GEOPOLITICS-FAITHS-HISTORY-WAR
Proverbs 24:5-6
A wise man is mightier than a strong man,
and a man of knowledge than he who has strength;
for by wise guidance you can wage your war,
and in abundance of counselors there is victory.
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Af-Raq ~ Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria: How We Got Here & Why Australia Fights
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) spent almost 13 years deployed in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, for the official purposes of defeating Islamist terrorists and assisting local Afghani and Iraqi efforts at democratic state building, which included training their military and security forces.
Since 2001, Australia's armed forces have fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (what I term "Af-raq Wars") alongside its closest allies and friends, the United States, Britain, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, as well as various NATO partners.
In these numerically small, if at times intense, conflicts, Australia lost over 40 killed and over 260 wounded, while spending billions of dollars, in wars that lasted from 2001 until very recently.
Now, Australia is deploying a task group to Iraq.
Iraq, Syria & How We Got Here
On the 18th of December 2011, the last US troops left Iraq. Australia had progressively withdrawn its ADF elements from Iraq in the years prior, as had the British and other allies. That was supposed to be "it" for allied expeditionary warfare in the Middle East. As former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said in 2011, the proponent of any future deployment of land forces to Asia or the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined”.
Yet here we are in 2014, with a renewed deployment of Australian forces to Iraq in support of an Iraqi Government that Australia had spent years assisting with not just our own armed forces but with Australian trainers of Iraq's armed and security forces.
The "why" for the ADF's current Iraq deployment is, prima facie, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) insurgency through Syria and now into Iraq. The Sunni jihadi IS movement occupies an ever larger part of Syria and now Iraq with every passing day, as it seeks to establish its "caliphate" and to kill or at least expel any Kurds, Shia, Christians, Yazidis or less zealous Sunnis that it finds in its way. (IS' fighting strength now also includes a large but imprecise number of nominal Australian citizens whose post-war residential intentions occupy the thoughts of Australia's security services). Despite the decade-plus efforts of the allied coalition in Iraq, what remains of that country now resembles a cross between the former Ottoman vilayets and a 'Mad Max' world albeit augmented by digital technologies. Some Sunni Arabs - who had historically lost most to the Ottomans' brutalisation and who had never had a protector of the sort the Shia had in the Shah's Iran – now flock to IS for protection, as well as to create a "caliphate" that would realise the salafist dream.
For most of 2014, while Syria fell further apart, the US, still recovering from the Iraq war it ended in 2011, hedged its position on what, if anything, was to be done about the Syrian civil war and the IS insurgency that it has given rise to.
The US – and much of the West – did not approve of what Syria's President Assad (an Iranian proxy, like his father before him) was doing in Syria. However insofar as Assad was fighting a Sunni insurgency with more than a layer of salafist jihadism, Syria was not a fight that readily offered a team for the West to back. Moreover, no one wanted another Iraq-style intervention, least of all President Obama who had campaigned on his early opposition to the Iraq War and his promise to never allow such a war to occur while he was in office. Intervention in Syria by the Western powers, led by the US, offered only possible downsides and, indeed, potential 'blowback'.
The "Free Syria Army" proffered by many concerned onlookers (and a host of Sunni Arab states) as a middle way for respectable Western assistance to ensure a favourable outcome in Syria by backing a non-Assad party, was, as Obama put it, a "fantasy" which had no real hope of toppling Assad. (While Obama's position has changed dramatically on the FSA, it is unclear why a militia that was a fantasy in August is now a valued ally in September. As Obama observed of the FSA "There’s not as much capacity as you would hope." Given that the US and coalition partners like Australia and the UK spent the better part of a decade training the Iraqi Army, only to see it melt away, one must wonder what realistic hope there is for the FSA's fighting efficiency.)
Given the rise of IS, it was incomprehensible that someone usually as deliberate as President Obama could say "we don't have a strategy yet" in early September about an IS threat arising from the Syrian civil war that had been the subject of enormous news and presumably internal government discussions for many years. Obama was also being unfair to himself – he did have a strategy. Obama's strategy was a classic Western one of "offshore balancing": the US would keep a watching brief on Syria but otherwise leave IS to Iran, the regional hegemon, and Iran's local proxies in the form of the Assad regime (supported by Iranian-backed Hezbollah) and the Iraqi Government (also supported and advised by Iran).
The Obama strategy for Syria was, therefore, classic realpolitik of a kind instantly recognisable to generations past: the West would live with, indeed support, an Iranian "Shiastan" that at least contained IS. Therefore, the West's strategy was effectively in the hands of the Iranian regime and more particularly in the hands of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Qasem Soleimani, who had been running Iran's 'advisory' missions in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. That Syria strategy, workable until now, foundered upon the failure of the Iraqi Army to halt the spread of ISIS' advance through Iraq and to Baghdad's approaches.
Fast forward to today, President Obama, now apprised of the real threat of IS, and clearly lacking confidence in Iran's capacity to bolster the Iraqi Government to deal with IS, has decided to provide decisive US military assistance to Iraqi and Kurdish governments. The Obama administration's response was slow but, as events moved quickly, so too did the Obama team, which has now responded in force, for which it should be given some credit, and now allied airstrikes are being made on IS targets.
So far as Australia is concerned, the Abbott Government remains, in public at least, determined to mount new operations in the Iraq theatre only, which already include Australian aircraft transporting arms and supplies to the Kurds fighting IS. The Australian contribution of Special Forces and Super Hornets is for striking targets in Iraq only (while perhaps Syria though this mission is only conjecture at this stage). The Labor opposition has been supportive of an Australian contribution at least so far as Iraq's security needs are concerned.
Nonetheless, the original sin of the 2003 Iraq war looms large over the war against IS, not least because IS' support base is among the very Sunnis who lost most from the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and whose fears of loss drive many Sunnis to support IS. It is difficult to see how IS could have arisen in an Iraq ruled by Saddam, not merely because Saddam's regime gave a certain preference to Sunnis but, also, Saddam did not tolerate theocrats of any kind, especially those purporting to challenge the Baathist regime.
[At the same time, the toppling of Saddam has offered the US and its allies the opportunity to help create an independent Kurdish state, which would likely be another Israel, albeit one abutting Iran, Iraq, Turkey and just south of Russia and its near abroad. Given the few real benefits from the fall of Saddam, the opportunity presented by Kurdistan should not be ignored. But that is a subject for another time.]
None of the current events in Iraq and Syria can be discussed, especially from an Australian perspective, without some reflection on the post-2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, aka the Af-raq Wars.
The Lessons of Recent Not So Splendid Little Wars
The profound lack of allied success in Afghanistan would, ordinarily, deter any further interventions in the Islamic world. Indeed, the Afghanistan war, despite the superficialities of Karzai's departure, seems destined to end in a kind of slow failure that has no Kurdish silver lining. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where most of Afghanistan does not, in the medium term, again return to Taliban control, with only perhaps Kabul (and perhaps Herat and its surrounds) to remain, as they did under Soviet puppet Najibullah regime, the last remaining bastions of foreign occupiers and their proxies. As was the case in 2001, the least worst Afghan future is an Afghanistan that has a Pashtu plurality kept at bay by a Western and Iranian-sponsored 'coalition of the others'.
It is tempting for Australians, especially given current events in Iraq and Syria, as well as the ongoing problems of Afghanistan, to see the Af-raq Wars as utter folly, poorly executed and almost immoral debacles. It is also tempting for some Australians, especially those of a Green and/or Left perspective, to think that a new military effort in Iraq is at best unwise, or more accurately a refusal by Australia to repent of the sins of the last decade, and to embrace a foreign policy that is more 'lawfare' than warfare.
On one view, many Australians would conclude that our 13 years of fighting the "Af-raq Wars" was, in short, a tragic waste of Australian lives and money. On any view, these wars achieved none of their stated results to any extent that could be termed "victory". Given that the US and its allies fought the Af-raq wars without clear objectives, without any real planning and forethought, without sufficient resourcing of the war effort, and, in particular, without anything like the drive and resolution necessary, such a conclusion would otherwise be justified. Such a paltry return on a decade's military investment would usually weigh against Australia ever deploying again in expeditionary wars and, instead, would augur a return to securing only our own island continent, a "Fortress Australia".
Further, the last 13 years' wars were fought in a manner heretical to what may be called, in shorthand, the "Western Way of War": whereby advanced polities use the full weight of their power to destroy - promptly and decisively - an adversary. This way of war involves mobilising the nation's resources for the war effort and directing them speedily and in overwhelming force to compel an enemy's capitulation.
It is no accident that the last wars Australia (and our Anglophone) allies unmistakably won were the two World Wars, the Falklands War and the 1991 Gulf War. In these wars – both total and limited - the respective allied leaderships accepted that these conflicts required the decisive use of force to attain clearly defined objectives, which in turn necessitated the practice of the Western Way of War: deliberate planning, the proper resourcing of the war effort, the building of military coalitions, and, most importantly, the speedy and relentless use of overwhelming force at decisive places and times. To risk descending into military jargon, these wars were notable for their selection and maintenance of aims, as well as their relentless retention of the initiative. Effecting these successful wars was a democratic political class who, put simply, could think strategically and "got" war, either from their deep intellectual training and long professional experience or, more simply, because of the personal vicissitudes of a real life lived in interesting times (... worldviews not formed by years of lobbying, political staffing or base electioneering.)
Instead of Western nations playing to their strengths and pursuing war-making in accordance with proven experience, Australia and her allies instead spent 13 years in bloody but meandering and ultimately hopeless Afghan and Iraq wars. When the Western coalition was faced with a strategic choice between (1) either a minimalist "offshore balancing" strategy of supporting chosen allies/proxies and occasionally intervening to support them (aka backing a hegemon) or (2) following the Western Way of War and using its own overwhelming force, the Western allies chose, disastrously, a third option of making war indecisively in very distant Islamic territories, where local and foreign insurgents and their allies would always retain both the more zealous interest and the strategic patience to wait out - if not exhaust - polities like ours.
The half-hearted war effort of Australia and her allies was made worse by possibly the least wise and least experienced political leaders of the West's recent history, as well as an allied military leadership that failed across coalition nations to advise their national political leaders, with required candours, that their goals and dreams were patently unrealistic.
The degree of Australian and allied confusion of what to do in the Af-raq theatres of war was best reflected by Western militaries' fostering the growth of, and then accepting, the very fashionable "Counter-Insurgency" (COIN) doctrine. While superficially attractive as a 21st century form of Lawrence Arabia's native romanticism, COIN was the very form of intra-societal warfare to which 21st century, affluent, English-speaking societies were - and are - least adept at engaging in. As a war-fighting doctrine for a democratic and technologically obsessed first world country like Australia, COIN has about as much practical application as Maoist people's war or Putin 'special war'.
Why Australia (nonetheless) Fights
However, despite the almost breathtakingly incompetent prosecution of the Af-raq wars, and while Australia has suffered deaths, wounded and expended large amounts of money fighting them, it would be wrong to see these wars only as military disasters, when Australia has derived some real benefits from its recent wars. Yes, these disastrous post-2001 conflicts yielded good results. And these recent wars explain also, why Australia (nonetheless) fights in coalition wars and why Australia will, in future, again ally itself with the US in similar contingencies to the current Iraq deployment.
First, Australia, by virtue of its geopolitical realities, needs strong allies and as a result of the Af-raq wars, Australia's military alliances with the US and its other allies have never been closer than they are now. It must be recalled that Australia's involvement in the "Af-raq" wars was never - ever - only about killing jihadists, destroying their bases of terrorist support, finding WMD or bringing the blessings of liberal democracy to huddled masses yearning to be free. To be sure, these were Australian Government objectives, pursued sincerely even if most unwisely. However, at the same time, each of the Howard, Rudd, Gillard and Abbott governments affirmed that Australian forces were deployed to support key allies (especially the US), and to prop up NATO (aka "No Action Talk Only"). In essence, Australians fought in far off places to ensure the vitality of alliances that matter to the security of Australia's own neighbourhood. Australia has always done this and Australia will always do this.
As anyone familiar with Australian military history knows, our armed forces have been used since colonial times to support, first, the Pax Britannica and, now, the Pax Americana, both of which superpower hegemonies are demonstrably in Australia's interests. Hegemony maintenance, like any maintenance, involves expense, risk, and, regrettably, it costs blood and treasure. However, as geopolitics and fallen human nature will always produce hegemons and hegemonic alliances, it is in Australia's interest as a sovereign constitutional democracy to ally ourselves with 'great and powerful friends' like the UK and the US that share Australia's interests and our values. Alliances, like any friendship, require work, especially messy and costly work like wars.
Moreover, Australia is an enormous island continent of only 23 million people located in a perpetually troubled region. As the famous British strategist Sir Eyre Crowe said in 1907 of British policy applies also to Australia in 2014: the "immutable conditions of [our] geographical situation" determine our national strategy. The very facts of our massive island, our wealthy but still small population, and our turbulent neighbourhood demand not just a potent ADF but also that Australia has the closest possible military relationship with the dominant friendly sea and air powers.
Those who question, naively, the morality of Australia supporting a continued American military primacy should be made to nominate their preferred alternative hegemon. China or Russia anyone?
Second, while the "Af-raq" wars were, as noted, plagued by strategic and operational flaws, these wars provided the ADF with invaluable war experience. Let there be no misunderstanding: the ADF is raised, equipped and maintained for war. Preparing for and fighting wars is the ADF's raison d'être. The ADF is composed entirely of volunteers, each of who knows he or she may be sent in harm’s way. War is a deadly trade - but like any trade, a skilled unpractised is a skill that will soon atrophy.
The Af-raq Wars have been excellent experience for the ADF, even if political correctness prevents this from ever being acknowledged openly by the service chiefs. The recent wars have been valuable experience which would have otherwise been denied to a provincial, stay-at-home ADF. One need not dwell for long on the history of, say, Rome, Spain and Britain – or indeed the modern United States - to see that regular war experience maintained the fighting skills, efficiencies and resilience of their fleets and armies. One need not dwell, either, on the fragile state of the ADF in the run-up to the East Timor intervention in 1999, where the bitter fruits of post-Vietnam military isolationism was an ADF reliant on improvisation and foreign assistance to conduct an operation only 700km from Darwin. If, as the conquistador Hernan Cortes warned, "valour loves not idleness", neither do less romantic but vital necessities like strategic depth and operational readiness appreciate decades of parsimonious Defence budgets, inadequate training and a denuding of the very Reserves that are drawn on in wartime. Indeed, the ADF's shallow bench meant that both regular and reserve personnel often had multiple Afghan and Iraq deployments in harm's way, the baneful results of which are only now becoming clear in the large numbers of veterans with wounds not just physical but mental as well.
Stating that Af-raq wars were good experience does not, in any way, ignore the moral requirement for satisfying “Just War” criteria. Nor does it ignore or explain away the very real cost to Australia of the deaths and wounds inflicted on our brave troops. However, one’s just war criteria is rather narrow if the killing and capturing of jihadists (whether of the Al Qaeda, Taliban or IS variety), sworn to destroy 'infidels' such as Australians, is considered illicit. The only real question arising from Af-raq is whether, in fact, Australia could have done more as part of the allied coalition, especially when compared to the enormous effort made by Canada in Afghanistan.
On a more human level, the last 13 years’ continuous operations has ensured the ADF now has many battle-hardened junior and middle-ranking leaders who will be tomorrow's senior commanders and NCOs. More importantly, on a cultural level, the last 13 years' continuous operations have trained these leaders to be impatient with red-tape, inertia and mediocrity. As the Israeli legend General Moshe Dayan said of military leadership, in words that should be engraved in large, bold type at all military headquarters, "We must prepare ourselves morally and physically to endure a protracted struggle, not to draw up a timetable for the achievement of 'rest and peace'". Indeed.
In sum, while the Af-raq wars were on one view "Operation Infinite Cluster", there were significant benefits for Australia and its armed forces from what may, at this time, only be seen as not just stupid but immoral wars. Reasonable Australians aware of our true strategic position should acknowledge not just the Af-raq wars' blunders and conceits, but, also, the benefits that have also accrued to Australia from our military perseverance. We have developed even more intimate alliances with the US and other allies, as well as exposed our armed forces to the realities of modern warfare and our service members to war experiences that, while inevitably hazardous, will only benefit the Australian profession of arms. Given the neighbourhood in which Australia lives, these are strategic gains of significant importance.
Australia's Renewed Iraq War
At root of Australia's involvement in the Af-raq wars - and now the renewed Iraq war against IS - is that, put succinctly, what was true of Thucydides' Athenians is also true of 21st century Australians: we are motivated by self-interest, security and honour in our statecraft. All three motives drive us to have armed forces and security alliances that can preserve our national sovereignty and freedom.
The world 'as it is' will always impose contrary and sometimes hostile disciplines upon us.
The world "as it is" will always have greater, medium and lesser powers with differing and conflicting interests.
The combustible interplay of Australia's inescapable realities will always result in rivalries, conflicts, upheavals, wars and insurgencies, which Australia cannot wish away but must be prepared to deal with, if necessarily forcefully.
Accordingly, the real nature of our strategic position means that Australia will always require military alliances with great and friendly powers, and we will always require an ADF that is prepared and ready for modern war to defend Australia and its interests. And if our participation in the disastrous Af-raq wars has paradoxically made Australia more secure by virtue of ever closer great power alliances and by ensuring an ADF that is even more experienced and potent, then, no matter how well camouflaged these blessings conferred on us by the Af-raq wars are, we should not just note them but, indeed, be thankful for them.
These realities of our strategic position and our military requirements are why we now, also, contribute to a renewed US-led expeditionary war against IS in Iraq (and perhaps Syria). No nation, even an island continent like Australia, is really an island. And in the great game of realpolitik, there is no benefit to Australia in seeing the Middle East's fragile arrangements come asunder because of IS' march and there is no harm done by – and indeed many benefits arise from – Australia supporting our US ally in stopping IS. Additionally, and not unimportantly, using military force to defeat IS is the right and responsible thing to do.
Finally, Australia is a very rich and strong nation but we live in a neighbourhood where we need our great and powerful friends. We are also a nation that honours its word and which stands by its friends. And when push comes to shove, real friends help their friends, whether in Afghanistan or in Iraq... or in places closer to home. It has been ever thus and will be ever thus.
Thursday, July 10, 2014
Robert Kaplan's "In Defense of Empire"
This piece by Stratfor's Robert Kaplan is well worth your reading and makes many valid points, especially on what a 21st US hegemony will looks like. A key takeaway is here:
Ancient empires such as Rome, Achaemenid Persia, Mauryan India, and Han China may have been cruel beyond measure, but they were less cruel and delivered more predictability for the average person than did anything beyond their borders. Who says imperialism is necessarily reactionary? Athens, Rome, Venice, and Great Britain were the most enlightened regimes of their day. True, imperialism has often been driven by the pursuit of riches, but that pursuit has in many cases resulted in a hard-earned cosmopolitanism. The early modern empires of Hapsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey were well known for their relative tolerance and protection of minorities, including the Jews. Precisely because the Hapsburg imperialists governed a mélange of ethnic and religious groups stretching from the edge of the Swiss Alps to central Romania, and from the Polish Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, they abjured ethnic nationalism and sought a universalism almost postmodern in its design. What followed the Hapsburgs were mono-ethnic states and quasi-democracies that persecuted minorities and helped ease the path of Nazism.
The main problem with empire is not just, as Kaplan points out, that empire is seen as undemocratic, coercive and suppressive of local aspirations, but that, in some respects much worse, great powers in 2014 are just not interested, even if they were otherwise capable, in being foreign administrators and foreign legionaries. It is not any lack of power holding back the desire to conquer, annex or otherwise direct the affairs of others but, rather, a disinterest in making others burdens one's own. The rebirth of prudence and consciousness of limits is to be contrasted with some of the more exuberant rhetoric that accompanied the US and Western ambitions for Afghanistan and Iraq.
The lack of great power interest in oppressing and exploiting people in weak, failed but valuable places is in some ways reflected more benignly by the lack of great power interest in even trying to help those in failed states such as, for example, Syria and Iraq. This is not to underestimate the effect of "War Fatigue" on western polities, especially in respect of any supposed humanitarian crises in the Arab world which seems to know nothing but humanitarian disasters that protagonists are only to keen to make problems for outside problems.
In any event, this salient lack of great power interest in empire, imperialism and formal annexations is augmented by the unsuitability of modern great powers, especially the United States, in supplying a governing class. This was a problem with the whole US-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Where the Romans, the Spanish, the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the British, the French and even the Dutch had classes of imperial administrator, the whole concept now is impossible to conceive of, as contra the spirit of our times. Who in the modern civil societies of any NATO power could be looked to or relied on to bring order to and then rule over a disparate territory in a largely fair and non-corrupt manner? The US and its NATO allies are, culturally and temperamentally, unlikely to now produce such proconsuls, pro-praetors and garrisons. In more simple terms, young Westerners do not aspire to rule the world as their forebears may once have done.
Saying all this may reflect 'progress' in the Whig sense but what then of those parts of the world persistently stuck in conflict, without hope of peace or prosperity, in the absence of some foreign, largely benevolent, outside power? As Kaplan says:
Rome, Parthia, and Hapsburg Austria were great precisely because they gave significant parts of the world a modicum of imperial order that they would not otherwise have enjoyed.
Who or what power is to undertake this still relevant task today? A good question, posed regularly by horrific events over the last two decades, to which no satisfactory answer has been provided.
Ancient empires such as Rome, Achaemenid Persia, Mauryan India, and Han China may have been cruel beyond measure, but they were less cruel and delivered more predictability for the average person than did anything beyond their borders. Who says imperialism is necessarily reactionary? Athens, Rome, Venice, and Great Britain were the most enlightened regimes of their day. True, imperialism has often been driven by the pursuit of riches, but that pursuit has in many cases resulted in a hard-earned cosmopolitanism. The early modern empires of Hapsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey were well known for their relative tolerance and protection of minorities, including the Jews. Precisely because the Hapsburg imperialists governed a mélange of ethnic and religious groups stretching from the edge of the Swiss Alps to central Romania, and from the Polish Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, they abjured ethnic nationalism and sought a universalism almost postmodern in its design. What followed the Hapsburgs were mono-ethnic states and quasi-democracies that persecuted minorities and helped ease the path of Nazism.
The main problem with empire is not just, as Kaplan points out, that empire is seen as undemocratic, coercive and suppressive of local aspirations, but that, in some respects much worse, great powers in 2014 are just not interested, even if they were otherwise capable, in being foreign administrators and foreign legionaries. It is not any lack of power holding back the desire to conquer, annex or otherwise direct the affairs of others but, rather, a disinterest in making others burdens one's own. The rebirth of prudence and consciousness of limits is to be contrasted with some of the more exuberant rhetoric that accompanied the US and Western ambitions for Afghanistan and Iraq.
The lack of great power interest in oppressing and exploiting people in weak, failed but valuable places is in some ways reflected more benignly by the lack of great power interest in even trying to help those in failed states such as, for example, Syria and Iraq. This is not to underestimate the effect of "War Fatigue" on western polities, especially in respect of any supposed humanitarian crises in the Arab world which seems to know nothing but humanitarian disasters that protagonists are only to keen to make problems for outside problems.
In any event, this salient lack of great power interest in empire, imperialism and formal annexations is augmented by the unsuitability of modern great powers, especially the United States, in supplying a governing class. This was a problem with the whole US-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Where the Romans, the Spanish, the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the British, the French and even the Dutch had classes of imperial administrator, the whole concept now is impossible to conceive of, as contra the spirit of our times. Who in the modern civil societies of any NATO power could be looked to or relied on to bring order to and then rule over a disparate territory in a largely fair and non-corrupt manner? The US and its NATO allies are, culturally and temperamentally, unlikely to now produce such proconsuls, pro-praetors and garrisons. In more simple terms, young Westerners do not aspire to rule the world as their forebears may once have done.
Saying all this may reflect 'progress' in the Whig sense but what then of those parts of the world persistently stuck in conflict, without hope of peace or prosperity, in the absence of some foreign, largely benevolent, outside power? As Kaplan says:
Rome, Parthia, and Hapsburg Austria were great precisely because they gave significant parts of the world a modicum of imperial order that they would not otherwise have enjoyed.
Who or what power is to undertake this still relevant task today? A good question, posed regularly by horrific events over the last two decades, to which no satisfactory answer has been provided.
Blogging Indolence
I have been busy with my daily trade but look to return to blogging with more regularity as soon as I can.
I have a Twitter account at which you can follow me: @GrayConnolly
At my Twitter account, you can receive your fix of "Daily Gray" on all matters of war, peace, religion, geopolitics, history, upheavals, rebellions, insurgencies, repressions and reaction. I hope I have captured some of the colour and movement of my tweeting.
I have a Twitter account at which you can follow me: @GrayConnolly
At my Twitter account, you can receive your fix of "Daily Gray" on all matters of war, peace, religion, geopolitics, history, upheavals, rebellions, insurgencies, repressions and reaction. I hope I have captured some of the colour and movement of my tweeting.
My conservative apologia pro Malcolm Turnbull
One of my rare forays into Australian domestic politics here, where I consider the position of Malcolm Turnbull, the former Liberal leader. I was surprised by the positive response I received from many fellow conservatives. Australian politics is in a curious position at present.
Monday, August 26, 2013
The Syrian Mess
Edward Luttwak has an, as usual, persuasive article in the New York Times warning President Obama about the hazards of involving the United States and its allies in the Syrian mess. Luttwak's contrarian article comes at a time when there is renewed debate on whether Syria's civil war is now worthy of Western intervention because of the use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). On 21 August, a WMD was used in an attack on a Damascus suburb, killing at least 100 people. Certainly, at time of writing, it seems undisputed that there was use in Syria of a chemical weapon - what one Obama aide said was "very little doubt". The question posed by recent events is the perennial one where an event occurs for which previous policy was not designed: so what?
The "so what?" of Syria is the so what of the intractable, sectarian civil war between the Assad Regime (backed by Russia and Iran and assisted by Shia Iraq) and the Rebels (backed by the Saudis and the Gulf states ... and probably elements of local Al Qaeda). In short, it is a war between Syria's Alawites and their great power patrons, and the Sunni majority and their Sunni sponsors fearful of the Sunni position after defeats in Iraq, Lebanon and now possibly Syria. While the Rebels are backed by Sunnis usually found on the US side, there are enough unsavoury jihadi elements on the Sunni side to make all but the most feverish neo-conservative reluctant to intervene. However, now WMD have been used and many are screaming "something must be done".
It has long been the case, well before President Obama, that use of WMD was indeed a red line for the United States. At the time of the First Gulf War in 1990-1991, the US Secretary of State James A. Baker III warned Saddam's Iraq that any use by Saddam of WMD would invite a response of "vengeance" by the United States. It was certainly the case that WMD proliferation at the end of the Cold War was an issue that occupied the minds of all Western governments of all persuasions and at the highest levels. During the 1990s and 2000s major efforts were made to counter the proliferation of WMD and by the time of the Iraq War in 2003, stopping proliferation was a stated war aim despite the catastrophic failure to find any WMD in Iraq. The creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003 reflected the long-standing concerns of not just the United States but of many of its closest allies that WMDs be the subject of aggressive counter-proliferation efforts, particularly given the efforts of Iran and North Korea to expand the number of countries with access to WMD. Given this history and the recent rhetoric of President Obama, one would expect that something would be done. It may be that, in the next few days, through sea and air launched strikes on Syrian targets, that some of Syria's WMD stocks and facilities will be destroyed and the capacity to repeat such horrific attacks eliminated or at least reduced. There is much merit to such a series of strikes against whatever Syrian WMD targets there are that can be destroyed or damaged and it is President Obama's duty to ensure such strikes are launched swiftly, especially as intelligence on targets is likely to be perishable. However such strikes will leave Assad's regime in place and, having survived NATO strikes, it is likely that Assad will claim some propaganda victory from the rubble of whatever is destroyed in his part of Syria.
Yet, for President Obama, who won election in 2008 on ending the Iraq War and re-election in 2012 on ending the Afghan war, he can have no appetite for further adventures in the Middle East. This is especially so in terms of the humanitarian intervention being urged upon President Obama by liberals and neoconservatives such as John McCain which do not call for "boots on the ground" but do disingenuously call for a Western training of Syria's Rebel armies. Given the way that many foreign interventions start with military training teams and advisors, this should give President Obama pause for thought. For all of the rhetoric of "something must be done", Barack Obama knows full well that all of the current liberal and neo-conservative enthusiasm for intervention will count for nothing when the first NATO soldier is killed by an IED or the first NATO armoured vehicle is destroyed by an Iranian EFP. After almost 12 years of constant war in Afghanistan and Iraq, an intervention in Syria - where Iranian and Russian forces would be assisting the Assad regime to survive - would be costly in Western blood and treasure, especially given the Alawites would be fighting for their very survival against the Sunni majority Rebels. And for what objective would such an intervention be for? There is no evidence that any intervention currently contemplated would serve a serious counter-proliferation objective. All that would occur is that Western forces would, again, be hostages to fortune and, especially, to being caught in a conflict between Iranian and Saudi ambitions in the Middle East. One would have thought that one Iraq War debacle is enough without starting a sequel 10 years later.
Finally, there is the Russians. Russia has long had a port facility at Tartus on the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Russia intends to keep this facility. There may be a necessity to soon seek to check Russian ambitions but Syria is not the place and now is not the time. Russia does not agonise over events in Syria. In the last 25 years, Russia has gone from a superpower to a Weimar republic to a now resurgent continental power. Russia's facility at Tartus is not new and does not alter the balance of power. Yet any fall of Assad would call into question the status of Tartus. For Russia this may be reason enough to continue to prop up Assad. In any case, Russia's long standing patronage of Syria cannot be ignored and Russia's facilities and military personnel in Syria must be taken into account in any decision by NATO to intervene there.
In short, Syria is a mess. A sectarian mess fueled also by regional power rivalries. It is a mess best avoided unless it is absolutely necessary to get involved in. The case for NATO involvements has not been made and, given the unavoidable and unpleasant facts of the Syrian mess, no case for western intervention can realistically be made, at least not at this time. Syria is a mess. But it is not our mess.
The "so what?" of Syria is the so what of the intractable, sectarian civil war between the Assad Regime (backed by Russia and Iran and assisted by Shia Iraq) and the Rebels (backed by the Saudis and the Gulf states ... and probably elements of local Al Qaeda). In short, it is a war between Syria's Alawites and their great power patrons, and the Sunni majority and their Sunni sponsors fearful of the Sunni position after defeats in Iraq, Lebanon and now possibly Syria. While the Rebels are backed by Sunnis usually found on the US side, there are enough unsavoury jihadi elements on the Sunni side to make all but the most feverish neo-conservative reluctant to intervene. However, now WMD have been used and many are screaming "something must be done".
It has long been the case, well before President Obama, that use of WMD was indeed a red line for the United States. At the time of the First Gulf War in 1990-1991, the US Secretary of State James A. Baker III warned Saddam's Iraq that any use by Saddam of WMD would invite a response of "vengeance" by the United States. It was certainly the case that WMD proliferation at the end of the Cold War was an issue that occupied the minds of all Western governments of all persuasions and at the highest levels. During the 1990s and 2000s major efforts were made to counter the proliferation of WMD and by the time of the Iraq War in 2003, stopping proliferation was a stated war aim despite the catastrophic failure to find any WMD in Iraq. The creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003 reflected the long-standing concerns of not just the United States but of many of its closest allies that WMDs be the subject of aggressive counter-proliferation efforts, particularly given the efforts of Iran and North Korea to expand the number of countries with access to WMD. Given this history and the recent rhetoric of President Obama, one would expect that something would be done. It may be that, in the next few days, through sea and air launched strikes on Syrian targets, that some of Syria's WMD stocks and facilities will be destroyed and the capacity to repeat such horrific attacks eliminated or at least reduced. There is much merit to such a series of strikes against whatever Syrian WMD targets there are that can be destroyed or damaged and it is President Obama's duty to ensure such strikes are launched swiftly, especially as intelligence on targets is likely to be perishable. However such strikes will leave Assad's regime in place and, having survived NATO strikes, it is likely that Assad will claim some propaganda victory from the rubble of whatever is destroyed in his part of Syria.
Yet, for President Obama, who won election in 2008 on ending the Iraq War and re-election in 2012 on ending the Afghan war, he can have no appetite for further adventures in the Middle East. This is especially so in terms of the humanitarian intervention being urged upon President Obama by liberals and neoconservatives such as John McCain which do not call for "boots on the ground" but do disingenuously call for a Western training of Syria's Rebel armies. Given the way that many foreign interventions start with military training teams and advisors, this should give President Obama pause for thought. For all of the rhetoric of "something must be done", Barack Obama knows full well that all of the current liberal and neo-conservative enthusiasm for intervention will count for nothing when the first NATO soldier is killed by an IED or the first NATO armoured vehicle is destroyed by an Iranian EFP. After almost 12 years of constant war in Afghanistan and Iraq, an intervention in Syria - where Iranian and Russian forces would be assisting the Assad regime to survive - would be costly in Western blood and treasure, especially given the Alawites would be fighting for their very survival against the Sunni majority Rebels. And for what objective would such an intervention be for? There is no evidence that any intervention currently contemplated would serve a serious counter-proliferation objective. All that would occur is that Western forces would, again, be hostages to fortune and, especially, to being caught in a conflict between Iranian and Saudi ambitions in the Middle East. One would have thought that one Iraq War debacle is enough without starting a sequel 10 years later.
Finally, there is the Russians. Russia has long had a port facility at Tartus on the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Russia intends to keep this facility. There may be a necessity to soon seek to check Russian ambitions but Syria is not the place and now is not the time. Russia does not agonise over events in Syria. In the last 25 years, Russia has gone from a superpower to a Weimar republic to a now resurgent continental power. Russia's facility at Tartus is not new and does not alter the balance of power. Yet any fall of Assad would call into question the status of Tartus. For Russia this may be reason enough to continue to prop up Assad. In any case, Russia's long standing patronage of Syria cannot be ignored and Russia's facilities and military personnel in Syria must be taken into account in any decision by NATO to intervene there.
In short, Syria is a mess. A sectarian mess fueled also by regional power rivalries. It is a mess best avoided unless it is absolutely necessary to get involved in. The case for NATO involvements has not been made and, given the unavoidable and unpleasant facts of the Syrian mess, no case for western intervention can realistically be made, at least not at this time. Syria is a mess. But it is not our mess.
Sunday, July 29, 2012
American Wars and Foreign Policy - Iraq
This is well worth watching in full, if only because it shows just how limited was the knowledge in the senior echelons of the US Government of Iraq and the realities of the Arab and Islamic world in the period 2002-2003. It is quite shocking to watch as none of the participants seem to feel any responsibility for the "Fiasco" (per Tom Ricks' book) that followed. A classic example of the "mistakes were made" apologia for what was a strategic debacle. Some rationalisation is offered for Saddam's removal on the basis that he ran a horrible regime. Hopefully, as the West considers another Middle East intervention, this time in Syria, some lessons have been learned about the (desperate) need for prudence, an understanding of history, religion and demography, and a realistic appraisal of what transient concerns the West has versus others with more 'to play for'.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
The Egyptian elections and the debacle of a decade
Sadly, stuck behind a paywall, is this excellent summary of the coming Egyptian elections by Greg Sheridan
The past decade has seen Western leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair, ignore the lessons of history, especially those of Woodrow Wilson, and all but abandon the virtues of prudence and realism in their post-9/11 attempt to export western liberal democracy to the Islamic and Arab worlds.
Despite the fact that constitutional democracy, featuring the rule of law and universal suffrage (regardless of gender or race), is only about 50 years old in the West, such facts could not impinge upon the liberal ambition to confer the "blessings of liberty" on populations very different from westerners in religion, language, traditions, and cultural experiences. In particular, the neoconservatives in the US sought to impose democracy by blitzkreig in Iraq, rather than persist with a policy of realpolitik and its balance of power arrangement, which the US had been content to live with in the Gulf. The fact that Iraqis proved stubbornly resistant to operating as liberal self-interested citizens - rather than as Arab tribesmen, Muslims and Iraqis - did not seem to dampen the neocon enthusiasm for further 'liberation by laser guided bomb' operations in Libya last year. As in Iraq, no thought was given in any western capital to who or what would succeed Gaddafi. No friendly Middle East strongman or tyrant - even if supportive of the rights of women and Christians - could be supported lest the application of Jeffersonian principles be diluted.
Sadly, President Obama, who in 2008-2009 had seemed an enthusiast for the realism of President Bush senior, adopted a policy of "leading from behind", whereby the US would support the British and French aiding of Libya's rebels to compel Gaddafi's fall and a new transitional regime to be succeeded by who-knows-what. The desire to "do something" overcame what many considered to be Barack Obama's great advantage over his predecessor: a reluctance for further conflicts, an awareness of religious and cultural differences, and an appreciation that the US may have permanent interests that transcend momentary desires for liberal triumphalism. Sadly, President Obama, too, has contributed to the West's debacle of a decade.
All this said, what happens in Egypt over the next month, as it faces its presidential election, may also hopefully be the final chapter in the modern West's idiotic desire to make every nation and every culture fit the straitjacket of western liberalism. That is because while democracy etc may be a worthy concept, Egypt is too big and too important to fall into 'enemy hands'. If the ghost of Iran in the late 1970s, where the friendly Shah fell and was replaced by the Ayatollahs, does not hover over these times then one is not looking closely enough. Certainly President Obama, anxious to avoid the fate of President Carter, will be watching events there very closely.
An Egyptian leader with Muslim Brotherhood loyalties - or an Egyptian military strongman reliant on Islamist assistance - would be the worst possible scenario. It would be bad for Egyptian Christians and for women. However, more broadly, it would mean that the West, Japan and China faced a strategic reality whereby both of the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal would be threatened by unfriendly powers. The effect of Egyptian unrest, internal chaos or hostility on Western shipping and on imports/exports of goods to and from the Mediterranean and Europe would be severe.
Most tellingly, an Egypt in chaos would result in Israel being effectively surrounded by anarchy: Lebanon to the north, Syria to the north east, Egypt to the west and the Palestinians in their usual tumult.
What Israeli government could possibly live easily in an Arab neighbourhood in a state of guaranteed civil unrest? What Israeli government would wish to make any sort of peace with regimes liable to be toppled by their own people? What Israeli government could credibly confront these realities and not adopt a 'fortress' mentality.
In statecraft, as in life, the choice is not between the best and worst of worlds but usually between a tolerable status quo and the always present danger of a descent into anarchy. At the end of the 1990s, western intellectuals believed that history had ended. The events of the last decade show that history is alive, well and, if ignored, always ready to stir new conflicts. We in the West have clearly learned nothing so far.
Friday, May 25, 2012
ADF: Attenuated Defence Force
Very good piece in the AFR today on Defence cuts
"The budget this month contained $5.5 billion in cuts over four years, a 10.5 per cent cut that is the biggest in percentage terms since the Korean War drawdown in 1953.
As a proportion of the size of the economy, defence spending is at its lowest level since the eve of World War II in 1938.
One of Australia’s pre-eminent defence analysts, professor Hugh White, said last night the government was “effectively downgrading Australia’s status from a middle power to a small power’’. “The government is free to make judgments about defence spending, but it should level with the Australian public about what it means for Australia’s security and so far it has been dishonest about it,’’ he said."
It is difficult to understand what, if any, thinking drives the Gillard government's thinking on Defence or indeed any aspect of military strategy. It is a well-known matter that as Deputy PM, Julia Gillard sent her former bodyguard to National Security Committee meetings. She is not interested in Defence and, given her background as a union lawyer, it is probably understandable that this is not her natural area of expertise. However she is the Prime Minister and that office requires her to take seriously the Prime Minister's duty to secure the country to the best of his or her ability. The contrast between her and her predecessor Kevin Rudd is a stark one indeed. The 2009 Defence White Paper was Kevin Rudd's great legacy to the ADF and, if implemented, would have resulted in an ADF of the potency and weight last experienced in the Vietnam era. Sadly, Rudd's blueprint has been junked by the Gillard Government and there is simply no replacement force structure concept. The worst aspect is that there is little appetite among Opposition ranks to fight on this issue. While Opposition Leader Tony Abbott is personally well-disposed to the ADF, the rest of the Coalition has no interest or stomach for fighting for a larger and more potent ADF. This is disappointing as whatever else is the role of conservative parties, the raising, training and sustaining of the armed forces is usually one of its major priorities.
The sly junking of the 2009 Defence White Paper reveals one of the fundamental problems faced by the ADF: it has comprehensively failed to develop a broad constituency. Since the end of the Vietnam War and national service in 1972, very few Australians have any personal experience of the armed forces and little knowledge about what they do. Australians are supportive of the ADF and proud of the work done but cannot understand "guns" as easily as "butter". This political reality enables Governments of all persuasions to extract billions of dollars from Defence safe in the knowledge that there will be few protests and that the issues involved and capabilities sacrificed are too complex for the average voter to understand. The depth of recent cuts to Defence would be unthinkable in portfolios like Health and Welfare, which have large, well-organised and mature lobbies ready to pounce on even a small reduction in the rate of spending. Defence has the odd retired senior officer writing a letter to the editor which, in 2012, will probably not be published if something more salacious is in the news.
To prevent such degradation in the future, one remedy is to legislate for a process whereby the ADF's senior commanders must provide annual reports to the Parliament, free of ministerial spin, on the ADF's force structure, manning, capabilities and readiness. In short, each year the ADF's senior commanders would report on what the state of the ADF is, where capability and personnel gaps exist, and what should be done to fill them. Senior commanders could be examined by Parliamentary committees and allowed to freely explain what the state of the ADF was and, if deficient, how to improve it. Then the pressure would be on the Government of the day to accept this advice or reject it.
Clearly the current system - of trusting partisan governments to honestly manage Defence structure in the national interest - has failed and failed miserably.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Australia's Strategy - George Friedman
George Friedman makes very valid points here.
The dilemma that Australia faces in perpetuity is how to secure a continent the size of the United States or the EU with a population smaller than Malaysia.
A valid question is why Australia has never properly considered the maximum exploitation of its continent and resources, aided and fueled by a determined policy to boost population. While the "Big Australia" ideal has been rejected by both PM Gillard and Opposition Leader Abbott, it remains the most logical and sustainable means of ensuring Australia has both economic weight and strategic depth. A Big Australia can better finance itself, secure itself and have influence in both its near abroad and in strategic fora. Unfortunately, as previously noted, Australia has regularly had provincial leaders and lacks any formalised structure for the making of a national strategy to increase the nation's power and influence. Increasing the nation-state's economic and military security is ordinarily a conservative goal and would be a worthy one for Tony Abbott to re-examine.
Monday, May 21, 2012
Afghanistan: Unspeakable Reasons to Stay
As the NATO-ISAF coalition meets in Chicago, the conventional wisdom is that this signals a move by the nations of the ISAF coalition to withdraw.
In Australia’s case, as this blog has said before, since the original commitment was made in 2001, no sustained effort has been made by any of the Howard, Rudd or Gillard governments to explain the Afghanistan commitment in terms readily comprehensible. Australia is not alone here and none of our major coalition partners in Canada, the United Kingdom or even the United States has conducted anything similar to the war information campaigns of the Second World War. Certainly Australia’s Parliament has reflected the, sadly, provincial and limited grasp of our elected representatives of the nation’s true interests. How else can 10 years of almost undebated war be explained?
Unfortunately, Australia has no formal, organised strategic body. We are a nation without a permanent, legislated and professional national security planning committee. Our nation’s grand strategy, beyond certain fundamental interests in regional stability and freedom of the seas, is not set by the nation’s leaders, nor is it guarded by a cohort of wise mandarins. During the 2010 election campaign, it became known that both Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard sent staffers to represent them at the Cabinet’s national security committee meetings, something that would be unthinkable in the United States or the United Kingdom. As a result, because of a lack of structure and a lack of seriousness, wars and military commitments can and do drift along. Afghanistan is not the first example and arguably the East Timor and Solomons’ operations have elements of this though the proximity of these places demands our attention.
Having said all this, even if we have stayed in Afghanistan without a strategic rationale, there are benefits to being ‘over there’ and to us staying there with our American and British allies.
Unspeakable Truth 1: we should only leave with our Allies
Despite the current Australian Parliament being composed by all shades of political opinion, and a minority Labor Government surviving with Greens support, the Afghanistan debate in 2010 reaffirmed a bipartisan consensus on Australia’s commitment: Australian forces are in Afghanistan to prevent it becoming an Al Qaeda sanctuary; to support the United States and key allies such as Britain, Canada and New Zealand; and to train the Afghan security forces to secure their country.
Of these public rationales, however, Australia’s principal strategic reason for being in Afghanistan is to maintain and strengthen the US alliance, with the anti-terrorism campaign an important but secondary priority. While many of the US’ NATO allies will go “wobbly” (per Margaret Thatcher’s phrase), especially as Bin-Laden’s death provides a convenient excuse, Australia entered the Afghanistan war in 2001 alongside the United States (and the United Kingdom) and, realistically, should only leave Afghanistan when the US and the UK are ready to withdraw.
Australia has no strategic interest whatsoever in humiliating the US and the UK by withdrawing on its own and, indeed, it would be an act of strategic folly to do so. The US alliance, as anyone who has served with US Forces knows, provides Australia with a level of strategic support that Australia could not ever build for itself. The US’ professional defence establishment, which sees presidents come and go, remembers very well which of America’s ‘friends’ are friends and which are merely acquaintances. The rapid escalation in the last 10 years of the US and Australia’s already intimate defence relationship is reflective of the US’ perception of Australia as a reliable ally, particularly when other allies hoist the white flag or offer token “civilian advisors” to a war. The same applies in a smaller measure to the old alliance with the UK. For Australia to suddenly decide the future of its Afghan commitment without first examining its effects on the greater alliance relationship, would be a cost benefit analysis done 10 years too late. Those who are against the war for reasons relating to either Christian just war theory and/or the futility of staying in Afghanistan, should at least pause to reflect on Australia's alliances before urging a prompt withdrawal. We might also consider our reputation as a nation that keep its word and whose armed forces carry on the virtues of stoicism, tenacity and grit that it publicly celebrates in its military tradition.
Unspeakable Truth 2: the Afghan war is good experience for the ADF
While it is true that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are strategically flawed, particularly given their dimensions of international social work and “do-gooder” ambition, these conflicts have provided invaluable real-world training benefits to the ADF.
Let there be no misunderstanding: war (and preparing for war) is the business of the armed forces. Australia’s armed forces are composed entirely of volunteers. Each volunteer joins knowing he or she may be sent in harm’s way.
In the quarter of a century from the end of Australia’s Vietnam commitment (1972-1973) to the start of the East Timor campaign (1999-2000), Australia intermittently deployed the Royal Australian Navy to the Persian Gulf, as well as occasionally deployed soldiers in Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda. However, deployments were for the relatively few, with most serving members knowing nothing but exercises, which could only hope to simulate not just war’s fog but its iron application of Murphy’s law. Since 1999, the ADF has made regular deployments to East Timor, the Solomons, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq. These deployments have resulted in improvements in the skills and operational readiness of the armed forces as a whole. The ADF has grown only stronger, harder and more resilient in the past decade.
More importantly, the last 12 years’ continuous operations have created cohorts of experienced leaders in all services. Whether junior sailors in the Middle East, young Diggers in Afghanistan, or the ‘rookie’ airmen supporting them, the young men and women of the last decade’s operations are forming an experienced cohort from which tomorrow’s ADF will draw its future leaders. The wartime crucible in which young men and women are being tested and are forging new skills and military knowledge is an unfashionable but significant benefit to the ADF. This is particularly so in respect of inter-operability between the services and with allied forces, which is denied to a provincial military that stays at home and which does not deploy. Above all, this experience is training junior leaders to be impatient with red-tape, ‘initiative inertia’ and the ‘cannot do’ attitude of the Canberra bureaucracy. While not (yet) regularly deployed in the manner of Rome’s legions, Spain’s Tercios, or Nelson’s fleets, it is the case that the regular operational deployments of the modern ADF has only benefited the force’s skills, depth and robustness.
Stating this does not ignore the difficulty that Afghanistan may have in satisfying “just war” criteria. However, even if one has qualms about the prudence of what is now a war against the Pashtu, one’s just war criteria is rather narrow if the killing and capturing of jihadists, sworn to destroy infidels such as Australians, is considered illicit.
In short, while various western leaders gather in Chicago and make pious pronouncements about the Afghan war and the “Afghan People”, it is well for Australians to pause and remember that their interests are different from Europeans, mired in welfare state penury, who are loudly reviewing their commitments to the Afghanistan mission.
Australia is a Pacific and Indian Ocean nation – we are surrounded by and exposed to these vast expanses of water and territory in which we have vital interests in maintaining a stable and friendly balance of power. These oceans are our moats – and we need our American and British allies to help us secure our realm. We depend on these (and other) allies’ willingness to commit themselves to these and other areas where Australia’s national interests are the most exposed. It is a small matter, realistically, for us to stay with our American and British allies until such time as all of us agree that it is time to withdraw from Afghanistan. Further, by staying, while we run obvious risks to our own forces, we also increasingly up-skill our military and better develop our future leaders in a demanding operational environment.
Australia’s position should be based on our own national interests, which include upholding and maintaining military alliances critical to our security, as well as a cool and unsentimental realism about the true costs and benefits of the Afghan War. We would do ourselves no favours by succumbing now to a conventional wisdom that is irrelevant to Australia’s geopolitical realities and which, if followed into withdrawal now, would only cause us strategic difficulty.
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