The Russian Problem

Almost a month ago, I wrote a piece for the Sydney Morning Herald on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and understanding the Russians, both as an adversarial power, and on their own terms as the historic Russia.  In some ways, it was a follow-on from my longer 2018 post here on the Russians.

As I have found out, partly to my amusement and partly to my disappointment, that one cannot have any perspective on the Russian problem that differs one iota from whatever is the conventional wisdom.  This is less about criticism, per se, than the sheer pride taken by so many in media and punditry in their complete ignorance of the Russians and, particularly, Russian strategic and military culture.  One could spend one's entire life attempting to counter, or even just contrast, so much of the current deluge of quite pathetic analysis of Russia with facts, and yet pass from this life with that task still a boulder that Sisyphus himself would mock you for trying to carry. 

The only ways forward in respect of Russia (as with China and Iran - also 'old countries' with historic claims of security domains) is, as regards the diplomacy:

1. understanding historic and current geography: boundaries past and present, component ethnic and religious groups, trade routes, enduring defence and security interests;  
2. recognising where common interests may lie, in which we can work together; and
3. recognising where our interests conflict - and trying to find ways to minimise those conflicts or, at least, mediate or arbitrate them, or disagree about them short of war.

In pursuing the above, the beginning of wisdom is recognising that Russia (like China and Iran) is an imperial and hegemonic power, with whom we will usually, if not always, have problems.  Russia - again, like China and Iran - will never be a 'normal country'.  Always maintaining a realistic perspective and only very modest expectations would help mitigate the swings and roundabouts of Western relations with the Russians, that seem to, always, be incapable of being anything other than the breathtakingly naïve or the irresponsibly bellicose, resulting in either unwise concessions or fevered hawkishness.

In saying this, yes, ideology does play a role here.  There will be revisionist powers that, ideologically, care only about extending their interests in respect of (1) and who do not care about (2) and (3). There will be, at times, adversaries with contempt for agreements and treaties, and no respect for concepts of legitimacy.  There may even be times for actions short of war.

However, if one's issue is that a revision is being sort by a nation-state, the first order question that is worth asking is, 'What actually is being revised?'  One should bear in mind with old countries, especially those that are great powers, or have been great powers and wish to be so again, is that they have long memories.  I am not usually given to quoting Edmund Burke but one must remember that not only do your adversaries get a vote in what the international order looks like, but their dead and as yet unborn, will, through the living, get a vote, too.  Not everyone lives in the now - and not everyone is historically illiterate - even if the West, too often is, sadly, both.  What if what you consider to be unable to be resolved without war, actually can be by diplomacy?  Where is the shame in discussions and negotiations?  And, if ideological powers during both war and peace could nonetheless still participate in the international order in the 20th century, and be negotiated with - on subjects from nuclear weapons to trade to space - then surely we should try this, also, now, rather than contribute to circumstances that may lead to future wars of unspeakable brutality and human tragedy?

By nature and intellectual inclination, I favour my own country, Australia, and our Western allies, having very large military establishments and enduring defence industrial bases, sufficient to deter aggressors and secure necessary interests - but which are used sparingly.  In other words, I may be a 'militarist' but I am most certainly no warmonger.  Resort to war should be the very last tool of statecraft - and war, once commenced, must be pursued, quickly and ruthlessly, with overwhelming force, to achieve a victory settlement that will ensure a long peace. Unless one is fully prepared to wage war, speedily and relentlessly - and, realistically, your reluctance to do so should almost always be the case - then our practice should be to engage in vigorous diplomacy, including diplomacy to avert wars by engaging in sensible and practical negotiation and compromise, by joining with allies in dialogue with adversaries. The effluxion of time by patient and calm reasoning may also see new generations come to power in adversaries, who may yet see matters differently.  In any event, it seems stupid not to first try such an approach, with a velvet glove overlaying any mailed fist.  

As Thucydides said in his magisterial history of the Peloponnesian War, "Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most."