded. The Russians, Iranians and their proxies have been operating in Syria for many years now and know this area of operations intimately. Further, in the case of Hezbollah, it has been fighting Israel for decades and, as well, provided lethal aid and support to militias and jihadis that fought Western troops in Iraq. It is difficult to overstate how much of an advantage the Assad forces and their Iranian and Russian patrons have in opposing any future Western military intervention in Syria.
History always casts the deciding vote
Since well before the fall of Constantinople, what is now the greater Middle East was traumatised over centuries by conquerors and invaders, by the clash of Christian and Islamic worlds, and by the desire to control silk roads and seaways. In particular, the long brutalisation of the region by the Ottomans and, also, by great power conflicts among the Ottomans, the Iranians, various Western powers and by Russian intrigue and "The Great Game", cannot be overstated. Only in the post-everything West is history considered optional and the brutal realities of a war something to be put to one side.
Unfortunately the history of these most bloody of the world's crossroads means one struggles to comprehend what, precisely, is the Western interest in seeing the Syrian status quo – the Assad regime – replaced by what would inevitably become a Sunni Islamist regime. An Assad supported by Russia and Iran, which has been the status quo for more than forty years, would be succeeded by, to borrow from Usama bin Laden, the "strong horse" of an Islamic state, if not a jihadistan. Why is this, in any way, desirable?
Moreover, most of the pundits and advocates for "something must be done" in Syria were proposing similarly grandiose solutions to Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya, and these latter day 'Lawrences of Amnesia' were completely discredited by events - and by a repeated unwillingness to recognise the unique problems that emerge in this region.
Given that what was Saddam's Iraq now resembles - thanks to Shia chauvinism, ISIS' insurgency and Kurdish assertiveness - something between the former Ottoman vilayets and a Mad Max world, some humility to proffering to know how any Western intervention in Syria would end is eminently desirable. Given the catastrophic results of the Western interventions of the past 16 years, the maxim "first, do no harm" should be engraved on the walls of every Western chancery.
Similarly, it is alarming to see how much of Western commentary on Syria is focused not on ISIL and Al Qaeda - but on Iran. To be sure, Iran is a hegemonic power, its population (c75m) dwarfs its Saudi (c27m) rival, and Iran's capacity to efficiently and decisively project power to its east and west, either directly or using its military proxies such as the IRGC and Hezbollah, into areas of Western security interest, is of great concern. However, Iran was a challenge when an ally under the Shah and has long been a challenge under the hostile regime of the Mullahs. There has been no appreciable change in the Iranian security challenge because of its participation in the Syrian war.
Moreover, Iran's size and strategic position make Western attempts to isolate and punish Iran little more than futile. Iran has been an historically important power since Biblical times, and, despite its innate ethnic and religious pluralism, Iran has a national cohesion, self-confidence and consistent grand strategy that its local adversaries, with the exception of Israel, do not. Expecting that any Western policy towards Iran - especially one of direct military confrontation in Syria - will result in Iran eschewing its pursuit of the regional hegemony, that the iron laws of geopolitics have historically granted it, is a foolish proposition. Iran fought Iraq for eight years to a bloody stalemate in circumstances where Iraq was armed by the Soviets and bankrolled by the Sunni Arab world, while Iran had only sub rosa support from North Korea, Syria, and, at times, Israel. The idea that Iran would be deterred by a Western military intervention in Syria – which would see Western forces operating in Tehran's preferred killing ground – is nothing short of insane.
Further, given that Shia Iran has, historically, been a Western ally and tolerant of Jewish and Christian faiths, it would be wiser for the West to seek to engage Iran's burgeoning civil society, as we once did those of the former Soviet empire, to seek to make the Iranian people our ally, and to appreciate the scholarly and artistic qualities of Shi'ism that differentiate Iran from the primitive salafism that afflicts our supposed Sunni 'allies'. What Churchill said of the Soviets applies to Iran's regime: they fear our friendship more than our enmity.
What would MacArthur and Patton do?
In a world of numerous concurrent, serious and draining security challenges, the case for masterly Western inactivity in Syria is overwhelming.
The current Western military effort, focused on combating ISIL and Al Qaeda should certainly be maintained and, where necessary, varied to achieved the desired end of destroying these two jihadi groups' capacities to operate in the Middle East and further afield. Similarly, there is a strong case for the enforcement of international legal norms by military strikes against those using weapons of mass destruction, something I have argued should have been done by President Obama when the Assad regime previously crossed the "red line".
However, the scope of the West's military effort in Syria should not be broadened to include that of seeking regime change or, indeed, some wider war in the Iraq and Syria areas of operations with Iran, Russia or their proxies. The West already has sufficient unfinished wars as it is without adding new fronts fighting protracted wars with the well-armed and combat-experienced forces of major military powers.
President Trump is known to be a disciple of two of America's greatest soldiers, General Douglas MacArthur and General George Patton. Both men were commanders known for achieving victories based on inspired leadership, meticulous planning, a keen appraisal of opposing forces, the relentless use of mass firepower, speed, and the remorseless concentration of forces on the weakest points of the enemy's positions. MacArthur himself has gone into history for the phrase, "In war there is no substitute for victory", uttered after MacArthur's relief as the allied commander during Truman's poorly prosecuted war in Korea.
However, less well known is that General MacArthur, in retirement, counselled presidents, prime ministers and various 'wise men' that wars that cannot be won must never be fought. MacArthur, in particular, advised his former Pacific war subordinate, President John F. Kennedy, to avoid land wars in Asia and, in particular, escalating the Vietnam war, which MacArthur judged as likely only to result in the US and its allies being bogged down in a costly quagmire that placed them at the mercy of their foes.
In the loneliness of the presidency, with all its burdens and responsibilities, and surveying the world on fire that has been bequeathed to him, President Trump could surely do worse than ask what his heroes MacArthur and Patton would make of the prospect of yet another long and unwinnable war in the Middle East? One suspects their advice would be, in every sense, laconic.
Accordingly, and given the range of security challenges already facing the US-led Western alliance, this is a good time to examine, coldly and realistically, today's already grave threats and explain why adding a new war in Syria to them would be a most unwise diversion of scarce military and intelligence resources.
The West's Security Challenges
Long before Donald Trump sought the US Presidency, these were among the more prominent problems in Western security and they persist today:
(1) apart from the UK, France, Canada and Poland, there is no NATO ally of the US that can contribute combat forces to any 'out of area' mission, let alone a sustained mission, and, sometimes, even within the European theatre. Notwithstanding every post-cold war President since Bush 41 pleading with Europeans to pull their weight as security partners, the response, even despite a supposedly ominous Russian threat, has been pathetic;
(2) China is building an ever more powerful military and constituting new bases in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, areas of direct military interest to not just the US but to Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. China has busily realised its "string of pearls" as the West's security position declined in the region, a consequence of maddening obsessions in fighting well intended but futile wars in the Islamic world. In fighting protracted war on land - a costly means of ruining oneself as Sun Tzu warned - West and especially the US has allowed the Chinese to focus on geopolitical realities and the opportunity to challenge both American seapower and the global economic order. The Chinese state is now directly challenging the decades-long hegemony of the United States as the world's greatest sea power. Additionally, China's former client state of North Korea, a nuclear-armed communist dictatorship, continued to issue bellicose statements and to test its increasingly capable missile arsenal. The greatest win for China has been the focus of the American political classes on Russian perfidies when China is consolidating its strategic position in Asia and potentially the South China Sea. It is hard to overstate the influence that China will have once its growing navy also has new Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea bases, in seas that were formerly the "American lake". The last three US administrations' focus on the insoluble problems of the Middle East and the post-Ottoman Islamic world have come at a tremendous cost to the security of the Asia-Pacific, based as it is on a US maritime hegemony;
(3) Iran remains a threat on any number of fronts. Most ominously, Iran continued to cooperate, to varying degrees, with North Korea on missile technology. Iran also continues to threaten to close the Persian Gulf and thereby deny the easy movement of oil from Saudi and Gulf suppliers. Iran also remains the principal state sponsor of terrorism, arming and financing Hezbollah in Lebanon, and supplying terrorists of not only Shia origin but, also, when in Iran's quasi-imperial interests, Sunni salafist groups like Al Qaeda. Iran also threatens to encircle (via its Shia crescent allies and proxies) the West's allies on the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, Iran has not renounced its intent to destroy Israel, albeit the military balance weighs still in Israel's favour and the Israeli arsenal should only be strengthened by the Trump administration;
(4) Russia has conquered (or in the Russian mind, "regained") Crimea, without much of a shot, while Russia still wages a hybrid war campaign to destabilise the new government of Ukraine and threatens the Baltic states. Russia's disinformation and electronic warfare campaigns have only intensified, often uncontradicted by any compelling Western narrative and counter-measures. Russia, also, continues to solicit new relationships in the Middle East, for the first time in 50 years, both as markets for its weaponry as well as its channels for Russian influence and destabilisation. To be fair, though, there is no US or Western policy that can stop Russia influencing its periphery or "near abroad". Russia is approximately 150m people, spanning 11 Eurasian timezones from NATO's fringes to Japan's maritime approaches. Russia is a real country, with a profound sense of itself as an Orthodox Christian, great power in perennial danger of encirclement and invasion, as has been its fate throughout its history. Russia, too, has a long term domestic jihadi problem, which it confronts with an admirable degree of kinetic zeal, and Moscow sees Western policy in Syria as both a threat to its long term Syrian ally and bases, as well as delusionary with regard to, if not tacitly supportive of, Sunni salafist extremism. The Russians can be countered in some areas and cooperated with in others of shared interests. Moreover, the West has more to fear from what former US President Nixon called a "Weimar Russia" than a Russia that asserts itself esp on its southern and eastern flanks. (Anyone familiar with basic Russian, especially Tsarist, military and foreign policies would be unsurprised by patterns of Russian assertiveness, but in this age of historical illiteracy, those so familiar are, sadly, small in number); and
(5) after almost 16 years of war, the Sunni salafist jihadi terrorist threat had not receded but, rather, was as dangerous and more widely distributed than before 11 September 2001. The past 18 months has seen deadly terrorist attacks in Europe and the US, as well as foiled plots in many major cities. As ISIL has become the more prominent jihadist group, now in Afghanistan as well as inspiring "lone wolf" attacks, Al Qaeda has been, for some time, expanding its operations and fundraising, into Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
West's all too protracted wars
Given these five key challenges, it is important to note that Iraq and Afghanistan remain theatres of war for Western military forces, now in their 16th year of the post-9/11 wars. Iraq's west and north remain in a state of war, as the Iraqis (with substantial Western and Iranian help) seek to retake their country from ISIL. These Sunni-majority areas of Iraq were, not coincidentally, identical theatres of war, a decade earlier, as the US-led coalition in Iraq sought to eject Al-Qaeda from western Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the Western-backed government in Kabul controls less of the country than it did one year ago. Various efforts by Western forces to help raise, train and sustain the Afghan military and security forces have been failures. Afghan territory won at considerable cost by Western troops have been surrendered by the Kabul regime to the Taliban with nary a shot fired. The Russians, meanwhile, are reported to be increasingly engaged with the Taliban, less likely as a means of hurting the West than of Moscow now seeking influence with the party that looks, inevitably, to again the Afghan government. Whether Iran, which was a reliable supporter of the Northern Alliance's insurgency against the Taliban before 11 September 2001, would accept the Taliban's resumption of power is an open question. Whether Russia and Iran both see a Taliban-run Afghanistan as preferable to a potentially ISIL-aligned one is another matter.
Meanwhile, the various Western allies that participated and still continue in the Iraq, Afghan and now Syrian wars have incurred thousands of war dead, tens of thousands wounded and maimed (who suffer today from neglect and bureaucratic obfuscation), and war costs in the trillions, from these wars in the Islamic world. It is hard to find any parallel in post-Westphalian military history for wars of such long duration, horrific cost in blood and treasure, and so pronounced a lack of any kind of success, as the West's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If, as the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, "There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited", one wonders what possible rationale there is for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to have been so fitfully and poorly prosecuted.
Notwithstanding these realities, in the West generally and in the United States in particular, there are new calls for a new Western war to be commenced in Syria, to combat, inter alia, Iran, Hezbollah, ISIL, Al Qaeda and...Russia. Thus it is time to calmly examine the Syria question and to, especially, repel the blitzkrieg of strategic stupidity presented by proponents of Western military intervention in Syria, especially that aimed at "regime change".
The case for masterly Western inactivity in Syria
For reasons that are difficult for any prudent observer to comprehend, Syria has now become the latest focus of apparent Western concern and renewed calls for intervention. To be sure, Syria has had a brutal civil war, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the outflow of refugees. Syria, also, has been a warzone between various odious armed groups, each of which pose security challenges to individual Western powers.
Given the Western security challenges identified above, however, and especially the two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the gathering storms in North Asia and the South China Sea, Syria is not the place for increasingly scarce military and intelligence resources to be spent, at least not to any significant degree.
First, the West has, as James Baker said in 1992 of the factions fighting in the former Yugoslavia, "no dog in this fight" and, if anything, Western security, the reduction of refugee flows, and Syria's religious and ethnic minorities, need Assad to survive (to be followed by some form of reconciliation process). While anguished liberal media commentary - and what is left of the neoconservative rump that boarded the Hillary Titanic in 2016 - urges "something must be done", there is very little that can be practically done by the Western powers beyond continuing to augment the war already waged by Assad, Russian and Iranian forces against the salafist jihadist threat. While there is touting by the media of the "moderate Syrian rebels", these groups are allied with Islamists or have aims indistinguishable from jihadis. Meanwhile, Western kvetching over Russian bombing of various Syrian targets, especially Aleppo and Idlib, avoids the obvious reality that the Russians take a much broader – and, frankly, more realistic – view of what is a legitimate jihadi target. The refreshingly kinetic Russian way of war, as well as its decades of dealing with its own deadly internal jihadi threat, has inured Moscow to Western criticism. Russia remains the only (quasi) Western-ish country that has successfully defeated an insurgency, jihadist or otherwise – and the Russians do so using a ferocious mixture of firepower, speed and overwhelming force that every serious Western military leader of yesteryear would have understood, even if anathema to current (and hopeless) Western approaches based on "cultural awareness" and "counterinsurgency". It is no accident that the last wars that Western forces unmistakably won were the Second World War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, where allied political and military leaders accepted that victory required clearly defined objectives, deliberate planning, proper resourcing, coalition building, and the speedy use of overwhelming force-and where Allied forces could avail themselves of seapower and had access to resupply by seaports. Instead, the West's various militaries have had 16 years of protracted wars of 'lions led by donkeys', planned and executed poorly, and of unmeritorious political and media concerns corrupting military operations. At a certain level, the West should be grateful that it is the Russian Bear and his brutal if effective mission focus that is driving the Syrian war's strategy - and not some sensitive, new age, David Petraeus-figure, eager for a 'pat on the head' from the media and whose command is doomed to almost certain defeat.
Secondly, there is no Western solution, of any kind, to Syria's problems. Syria is c.23m people, majority Sunni Muslim (most of the 'gin and tonic' kind) but also with powerful Alawite and Christian minorities. Syria is the reverse of Saddam's Iraq, which was majority Shia but run by a mostly Sunni regime. Syria is the last bastion of Baathism and its sort of pan-Arab, secularist, ideology that had once been a conventional wisdom across the Middle East, which manifested itself in secular and rather brutal regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Such religiously diverse polities and their mismatch between demography and regime cannot ever be truly stable and yet also cannot ever be neatly reformed...certainly not during year 6 of a brutal civil and now sectarian civil war. Therefore, what precisely is the political outcome that any Western intervention would seek? Because once the West were to intervene in Syria to change the regime, it would 'own' whatever polity resulted from it, noting, also, that the anti-Assad forces are patronised by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, hardly known for their adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of non-Sharia law.
Thirdly, as a matter of simple realpolitik, the Russians and the Iranians have large stakes in the survival of Assad's Syria, for which Moscow and Tehran will fight against any Western intervention that seeks to topple or destabilise the regime. The Syrian regimes of Assad (senior and junior) have been reliable Russian and Iranian clients for over 40 years: Russia has substantial bases in Syria at Tartus and Latakia, and from the Iran-Iraq war onwards, Syria has been a loyal facilitator of Iran's regional ambitions, including its arming and training of Hezbollah in adjoining Lebanon. Neither Russia or Iran will want to be seen as fair-weather allies – quite the reverse. Russia and Iran are sending a message to current allies and potential allies that they are true friends and will defend with enormous violence a truly terrible regime like Assad, cf the West's abandonments during the Arab Spring.
Fourthly, any Western military intervention in Syria that is opposed by Russia and Iran (and thus Hezbollah) is guaranteed to incur substantial Western dead and wounded. The Russians, Iranians and their proxies have been operating in Syria for many years now and know this area of operations intimately. Further, in the case of Hezbollah, it has been fighting Israel for decades and, as well, provided lethal aid and support to militias and jihadis that fought Western troops in Iraq. It is difficult to overstate how much of an advantage the Assad forces and their Iranian and Russian patrons have in opposing any future Western military intervention in Syria.
History always casts the deciding vote
Since well before the fall of Constantinople, what is now the greater Middle East was traumatised over centuries by conquerors and invaders, by the clash of Christian and Islamic worlds, and by the desire to control silk roads and seaways. In particular, the long brutalisation of the region by the Ottomans and, also, by great power conflicts among the Ottomans, the Iranians, various Western powers and by Russian intrigue and "The Great Game", cannot be overstated. Only in the post-everything West is history considered optional and the brutal realities of a war something to be put to one side.
Unfortunately the history of these most bloody of the world's crossroads means one struggles to comprehend what, precisely, is the Western interest in seeing the Syrian status quo – the Assad regime – replaced by what would inevitably become a Sunni Islamist regime. An Assad supported by Russia and Iran, which has been the status quo for more than forty years, would be succeeded by, to borrow from Usama bin Laden, the "strong horse" of an Islamic state, if not a jihadistan. Why is this, in any way, desirable?
Moreover, most of the pundits and advocates for "something must be done" in Syria were proposing similarly grandiose solutions to Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya, and these latter day 'Lawrences of Amnesia' were completely discredited by events - and by a repeated unwillingness to recognise the unique problems that emerge in this region.
Given that what was Saddam's Iraq now resembles - thanks to Shia chauvinism, ISIS' insurgency and Kurdish assertiveness - something between the former Ottoman vilayets and a Mad Max world, some humility to proffering to know how any Western intervention in Syria would end is eminently desirable. Given the catastrophic results of the Western interventions of the past 16 years, the maxim "first, do no harm" should be engraved on the walls of every Western chancery.
Similarly, it is alarming to see how much of Western commentary on Syria is focused not on ISIL and Al Qaeda - but on Iran. To be sure, Iran is a hegemonic power, its population (c75m) dwarfs its Saudi (c27m) rival, and Iran's capacity to efficiently and decisively project power to its east and west, either directly or using its military proxies such as the IRGC and Hezbollah, into areas of Western security interest, is of great concern. However, Iran was a challenge when an ally under the Shah and has long been a challenge under the hostile regime of the Mullahs. There has been no appreciable change in the Iranian security challenge because of its participation in the Syrian war.
Moreover, Iran's size and strategic position make Western attempts to isolate and punish Iran little more than futile. Iran has been an historically important power since Biblical times, and, despite its innate ethnic and religious pluralism, Iran has a national cohesion, self-confidence and consistent grand strategy that its local adversaries, with the exception of Israel, do not. Expecting that any Western policy towards Iran - especially one of direct military confrontation in Syria - will result in Iran eschewing its pursuit of the regional hegemony, that the iron laws of geopolitics have historically granted it, is a foolish proposition. Iran fought Iraq for eight years to a bloody stalemate in circumstances where Iraq was armed by the Soviets and bankrolled by the Sunni Arab world, while Iran had only sub rosa support from North Korea, Syria, and, at times, Israel. The idea that Iran would be deterred by a Western military intervention in Syria – which would see Western forces operating in Tehran's preferred killing ground – is nothing short of insane.
Further, given that Shia Iran has, historically, been a Western ally and tolerant of Jewish and Christian faiths, it would be wiser for the West to seek to engage Iran's burgeoning civil society, as we once did those of the former Soviet empire, to seek to make the Iranian people our ally, and to appreciate the scholarly and artistic qualities of Shi'ism that differentiate Iran from the primitive salafism that afflicts our supposed Sunni 'allies'. What Churchill said of the Soviets applies to Iran's regime: they fear our friendship more than our enmity.
What would MacArthur and Patton do?
In a world of numerous concurrent, serious and draining security challenges, the case for masterly Western inactivity in Syria is overwhelming.
The current Western military effort, focused on combating ISIL and Al Qaeda should certainly be maintained and, where necessary, varied to achieved the desired end of destroying these two jihadi groups' capacities to operate in the Middle East and further afield. Similarly, there is a strong case for the enforcement of international legal norms by military strikes against those using weapons of mass destruction, something I have argued should have been done by President Obama when the Assad regime previously crossed the "red line".
However, the scope of the West's military effort in Syria should not be broadened to include that of seeking regime change or, indeed, some wider war in the Iraq and Syria areas of operations with Iran, Russia or their proxies. The West already has sufficient unfinished wars as it is without adding new fronts fighting protracted wars with the well-armed and combat-experienced forces of major military powers.
President Trump is known to be a disciple of two of America's greatest soldiers, General Douglas MacArthur and General George Patton. Both men were commanders known for achieving victories based on inspired leadership, meticulous planning, a keen appraisal of opposing forces, the relentless use of mass firepower, speed, and the remorseless concentration of forces on the weakest points of the enemy's positions. MacArthur himself has gone into history for the phrase, "In war there is no substitute for victory", uttered after MacArthur's relief as the allied commander during Truman's poorly prosecuted war in Korea.
However, less well known is that General MacArthur, in retirement, counselled presidents, prime ministers and various 'wise men' that wars that cannot be won must never be fought. MacArthur, in particular, advised his former Pacific war subordinate, President John F. Kennedy, to avoid land wars in Asia and, in particular, escalating the Vietnam war, which MacArthur judged as likely only to result in the US and its allies being bogged down in a costly quagmire that placed them at the mercy of their foes.
In the loneliness of the presidency, with all its burdens and responsibilities, and surveying the world on fire that has been bequeathed to him, President Trump could surely do worse than ask what his heroes MacArthur and Patton would make of the prospect of yet another long and unwinnable war in the Middle East? One suspects their advice would be, in every sense, laconic.
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