American Wars and Foreign Policy - Iraq

This is well worth watching in full, if only because it shows just how limited was the knowledge in the senior echelons of the US Government of Iraq and the realities of the Arab and Islamic world in the period 2002-2003. It is quite shocking to watch as none of the participants seem to feel any responsibility for the "Fiasco" (per Tom Ricks' book) that followed.  A classic example of the "mistakes were made" apologia for what was a strategic debacle.  Some rationalisation is offered for Saddam's removal on the basis that he ran a horrible regime.  Hopefully, as the West considers another Middle East intervention, this time in Syria, some lessons have been learned about the (desperate) need for prudence, an understanding of history, religion and demography, and a realistic appraisal of what transient concerns the West has versus others with more 'to play for'.

The Egyptian elections and the debacle of a decade

Sadly, stuck behind a paywall, is this excellent summary of the coming Egyptian elections by Greg Sheridan

The past decade has seen Western leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair, ignore the lessons of history, especially those of Woodrow Wilson, and all but abandon the virtues of prudence and realism in their post-9/11 attempt to export western liberal democracy to the Islamic and Arab worlds.

Despite the fact that constitutional democracy, featuring the rule of law and universal suffrage (regardless of gender or race), is only about 50 years old in the West, such facts could not impinge upon the liberal ambition to confer the "blessings of liberty" on populations very different from westerners in religion, language, traditions, and cultural experiences. In particular, the neoconservatives in the US sought to impose democracy by blitzkreig in Iraq, rather than persist with a policy of realpolitik and its balance of power arrangement, which the US had been content to live with in the Gulf. The fact that Iraqis proved stubbornly resistant to operating as liberal self-interested citizens - rather than as Arab tribesmen, Muslims and Iraqis - did not seem to dampen the neocon enthusiasm for further 'liberation by laser guided bomb' operations in Libya last year. As in Iraq, no thought was given in any western capital to who or what would succeed Gaddafi. No friendly Middle East strongman or tyrant - even if supportive of the rights of women and Christians - could be supported lest the application of Jeffersonian principles be diluted.

Sadly, President Obama, who in 2008-2009 had seemed an enthusiast for the realism of President Bush senior, adopted a policy of "leading from behind", whereby the US would support the British and French aiding of Libya's rebels to compel Gaddafi's fall and a new transitional regime to be succeeded by who-knows-what. The desire to "do something" overcame what many considered to be Barack Obama's great advantage over his predecessor: a reluctance for further conflicts, an awareness of religious and cultural differences, and an appreciation that the US may have permanent interests that transcend momentary desires for liberal triumphalism. Sadly, President Obama, too, has contributed to the West's debacle of a decade.

All this said, what happens in Egypt over the next month, as it faces its presidential election, may also hopefully be the final chapter in the modern West's idiotic desire to make every nation and every culture fit the straitjacket of western liberalism. That is because while democracy etc may be a worthy concept, Egypt is too big and too important to fall into 'enemy hands'. If the ghost of Iran in the late 1970s, where the friendly Shah fell and was replaced by the Ayatollahs, does not hover over these times then one is not looking closely enough. Certainly President Obama, anxious to avoid the fate of President Carter, will be watching events there very closely.

An Egyptian leader with Muslim Brotherhood loyalties - or an Egyptian military strongman reliant on Islamist assistance - would be the worst possible scenario. It would be bad for Egyptian Christians and for women. However, more broadly, it would mean that the West, Japan and China faced a strategic reality whereby both of the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal would be threatened by unfriendly powers. The effect of Egyptian unrest, internal chaos or hostility on Western shipping and on imports/exports of goods to and from the Mediterranean and Europe would be severe.

Most tellingly, an Egypt in chaos would result in Israel being effectively surrounded by anarchy: Lebanon to the north, Syria to the north east, Egypt to the west and the Palestinians in their usual tumult.

What Israeli government could possibly live easily in an Arab neighbourhood in a state of guaranteed civil unrest? What Israeli government would wish to make any sort of peace with regimes liable to be toppled by their own people? What Israeli government could credibly confront these realities and not adopt a 'fortress' mentality.

In statecraft, as in life, the choice is not between the best and worst of worlds but usually between a tolerable status quo and the always present danger of a descent into anarchy. At the end of the 1990s, western intellectuals believed that history had ended. The events of the last decade show that history is alive, well and, if ignored, always ready to stir new conflicts. We in the West have clearly learned nothing so far.

ADF: Attenuated Defence Force

Very good piece in the AFR today on Defence cuts

"The budget this month contained $5.5 billion in cuts over four years, a 10.5 per cent cut that is the biggest in percentage terms since the Korean War drawdown in 1953.

As a proportion of the size of the economy, defence spending is at its lowest level since the eve of World War II in 1938.

One of Australia’s pre-eminent defence analysts, professor Hugh White, said last night the government was “effectively downgrading Australia’s status from a middle power to a small power’’. “The government is free to make judgments about defence spending, but it should level with the Australian public about what it means for Australia’s security and so far it has been dishonest about it,’’ he said."

It is difficult to understand what, if any, thinking drives the Gillard government's thinking on Defence or indeed any aspect of military strategy. It is a well-known matter that as Deputy PM, Julia Gillard sent her former bodyguard to National Security Committee meetings. She is not interested in Defence and, given her background as a union lawyer, it is probably understandable that this is not her natural area of expertise. However she is the Prime Minister and that office requires her to take seriously the Prime Minister's duty to secure the country to the best of his or her ability. The contrast between her and her predecessor Kevin Rudd is a stark one indeed. The 2009 Defence White Paper was Kevin Rudd's great legacy to the ADF and, if implemented, would have resulted in an ADF of the potency and weight last experienced in the Vietnam era. Sadly, Rudd's blueprint has been junked by the Gillard Government and there is simply no replacement force structure concept. The worst aspect is that there is little appetite among Opposition ranks to fight on this issue. While Opposition Leader Tony Abbott is personally well-disposed to the ADF, the rest of the Coalition has no interest or stomach for fighting for a larger and more potent ADF. This is disappointing as whatever else is the role of conservative parties, the raising, training and sustaining of the armed forces is usually one of its major priorities.

The sly junking of the 2009 Defence White Paper reveals one of the fundamental problems faced by the ADF: it has comprehensively failed to develop a broad constituency. Since the end of the Vietnam War and national service in 1972, very few Australians have any personal experience of the armed forces and little knowledge about what they do. Australians are supportive of the ADF and proud of the work done but cannot understand "guns" as easily as "butter". This political reality enables Governments of all persuasions to extract billions of dollars from Defence safe in the knowledge that there will be few protests and that the issues involved and capabilities sacrificed are too complex for the average voter to understand. The depth of recent cuts to Defence would be unthinkable in portfolios like Health and Welfare, which have large, well-organised and mature lobbies ready to pounce on even a small reduction in the rate of spending. Defence has the odd retired senior officer writing a letter to the editor which, in 2012, will probably not be published if something more salacious is in the news.

To prevent such degradation in the future, one remedy is to legislate for a process whereby the ADF's senior commanders must provide annual reports to the Parliament, free of ministerial spin, on the ADF's force structure, manning, capabilities and readiness. In short, each year the ADF's senior commanders would report on what the state of the ADF is, where capability and personnel gaps exist, and what should be done to fill them. Senior commanders could be examined by Parliamentary committees and allowed to freely explain what the state of the ADF was and, if deficient, how to improve it. Then the pressure would be on the Government of the day to accept this advice or reject it.

Clearly the current system - of trusting partisan governments to honestly manage Defence structure in the national interest - has failed and failed miserably.

Australia's Strategy - George Friedman

George Friedman makes very valid points here. The dilemma that Australia faces in perpetuity is how to secure a continent the size of the United States or the EU with a population smaller than Malaysia. A valid question is why Australia has never properly considered the maximum exploitation of its continent and resources, aided and fueled by a determined policy to boost population. While the "Big Australia" ideal has been rejected by both PM Gillard and Opposition Leader Abbott, it remains the most logical and sustainable means of ensuring Australia has both economic weight and strategic depth. A Big Australia can better finance itself, secure itself and have influence in both its near abroad and in strategic fora. Unfortunately, as previously noted, Australia has regularly had provincial leaders and lacks any formalised structure for the making of a national strategy to increase the nation's power and influence. Increasing the nation-state's economic and military security is ordinarily a conservative goal and would be a worthy one for Tony Abbott to re-examine.

Afghanistan: Unspeakable Reasons to Stay

As the NATO-ISAF coalition meets in Chicago, the conventional wisdom is that this signals a move by the nations of the ISAF coalition to withdraw.

In Australia’s case, as this blog has said before, since the original commitment was made in 2001, no sustained effort has been made by any of the Howard, Rudd or Gillard governments to explain the Afghanistan commitment in terms readily comprehensible.  Australia is not alone here and none of our major coalition partners in Canada, the United Kingdom or even the United States has conducted anything similar to the war information campaigns of the Second World War.  Certainly Australia’s Parliament has reflected the, sadly, provincial and limited grasp of our elected representatives of the nation’s true interests.  How else can 10 years of almost undebated war be explained?

Unfortunately, Australia has no formal, organised strategic body.  We are a nation without a permanent, legislated and professional national security planning committee.  Our nation’s grand strategy, beyond certain fundamental interests in regional stability and freedom of the seas, is not set by the nation’s leaders, nor is it guarded by a cohort of wise mandarins.  During the 2010 election campaign, it became known that both Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard sent staffers to represent them at the Cabinet’s national security committee meetings, something that would be unthinkable in the United States or the United Kingdom.  As a result, because of a lack of structure and a lack of seriousness, wars and military commitments can and do drift along.  Afghanistan is not the first example and arguably the East Timor and Solomons’ operations have elements of this though the proximity of these places demands our attention.

Having said all this, even if we have stayed in Afghanistan without a strategic rationale, there are benefits to being ‘over there’ and to us staying there with our American and British allies.

Unspeakable Truth 1: we should only leave with our Allies

Despite the current Australian Parliament being composed by all shades of political opinion, and a minority Labor Government surviving with Greens support, the Afghanistan debate in 2010 reaffirmed a bipartisan consensus on Australia’s commitment:  Australian forces are in Afghanistan to prevent it becoming an Al Qaeda sanctuary; to support the United States and key allies such as Britain, Canada and New Zealand; and to train the Afghan security forces to secure their country. 

Of these public rationales, however, Australia’s principal strategic reason for being in Afghanistan is to maintain and strengthen the US alliance, with the anti-terrorism campaign an important but secondary priority.  While many of the US’ NATO allies will go “wobbly” (per Margaret Thatcher’s phrase), especially as Bin-Laden’s death provides a convenient excuse, Australia entered the Afghanistan war in 2001 alongside the United States (and the United Kingdom) and, realistically, should only leave Afghanistan when the US and the UK are ready to withdraw.  

Australia has no strategic interest whatsoever in humiliating the US and the UK by withdrawing on its own and, indeed, it would be an act of strategic folly to do so.  The US alliance, as anyone who has served with US Forces knows, provides Australia with a level of strategic support that Australia could not ever build for itself.  The US’ professional defence establishment, which sees presidents come and go, remembers very well which of America’s ‘friends’ are friends and which are merely acquaintances.  The rapid escalation in the last 10 years of the US and Australia’s already intimate defence relationship is reflective of the US’ perception of Australia as a reliable ally, particularly when other allies hoist the white flag or offer token “civilian advisors” to a war. The same applies in a smaller measure to the old alliance with the UK.  For Australia to suddenly decide the future of its Afghan commitment without first examining its effects on the greater alliance relationship, would be a cost benefit analysis done 10 years too late.  Those who are against the war for reasons relating to either Christian just war theory and/or the futility of staying in Afghanistan, should at least pause to reflect on Australia's alliances before urging a prompt withdrawal.  We might also consider our reputation as a nation that keep its word and whose armed forces carry on the virtues of stoicism, tenacity and grit that it publicly celebrates in its military tradition.

Unspeakable Truth 2: the Afghan war is good experience for the ADF

While it is true that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are strategically flawed, particularly given their dimensions of international social work and “do-gooder” ambition, these conflicts have provided invaluable real-world training benefits to the ADF. 

Let there be no misunderstanding: war (and preparing for war) is the business of the armed forces.  Australia’s armed forces are composed entirely of volunteers.  Each volunteer joins knowing he or she may be sent in harm’s way. 

In the quarter of a century from the end of Australia’s Vietnam commitment (1972-1973) to the start of the East Timor campaign (1999-2000), Australia intermittently deployed the Royal Australian Navy to the Persian Gulf, as well as occasionally deployed soldiers in Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda.  However, deployments were for the relatively few, with most serving members knowing nothing but exercises, which could only hope to simulate not just war’s fog but its iron application of Murphy’s law.  Since 1999, the ADF has made regular deployments to East Timor, the Solomons, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq.  These deployments have resulted in improvements in the skills and operational readiness of the armed forces as a whole. The ADF has grown only stronger, harder and more resilient in the past decade. 

More importantly, the last 12 years’ continuous operations have created cohorts of experienced leaders in all services.  Whether junior sailors in the Middle East, young Diggers in Afghanistan, or the ‘rookie’ airmen supporting them, the young men and women of the last decade’s operations are forming an experienced cohort from which tomorrow’s ADF will draw its future leaders.  The wartime crucible in which young men and women are being tested and are forging new skills and military knowledge is an unfashionable but significant benefit to the ADF.  This is particularly so in respect of inter-operability between the services and with allied forces, which is denied to a provincial military that stays at home and which does not deploy.  Above all, this experience is training junior leaders to be impatient with red-tape, ‘initiative inertia’ and the ‘cannot do’ attitude of the Canberra bureaucracy.  While not (yet) regularly deployed in the manner of Rome’s legions, Spain’s Tercios, or Nelson’s fleets, it is the case that the regular operational deployments of the modern ADF has only benefited the force’s skills, depth and robustness. 

Stating this does not ignore the difficulty that Afghanistan may have in satisfying “just war” criteria.  However, even if one has qualms about the prudence of what is now a war against the Pashtu, one’s just war criteria is rather narrow if the killing and capturing of jihadists, sworn to destroy infidels such as Australians, is considered illicit. 

In short, while various western leaders gather in Chicago and make pious pronouncements about the Afghan war and the “Afghan People”, it is well for Australians to pause and remember that their interests are different from Europeans, mired in welfare state penury, who are loudly reviewing their commitments to the Afghanistan mission. 

Australia is a Pacific and Indian Ocean nation – we are surrounded by and exposed to these vast expanses of water and territory in which we have vital interests in maintaining a stable and friendly balance of power.  These oceans are our moats – and we need our American and British allies to help us secure our realm.  We depend on these (and other) allies’ willingness to commit themselves to these and other areas where Australia’s national interests are the most exposed.  It is a small matter, realistically, for us to stay with our American and British allies until such time as all of us agree that it is time to withdraw from Afghanistan.  Further, by staying, while we run obvious risks to our own forces, we also increasingly up-skill our military and better develop our future leaders in a demanding operational environment. 

Australia’s position should be based on our own national interests, which include upholding and maintaining  military alliances critical to our security, as well as a cool and unsentimental realism about the true costs and benefits of the Afghan War.  We would do ourselves no favours by succumbing now to a conventional wisdom that is irrelevant to Australia’s geopolitical realities and which, if followed into withdrawal now, would only cause us strategic difficulty.

Lessons of the Iraq War?

A timely and accurate analysis of what went wrong and how.

Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War - By Stephen M. Walt | Foreign Policy

In addition to Stephen Walt's list, I also think there were two big problems revealed by the Iraq war from the occupation in 2003 onwards:

(1) Resourcing - there were simply never enough ground forces in-country to truly enforce order, both in the Sunni West and in the Shia South.  One significant difference between the supposed neocon model of Europe in 1945 and the reality of Iraq in 2003 was (A) most (sadly not all) Europeans wanted the Allies to come in and remove the Nazis in 1945 and (B) the Allies had destroyed the Wehrmacht, and then occupied Germany and Austria with overwhelming numbers of troops.  The German werewolf threat never materialised.  Whereas in Iraq, few Iraqis wanted the Coalition there and then, undefeated, disgruntled Iraqi Army personnel and foreign fighters helped to form the Sunni insurgency, which quickly started attacking Coalition Forces and Shia sites and then the Shia militias arose as well to defend their own and to effectively seize power.  Chaos throughout 2003 and 2004 allowed the sectarian fissure to become a full-on civil war.  By 2006, Baghdad and western Iraq were sectarian battlegrounds.

(2) Leaders -- sadly, the pro-consuls sent to Iraq in 2003-2004 were not brilliant.  Paul Bremer was not Douglas MacArthur.  The Bremer decision to disband the Iraqi Army and dismiss from Government service all of the Iraqis who had kept it running, was an act of insanity. Most of the Coalition's senior commanders and officials had no deep knowledge of Iraqi or even Arab culture.  I suspect this is because the most knowledgeable diplomats were against the war and because the most experienced strategist-soldiers (eg GEN Anthony Zinni) had retired.  It is difficult to believe that the Allied occupation forces in 1944-1945 were as poorly prepared as the Coalition commanders were to take charge of an Arab and Islamic country.

There was also a moral problem that should be discussed as well alongside any lessons.  In 2003-2004, there was conduct at Abu Ghraib prison that disgraced the US military and from which the Coalition Forces never subsequently recovered.  Even now it is shocking.  From then on, whatever residual goodwill may have existed among locals for the Coalition was gone.  That conduct arose, in part, from a determination on the part of some, after 9/11, to dehumanise any enemies and treat suspected members of the Iraqi insurgency as ripe for acts of bestial cruelty and perversion.  That conduct was possible in part because the military is a reflection of society and, since the 1960s, traditional moral values in western societies have on any viewed eroded.  It is impossible to believe that in WWI or WWII there was any requirement to train young troops in how to treat captured prisoners, at least in terms of not committing acts of perversion on them.  In 2003, it was, it seems, sadly necessary.  If ever there was a lesson in what happens when a military does not teach and enforce basic Judeo-Christian morality among its own ranks, then this was it.  Sadly, one unit's feral behaviour cast a pall over the honourable and decent conduct of others who served in Iraq.  All of the officers in that unit's chain of command should have been held accountable, not just the junior enlisted personnel.

1848: History

Robert D. Kaplan is one of my favourite writers and kudos to Stratfor for hiring him.  He writes below of the challenge posed to the Middle East's fragile order by the West's renewed push for democracy.

One of the ongoing problems of the post-11 September 2001 world is that, in order to fight Sunni jihadists, it somehow became necessary that everywhere in the Middle East be made into a secular democracy.  The rationale for this was never explained by the Bush Administration and the proposition was, sadly, never challenged by sufficient numbers of conservative Americans, custodians of the realpolitik tradition.  As a result, the years since 2001 have been seen, inter alia, the US and its allies attempt to remediate Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and now Syria.  At the same time, even allies hosting US facilities like Bahrain have been pressured to give more ground to dissentients even ones allied to Iran.  However this toppling of previously friendly or at least benign Arab regimes has come at a cost - to locals, to Arab women and to Arab Christians.  No one seems to have thought ahead and asked "what comes next"?  It is almost as if no lesson was learned from the Iraq debacle.  At no stage has the national interest test been passed whereby any Western country can say its security has been improved because, say, Mubarak has been toppled and now a military council (requiring Islamist backing) is in charge.



"While there is no equivalent in the Middle East of the Habsburg system, not every dictatorial regime in the Arab world is expendable for some of the same reasons that Habsburg Austria's was not. That is the burdensome reality of the Middle East today: If conservative -- even reactionary -- orders are necessary for inter-communal peace, then they may survive in one form or another, or at least resurface in places such as Egypt and Iraq."


Read more: 1848: History's Shadow Over the Middle East, by Robert D. Kaplan | Stratfor


1848: History



I should add, meanwhile, that while the US is expending billions to somehow perfect the Middle East, the US is borrowing the money from China ... what sense is there in such a policy?

Obama's war

This happened in Australia as well, where the ALP championed Afghanistan as the "good war" and Iraq as the "bad war", ignoring the strategic reality that Iraq is an important country for a host of strategic and demographic reasons and Afghanistan is ... not.  This is quite apart from Afghanistan's status as the graveyard of empires.  But the Left needed its war, too, and this one came with a nation-building, missionary aspect that would warm the hearts of liberals who wanted to let the oppressed go free and all that.  Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, there is a clash of medieval cultures (Pashtu, Tajik, Hazara) and the resolution of these, unless it leads to terrorist sanctuaries, is any problem of Australia (or the United States') to solve.

The saddest aspect is that President Obama could, in 2009, have ordered a thorough reassessment of Afghanistan, not just how the war was being fought but what the point of the war was, but he chose not to.  History will probably record VP Biden's internal criticism of the Afghan war as prescient but sadly the criticism should have been being made in 2006-2007 when it was clear that the TB was resurgent in southern Afghanistan.

The key passage here:

"Furthermore, Iraq was always a more solvable problem than Afghanistan for demographic and historical reasons. Compared to Afghanistan's multifarious ethnic and religious groups, Iraq is quite cohesive, with only three major ethnic groups and two languages. While Iraq experienced four years of war from 2003 to 2007, and although Saddam Hussein's regime was vicious, war-torn and bloody, Iraq was a stable paradise compared to the thirty years of near anarchy and constant warfare Afghanistan has seen since the Soviet invasion."


RealClearWorld - Come What May, Obama Owns Afghanistan

Syria - will we be smart or dumb?

Great summary of the problem and the options in Syria.  Miller ends with this:

"We should stop beating ourselves up for once. Given the complexity of the problem, other pressing priorities, our interests, and the potential costs of an intervention, the administration is doing what it can. Chances are the longer the killing goes on, the more likely we be will dragged into doing more. But the notion that we should intercede quickly with some dramatic,  ill-advised, poorly thought through idea of kill zones or safe havens without thinking through the consequences of what protecting those areas would entail is a prescription for disaster.


Intervening militarily now isn't about left or right, liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat, or even about right or wrong -- it's really about choosing between being dumb or smart. I know where I come down."

How Not to Intervene in Syria - By Aaron David Miller | Foreign Policy

Why 2012 reminds us of 1871

Harold James is a Princeton professor and historian of globalisation - his piece for Bloomberg bears close reading.

History Blinds Europe to a Germany Worth Emulating: Harold James - Bloomberg

Probably the most interesting aspect is that none of the European nation-states' problems can be divorced from their prevailing cultures, be it the Teutonic work ethic or the Latin penchant for denying problems and thereby delaying doing anything about them.  This all said, given Europe's terrible demographic problems, perhaps currency woes are the least of the old world's problems:

http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-the-15-demographic-dogs-that-are-going-the-way-of-greece-2010-3

Tory against war with Iran

This is a provocative piece by a British Conservative opposing military action against Iran.

New Statesman - Why the west should rule out military action against Iran

This issue has a way to play out yet.

Among the questions still unanswered is, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, if there is a decision to launch attacks on Iran, then what comes next?  Is the military operation a series of coordinated strikes against Iran's military/scientific infrastructure or is it a wider regime change campaign against the Islamic Republic's power structure? All of these questions are unanswered as yet by proponents of military action.  After Afghanistan and especially Iraq, perhaps some serious thinking and planning is required.

Right now, the prudent realist on this issue is ... President Obama.

The State of the Anglosphere by Joel Kotkin and Shashi Parulekar, City Journal Winter 2012

The State of the Anglosphere by Joel Kotkin and Shashi Parulekar, City Journal Winter 2012