The only real news came from the press conference, where Trump, as is his wont, denied the obvious Russian meddling in US elections, even when told by his own intelligence agencies, because of a fear that there be any question as to the legitimacy of his 2016 electoral victory. Trump’s bizarre obstinancy, which deserved, fully, the criticism that it received, was quickly outdone by the increasingly hysterical and broken, with cries of “treason” from the very same and supposedly non-partisan media that cheered on the disastrous Obama defence sequester, the inane Hillary Clinton Russian Reset, and who ridiculed Mitt Romney for his observation in 2012 that Russia was the United States’ primary geopolitical foe.
One of the miracles of the Trump era is the conversion of formerly poncy American liberals into hawks, at least against Russia, something that did not occur during the Soviet era and which was unknown before 09 November 2016. Moreover, the fact that Trump remains the US President means that many neoconservatives remain on the brink of requiring institutionalisation.
In any event, as I often say, it is always good to keep a sense of perspective and see things as they really are. If Donald Trump or, indeed, Vladimir Putin, disappeared tomorrow, the Western relationship with Russia would still have many problems. It has always been a cardinal error of Western analysis of foreign (and especially Russian) policy to focus on personalities and ignore enduring cultural and historical drivers of statecraft. This is a particular failing among Anglophones, of which I am one. English speakers and Anglophone analysts are, too often, ignorant of their own geography and history, and how it drove and still determines their statecraft. The British were and remain an island and seafaring people, whose language, law, culture and customs spread by sea to North America, Australia and New Zealand. This bred both an aggressively commercial instinct, as well as habits of insularity and provincialism. Also, being island people with sea frontiers, Anglophones were liberated from the sort of messy and combative, “cheek-by-jowl”, Realpolitik, existence that has been the lot of continental European states that share land borders, rivers, lakes, mountains, and other intimate frontiers, with historic enemies. Anglophones have the luxury of an idealism conferred by the security of their sea walls, and which idealism is denied to those continental states who must look at their enemy’s enemies for their friends. The Russian state, over centuries, has had many problems but a lack of a sense of history and geography - and a lack of enemies - is not one of them. In the case of Russia and the Russians, then, the following should always be born in mind:
A. The Russian Federation spans 11 time zones and contains 150 million people. Modern Russia sits central and atop what the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder called, “the heartland” of Eurasia. While the Russian economy is, on a good day, only the size of that of Italy, or less than that of California, Russia has nuclear weapons, is a major military power and arms exporter, and has a historic capacity for war, spycraft, and subversion, both out of a sense of self-preservation against adversaries and to impose its will on weaker neighbours on the Russian periphery;
B. The Russians have their own language, culture and understanding of nationhood. The Russian nation dates back to Kievan Rus in 882AD and to the story of its ensuing Christianisation. This more than 1000 year old history well predates the colonisation of the Americas, let alone the United States, and pretty much all of the states of the European Union. Russians – whether governed by Grand Princes, Tsars, Commissars, or now a President – have a defined sense of self and of shared bonds together and their estrangement from others. Moreover, the religious dominance of the state-supported and directed Russian Orthodox Church had the effect of uniting the Russian people spiritual and political in a way that Western liberal secularists fail to comprehend or, if they do, generally despise it; and
C. In that past 1000 years, the Russian people have fought against and been invaded by – from all points of the compass rose – the Mongols, the Swedes, the Persians, the Turks, the French, and the Germans (twice). And then, during the Cold War, came the shambolic Soviet attempts to maintain an empire over old central European peoples who hated both Russia and especially the Soviets. The Soviets came close to a nuclear conflict with the United States during the Cuban Missile (1962) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), and had an actual shooting conflict with China over the Ussuri River border in 1969. That Russia has been attacked from all directions, regularly, in its history, breeds a fear of encirclement and invasion that is never far from the surface of Kremlin thinking.
Suffice to say, each and all of A-C leaves their imprint down the ages. There is nothing that anyone who is (or is not) Russian can do about them. These geopolitical realities ensure Russian statecraft follows certain repetitive directions, to retain Russian power, to deploy Russian force, and to avoid Russia’s perennial fears of invasion and encirclement. It is best, then, to bear these enduring and historic influences in mind when considering statecraft, especially that of a great power. The great British military historian, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, advised his readers, a devoted one of which was the future US President, John F. Kennedy, who would review Liddell Hart’s book, in the following terms:
Keep strong, if possible. In any case, keep cool. Have unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save face. Put yourself in his shoes - so as to see things through his eyes. Avoid self-righteousness like the devil - nothing is so self-blinding.
This is wise advice. Pause and think of the view from Moscow (or Tehran or Beijing) before formulating a new strategy.
As it is, we in the broader West face numerous and intractable problems in dealing with Russia which make any attempt at improving relations almost doomed to fail.
Firstly, there is no real trust between the Russians and the West. The expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders occurred in contradiction of the guarantees made to the former Soviet Union that a united Germany would be the only addition to NATO’s membership. By 1999, under the Clinton Administration, former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became NATO members, which has since grown to include all manner of smaller European states that few if any US politician could find on a map. Also in 1999, NATO bombed Russia’s ally Serbia in support of the Kosovars. All this NATO expansion occurred when Russia was at its weakest, most dysfunctional, and, in the Russian mind, while they were being exploited by the new oligarchs and Western vagabonds who plundered their wealth. These grievances are all ‘baked in’ the Russian relationship - and Vladimir Putin is but one of the inevitable reactions by a Russian people with grievances towards the West. The (disastrous) Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, continuing or leaving chaos in their wake, have also raised Russian anxieties as to Western enthusiasm for ‘regime change’. Even if a Vladimir Putin was not the Russian President, the advance of the NATO frontier so close to Russia and the Western involvement in the 2014 Maidan Square toppling of Ukraine's former President Viktor Yanukovych would mean any Russian President would take steps to rebuff the West's advance.
(I leave aside the West’s own grievances against Russia, most recently its proxies’ shooting down of the MH17 aircraft, killing 298 innocent people, and Russia’s support for Iranian moves. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea is, in truth, a less serious issue, as it has no real likelihood of being reversed, given the local Crimean support for Russian unity and the fact that no Russian leader will ever surrender Sebastopol. Those criticising President Obama for weakness towards Russia over Crimea and Donetsk ignore that Obama had no good options. Simple fact is that there is simply no trust between either side and Russia is entrenching its newly acquired position.)
Secondly, Russia’s geography and the value of its ‘near abroad’ to its security mean that Russia cannot overlook Western militaries operating in or near its borders, bases and interests, be it in Afghanistan, Syria, the Black Sea or Baltic Sea. One can have idealistic dreams of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific” but the reality is that, each day, the Russian military operates and patrols to deter what the Russians see as deterrence of Western probes, intelligence collection and reconnaissance against ‘the motherland’. Even with a relationship in a better state than the current dismal one, it is inevitable that ‘blue and red’ military activities risk future clashes between Russian and Western militaries, which will, when they occur, have to be de-escalated quickly. This is in addition to Western provision of lethal military aid to the Ukranians, which risks Western weaponry being used to kill Russia’s “little green men”. One does not need to be AJP Taylor to see the obvious dangers of escalation here. Moreover, the Russian military staff system is mature and dates back centuries, improved by the Soviets, and staff training prepares Russian officers in understanding the history, languages, cultures and military thinking of their adversaries. The Russian military mind is brutal where necessary but is just as supple and sophisticated as any Western military at its higher echelons. Westerners underestimate the sophistication of Russian military thinking at their peril.
Thirdly, the sanctions against Russia have done grave damage to the Russian economy. There is no prospect of the West relaxing sanctions. There is no prospect of Russia engaging in any sort of behaviours that would lead to a relaxing of sanctions.
Fourthly, Russia (through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and bilateral relations) has sought closer relations with China and Iran. This is in addition to Russia’s role as a backer of North Korea and Syria. In the case of Russian support of Syria, this is not a policy choice suggesting a desire to relieve Americans and Israelis of anxieties as to Russian policy in the Middle East. Russia is promoting its reliability as an ally by backing its long term Syrian ally and by ensuring Russia’s bases in Tartus and Lakatia. Russia also sees these relations as a means of breaking out of its perennial fear of encirclement.
These are just some of the problems that plague the Russian relationship.
The conundrum of Western statecraft is that, at present, the Russians, Chinese, and Iranians, form a geopolitical bloc that dominates the Eurasian heartland and rimland. The military, security, and other working partnership between Russia and China has been termed "DragonBear". The more Western policy punishes Russia (rightly or wrongly), the more Russia is pushed to sees its future as one of these three overlords, rather than, say, as a humiliated counterparty of an ever more mercurial West. Moreover, from a Muscovy perspective, it is far better to be in penury and have good relations with the other land powers adjacent to Russia than to risk disappointment again by engaging with the West. A Russian people that lost tens of millions of people during the Second World War, a war that still helps define even a modern, non-Sovietised Russia, has little fear of Western sanctions that do not bind China and other states.
To some degree, the future will be determined by this geopolitical question: does the West see curtailing Chinese and Iranian ambitions as worth overlooking some previously unacceptable Russian belligerence? Can Moscow win concessions if Chinese and Iranian aspirations become the most pressing concern? If so, does Russia do what it can via arms sales, training, intelligence sharing, and subversion, to assist the Iranians, especially, and the Chinese to make as much of a nuisance of themselves as to force the West to come to terms with Russia - on Russia's terms? There is no feasible way that the West can posture military forces to engage in a “Triple Containment” of Russia, China, and Iran, especially as they are all land powers. The future of Russian statecraft may seem to be adventurist but that is to assume that the Kremlin sees the world as the West does. Where the liberal West eschews the means of military power in favour of absurd ideas of 'soft power', the Russians look at the required ends to be achieved, including intervening with overwhelming military force, as Russia's Syrian campaign has shown.
On any view, relations with Russia will remain fraught for the foreseeable future. If one is to understand Russian statecraft, one must understand the Russian people, history, and culture, on their own terms and as Russians see them. To understand your adversary is not to betray your own nation but to be able to pursue its interests all the more effectively and with a needed grounding in reality.
The current hysteria over Russia helps no one. We need a broader debate over Russian policy rather than allegations of treason or puppet when anyone tries to correct error. Conformity helps no one, especially when it is imposed on pain of dissenters being defamed. The real question must be asked, also, of the utility and realism of Western security pledges made to states on the historic Russian periphery by alliances in which Americans shoulder an immensely disproportionate share of the military burden, at a time when most Americans are tired of alliances that are, in effect, dependencies. Europeans that have effectively disarmed take grave risks when poking the Russian bear or threatening the approaches to its historic domain. The question, "Who will die for Donbass?" may not be wholly rhetorical for NATO in the years to come. The Russian view is that the Europeans are too weak, infantilised, disarmed, and militarily unserious, as well as too divided by conflicting interests, to mount any response to Russian advances, whether by way of open or by hybrid warfare. The American appetite to defend Europeans who cannot and will not help defend themselves is also, likely, waning, on all sides of US politics. The Cold War is (long) over and, to the degree that Europeans have chosen butter over guns, then the European military decline is a choice that Europeans have made for themselves. The Americans are not obligated to prevent the Europeans from suffering the inevitable consequences of their military delinquency.
I will leave the final words to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, himself a very astute judge of Russian military history and statecraft, as to why we do not learn from history:
“Regrettable as it may seem to the idealist, the experience of history provides little warrant for the belief that real progress, and the freedom that makes progress possible, lies in unification. For where unification has been able to establish unity of ideas it has usually ended in uniformity, paralysing the growth of new ideas. And where the unification has merely brought about an artificial or imposed unity, its irksomeness has led through discord to disruption.”
Spasiba.
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