The Egyptian elections and the debacle of a decade

Sadly, stuck behind a paywall, is this excellent summary of the coming Egyptian elections by Greg Sheridan

The past decade has seen Western leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair, ignore the lessons of history, especially those of Woodrow Wilson, and all but abandon the virtues of prudence and realism in their post-9/11 attempt to export western liberal democracy to the Islamic and Arab worlds.

Despite the fact that constitutional democracy, featuring the rule of law and universal suffrage (regardless of gender or race), is only about 50 years old in the West, such facts could not impinge upon the liberal ambition to confer the "blessings of liberty" on populations very different from westerners in religion, language, traditions, and cultural experiences. In particular, the neoconservatives in the US sought to impose democracy by blitzkreig in Iraq, rather than persist with a policy of realpolitik and its balance of power arrangement, which the US had been content to live with in the Gulf. The fact that Iraqis proved stubbornly resistant to operating as liberal self-interested citizens - rather than as Arab tribesmen, Muslims and Iraqis - did not seem to dampen the neocon enthusiasm for further 'liberation by laser guided bomb' operations in Libya last year. As in Iraq, no thought was given in any western capital to who or what would succeed Gaddafi. No friendly Middle East strongman or tyrant - even if supportive of the rights of women and Christians - could be supported lest the application of Jeffersonian principles be diluted.

Sadly, President Obama, who in 2008-2009 had seemed an enthusiast for the realism of President Bush senior, adopted a policy of "leading from behind", whereby the US would support the British and French aiding of Libya's rebels to compel Gaddafi's fall and a new transitional regime to be succeeded by who-knows-what. The desire to "do something" overcame what many considered to be Barack Obama's great advantage over his predecessor: a reluctance for further conflicts, an awareness of religious and cultural differences, and an appreciation that the US may have permanent interests that transcend momentary desires for liberal triumphalism. Sadly, President Obama, too, has contributed to the West's debacle of a decade.

All this said, what happens in Egypt over the next month, as it faces its presidential election, may also hopefully be the final chapter in the modern West's idiotic desire to make every nation and every culture fit the straitjacket of western liberalism. That is because while democracy etc may be a worthy concept, Egypt is too big and too important to fall into 'enemy hands'. If the ghost of Iran in the late 1970s, where the friendly Shah fell and was replaced by the Ayatollahs, does not hover over these times then one is not looking closely enough. Certainly President Obama, anxious to avoid the fate of President Carter, will be watching events there very closely.

An Egyptian leader with Muslim Brotherhood loyalties - or an Egyptian military strongman reliant on Islamist assistance - would be the worst possible scenario. It would be bad for Egyptian Christians and for women. However, more broadly, it would mean that the West, Japan and China faced a strategic reality whereby both of the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal would be threatened by unfriendly powers. The effect of Egyptian unrest, internal chaos or hostility on Western shipping and on imports/exports of goods to and from the Mediterranean and Europe would be severe.

Most tellingly, an Egypt in chaos would result in Israel being effectively surrounded by anarchy: Lebanon to the north, Syria to the north east, Egypt to the west and the Palestinians in their usual tumult.

What Israeli government could possibly live easily in an Arab neighbourhood in a state of guaranteed civil unrest? What Israeli government would wish to make any sort of peace with regimes liable to be toppled by their own people? What Israeli government could credibly confront these realities and not adopt a 'fortress' mentality.

In statecraft, as in life, the choice is not between the best and worst of worlds but usually between a tolerable status quo and the always present danger of a descent into anarchy. At the end of the 1990s, western intellectuals believed that history had ended. The events of the last decade show that history is alive, well and, if ignored, always ready to stir new conflicts. We in the West have clearly learned nothing so far.